2020年10月19日 星期一

新疆與世界--迫害維吾爾族是危害人類罪

 

Xinjiang and the world 新疆與世界

The persecution of the Uyghurs is a crime against humanity 迫害維吾爾族是危害人類罪

It is also the gravest example of a worldwide attack on human rights

這也是全世界侵犯人權的最嚴重案例

The first stories from Xinjiang were hard to believe. Surely the Chinese government was not running a gulag for Muslims? Surely Uyghurs were not being branded “extremists” and locked up simply for praying in public or growing long beards? Yet, as we report in this week’s China section , the evidence of a campaign against the Uyghurs at home and abroad becomes more shocking with each scouring of the satellite evidence, each leak of official documents and each survivor’s pitiful account.

來自新疆的第一個故事令人難以置信。中國政府肯定不是為穆斯林建造古拉格勞改營嗎?維吾爾族人肯定不是只因在公共場合祈禱或留長鬚,而被冠上「極端主義分子」並遭拘禁?然而,正如我們在本周的中國專欄文章的報導,隨著每次細察衛星證據、每次官方文件外洩,和每個倖存者令人憐憫的敘述,在國內外迫害維吾爾族的證據變得更令人震驚。

In 2018 the government pivoted from denying the camps’ existence to calling them “vocational education and training centres”—a kindly effort to help backward people gain marketable skills. The world should instead heed Uyghur victims of China’s coercive indoctrination. Month after month, inmates say, they are drilled to renounce extremism and put their faith in “Xi Jinping Thought” rather than the Koran. One told us that guards ask prisoners if there is a God, and beat those who say there is. And the camps are only part of a vast system of social control.

2018年,中國政府從否認勞改營的存在,到稱其為「職業教育和培訓中心」—一種善意的努力,意在幫助落後的人們,得到市場所需的技能。世界應轉向關注遭中國強制洗腦的維吾爾族受害者。月復一月,囚犯們表示他們被軍方威脅聲明放棄極端主義,並將他們的信仰投向「習近平思想」而不是《古蘭經》。有人告訴我們,警衛詢問囚犯是否有上帝,並毆打說有的人。勞改營只是龐大的社會控制系統的一部分。

China’s 12m Uyghurs are a small, disaffected minority. Their Turkic language is distant from Chinese. They are mostly Muslim. A tiny handful have carried out terrorist attacks, including a bombing in a market in 2014 that left 43 people dead. No terrorist incidents have occurred since 2017: proof, the government says, that tighter security and anti-extremism classes have made Xinjiang safe again. That is one way of putting it. Another is that, rather than catching the violent few, the government has in effect put all Uyghurs into an open-air prison. The aim appears to be to crush the spirit of an entire people.

中國的1,200萬維吾爾族是一個很小、失落的少數民族。他們的突厥語與中文大相徑庭。他們大多是穆斯林,極少數人進行恐怖襲擊,包括2014年市集爆炸造成43人死亡。自2017年以來未再發生恐怖事件:政府表示,這證實戒備森嚴和反極端主義課程,使新疆再次安全。那只是一種說法。另一種說法是,政府不只是抓出少數暴力分子,其實是將所有維吾爾族關進露天監獄。

Even those outside the camps have to attend indoctrination sessions. Any who fail to gush about China’s president risk internment. Families must watch other families, and report suspicious behaviour. New evidence suggests that hundreds of thousands of Uyghur children may have been separated from one or both detained parents. Many of these temporary orphans are in boarding schools, where they are punished for speaking their own language. Party cadres, usually Han Chinese, are stationed in Uyghur homes, a policy known as “becoming kin”.

甚至營地外的人也須參加思想灌輸課程,任何未能滔滔不絕地頌揚中國主席面臨監禁風險,家庭必須監視其他家庭,並舉報可疑行為。新證據顯示,成千上萬維吾爾族兒童可能與一個或皆被拘留的父母分開,許多臨時孤兒都在寄宿學校,在那裡他們會因說自己的語言而受懲。黨的幹部通常是漢族,駐紮到維吾爾族的家中,這一政策被稱為「成為親人」。

Rules against having too many children are strictly enforced on Uyghur women; some are sterilised. Official data show that in two prefectures the Uyghur birth rate fell by more than 60% from 2015 to 2018. Uyghur women are urged to marry Han Chinese men and rewarded if they do with a flat, a job or even a relative being spared the camps. Intimidation extends beyond China’s borders. Because all contact with the outside world is deemed suspect, Uyghurs abroad fear calling home lest they cause a loved one to be arrested, as a harrowing report in 1843, our sister magazine, describes .

禁止有過多小孩的規定對維吾爾族婦女嚴格執行;有些人被結紮。官方數據顯示,從2015年到2018年,兩個地區的維吾爾族出生率減少超過60%。維爾族婦女被鼓勵嫁給漢族男性,實行者可得到一塊平地、一份工作甚至是一個親戚免在勞改營的獎勵。恐嚇延伸到中國境外,由於所有與外界的聯繫都被視為嫌疑犯,國外維吾爾族人害怕打電話回家,唯恐造成摯愛的人被捕,正如我們姊妹雜誌《1843》的悲慘報導所述。

The persecution of the Uyghurs is a crime against humanity: it entails the forced transfer of people, the imprisonment of an identifiable group and the disappearance of individuals. Systematically imposed by a government, it is the most extensive violation in the world today of the principle that individuals have a right to liberty and dignity simply because they are people.

維吾爾人受到迫害是危害人類罪:牽涉到人民被迫遷移,監禁可識別的團體和個體失蹤。政府有系統地加罪於人,這是當今世界上最大規模違反「凡生為人,即享自由和尊嚴的權利」的原則。

China’s ruling party has no truck with this concept of individual rights. It claims legitimacy from its record of providing stability and economic growth to the many. Its appeal to the majority may well command popular support. Accurate polling is all but impossible in a dictatorship, and censorship insulates ordinary Chinese from the truth about their rulers. But many Chinese people clearly do back their government, especially since to object is deemed unpatriotic. Awkward minorities, such as Tibetans and Uyghurs, have no protection in such a system. Unbound by notions of individual rights, the regime has been determined to terrorise them into submission and force them to assimilate into the dominant Han culture.

中國執政黨不與個體權利的概念打交道。它聲稱合法性來自於向許多人提供穩定和經濟成長的記錄,它對多數人的吸引力可能有助命令大眾支持,在獨裁統治下,幾乎不可能進行準確的民意測驗,而審查制度隔絕一般中國人獲得有關他們統治者真相。但是許多中國人顯然支持政府,尤其因為若是反對,會被視為不愛國。藏族和維吾爾族等尷尬的少數民族,在這種制度中沒有保護。沒有個人權利觀念的束縛,中國政權決定恐嚇並使少數民族屈服,迫使他們融入主流的漢族文化。

China lies at the extreme of a worrying trend. Globally, democracy and human rights are in retreat. Although this began before covid-19, 80 countries have regressed since the pandemic began and only Malawi has improved, says Freedom House, a think-tank. Many people, when scared, yearn to be led to safety by a strong ruler. The virus offers governments an excuse to seize emergency powers and ban protests.

中國處於令人擔憂趨勢的極端。全球的民主與人權正在開倒車。智庫自由之家表示,儘管這從新冠疫情前就開始,但自疫病流行來已有80個國家退步,僅馬拉維有所改善。許多人在恐慌時渴望得到堅強的統治者的保護,病毒為政府提供奪取緊急權力和禁止抗議活動的藉口。

Abusive rulers often rally the majority against a minority. India’s prime minister, Narendra Modi, espouses an aggressive Hindu nationalism and treats India’s Muslims as if they were not really citizens. For this, he earns stellar approval ratings. So does Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines, who urges the murder of criminal suspects. Hungary’s prime minister crushes democratic institutions and says his opponents are part of a Jewish plot. Brazil’s president celebrates torture and claims that his foreign critics want to colonise the Amazon. In Thailand the king is turning a constitutional monarchy into an absolute one.

腐敗的統治者常會召集多數對付少數。印度總理莫迪(Narendra Modi)擁護激進的印度教民族主義,對待印度穆斯林像非真正的公民。為此,他贏得亮眼的支持率。菲律賓的杜特蒂(Rodrigo Duterte)也是如此,他呼籲謀殺犯罪的嫌疑人。匈牙利總理粉碎民主體制,並說他的反對者是猶太人陰謀的一部分。巴西總統讚頌酷刑,並聲稱他的外國批評者想要殖民亞馬遜。在泰國,國王正在將君主立憲制轉變為絕對君主制。

How can those who value liberty resist? Human rights are universal, but many associate them with the West. So when the West’s reputation took a battering, after the financial crisis of 2007-08 and the botched war in Iraq, respect for human rights did, too. Although America has imposed targeted sanctions over the Uyghurs, the suspicion that Western preaching was hypocritical has grown under Donald Trump. A transactional president, he has argued that national sovereignty should come first—and not only for America. That suits China just fine. It is working in international forums to redefine human rights as being about subsistence and development, not individual dignity and freedom. This week, along with Russia, it was elected to the un Human Rights Council.

珍視自由的人該如何抵抗?人權是舉世皆然的,但許多人將人權與西方聯想在一起。因此在2007至2008年的金融危機和混亂的伊拉克戰爭後,西方的聲譽受重創,對人權的尊重也隨之沈淪。儘管美國已為維吾爾族實施有針對性的制裁,但在川普的領導下,人們愈來愈懷疑西方的說教是偽善的。一個交易型的總統,這(國家主權至上)在國際論壇上奏效,將人權重新定義為生存和發展,而不是個人尊嚴和自由。本周,中國與俄羅斯雙雙當選為聯合國人權理事會成員。

Start in Xinjiang 從新疆起步

Resistance to the erosion of human rights should begin with the Uyghurs. If liberals say nothing about today’s single worst violation outside a war zone, how can anyone believe their criticism of other, lesser crimes? Activists should expose and document abuse. Writers and artists can say why human dignity is precious. Companies can refuse to collude. There is talk of boycotts—including, even, of the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics.

對人權腐蝕的抵抗應從維吾爾族開始。如果自由派人士對今天在戰區外最嚴重的侵犯事件不發一語,那麼誰還會相信他們對其他次要罪行的批評?積極分子應揭露並記錄濫權行為,作家和藝術家可高談闊論人的尊嚴為什麼珍貴,公司可以拒絕串通。有人談論抵制,甚至包括2022年的北京冬奧。

Ultimately, governments will need to act. They should offer asylum to Uyghurs and, like America, slap targeted sanctions on abusive officials and ban goods made with forced Uyghur labour. They should speak up, too. China’s regime is not impervious to shame. If it were proud of its harsh actions in Xinjiang, it would not try to hide them. Nor would it lean on smaller countries to sign statements endorsing its policies there. As the scale of the horror emerges, its propaganda has grown less effective: 15 majority-Muslim countries that had signed such statements have changed their mind. China’s image has grown darker in many countries in recent years, polls suggest: 86% of Japanese and 85% of Swedes now have an unfavourable view of the country. For a government that seeks to project soft power, this is a worry.

最終,政府將需行動。他們應向維吾爾族提供庇護,並像美國一樣,對濫權官員施加針對性的制裁,並禁止強迫維吾爾族勞動所製造的貨品。他們也應表達意見。政權對羞恥並非無動於衷。假如它為在新疆的暴行感到自豪,就不會試圖隱瞞,也不會威脅小國簽署贊同其政策的聲明。隨著倒行逆施的程度揭露,政府宣傳愈來愈無效:15個曾簽署贊同聲明的穆斯林國家改變主意。近年來,在許多國家,中國的形象愈來愈暗黑。調查顯示,如今86%的日本人和85%的瑞典人對中國觀感不佳。這對尋求塑造軟實力的政府來說是個隱憂。

Some say the West would lose too much by lecturing about human rights—China won’t change, and the acrimony will stymie talks about trade, pandemics and climate change. True, keeping human rights separate from such things is impossible, and China will try to convince other countries that moral candour will cause them economic harm. Nonetheless, liberal democracies have an obligation to call a gulag a gulag. In an age of growing global competition, that is what makes them different. If they fail to stand up for liberal values they should not be surprised if others do not respect them, either.■

有人說,西方訓斥人權問題,將損失太多。—中國不會改變,而這種針鋒相對會阻礙有關貿易、疫情和氣候變化的討論。的確,把人權與這類事情分開不太可能,中國將試圖說服其他國家,道德上的坦誠會導致經濟損害。然而,自由民主國家有義務稱古拉格為古拉格。在全球競爭日益激烈的時代,這是使他們與眾不同的原因。如果他們不能捍衛自由主義的價值觀,那麼即使其他人不尊重它們,也不必感到驚訝。 ■



2020年10月12日 星期一

數位貨幣--螞蟻集團與金融科技的成熟

Digital money 

數位貨幣

Ant Group and fintech come of age 

螞蟻集團與金融科技的成熟

A blockbuster listing shows how fintech is revolutionising finance

轟動的上市計畫顯示金融科技如何徹底革新金融


Leaders

Oct 8th 2020 edition


Oct 8th 2020

In 1300 or so Marco Polo, a Venetian merchant, introduced Europeans to a monetary marvel witnessed in China. The emperor, he wrote, “causes the bark of trees, made into something like paper, to pass for money all over his country”. Eventually the West also adopted paper money, some six centuries after China invented it. More recent foreign travellers to China have come back agog at the next big step for money: the total disappearance of paper, replaced by pixels on phone screens.

公元1300年左右,威尼斯商人馬可·波羅(Marco Polo)向歐洲人介紹在中國目睹的貨幣奇蹟。他寫道,皇帝「使樹皮做成像紙的東西,當作錢幣通行全國」。在中國發明紙幣大約六個世紀之後,西方也終於採用。近期到中國旅行的外籍遊客返國後,也興高采烈談論錢幣演進的下一步:紙幣全部消失,取而代之的是手機螢幕上的像素。

China’s pre-eminence in digital money is likely to be on display in the next few weeks with the monster listing of Ant Group, its largest fintech firm, in Hong Kong and Shanghai. Measured by cash raised, it will probably be the biggest initial public offering in history, beating Saudi Aramco’s last year. Once listed, Ant, which was formed in 2004, could have a similar value to JPMorgan Chase, the world’s biggest bank, which traces its roots to 1799. Ant’s rise worries hawks in the White House and enthralls global investors. It portends a bigger transformation of how the financial system works—not just in China but around the world.

中國在數位貨幣領域的領先地位,可能在未來幾周展現在世人眼前:最大金融科技公司螞蟻集團將在香港和上海隆重上市。以籌資規模計算,這可能擊敗去年沙烏地阿拉伯國家石油公司,成為歷來最大的首次公開發行股票(IPO)案。一旦股票掛牌交易,成立於2004年的螞蟻金服,市值堪比起源於1799年的世界最大銀行摩根大通。螞蟻金服的興起讓白宮鷹派憂心忡忡,全球投資人則興致勃勃。這預吿金融體系運作方式面臨更大的變革----不只在中國,在全世界也是。

Jamie Dimon, JPMorgan’s boss, and others have kept a wary and admiring eye on Ant for years. Spun off from Alibaba, an e-commerce firm, it has over 1bn users, mostly in China, and its payments network carried $16trn of transactions last year, connecting 80m merchants. Payments are just the appetiser. Users can borrow money, choose from 6,000 investment products, and buy health insurance. Imagine if main-street banks, Wall Street’s brokers, Boston’s asset managers and Connecticut’s insurers were all shrunk to fit into a single app designed in Silicon Valley that almost everyone used. Other Chinese firms, notably Tencent, which owns the WeChat app, also operate cutting-edge fintech arms.


摩根大通執行長戴蒙(Jamie Dimon)和其他人對螞蟻金服關注多年,既戒慎又欽佩。螞蟻金服從電商公司阿里巴巴分拆出來,如今擁有超過10億用戶,主要在中國。其支付網路去年交易額達到16兆美元,連結8,000萬個商家。支付只是開胃菜。用戶可以借錢、有6,000種投資商品可供選擇,還能購買健康保險。想像假如主要街道銀行、華爾街券商、波士頓資產管理人和康乃狄克州的保險公司,全縮進一個由矽谷設計、幾乎人人使用的應用程式(App)。其他中國公司,尤其是微信App母公司騰訊,也經營著尖端的金融科技部門。


China is not alone. The pandemic has supercharged activity elsewhere. Alongside the surge in global e-commerce and remote working there has been an accompanying boom in digital payments, which have jumped by 52% at Venmo, an American network, compared with last year, and by 142% at Mercado Pago, a Latin American fintech. Parisian “farmers’ markets, pizza firms and Singaporean hawkers have upgraded their systems so they can be paid instantly without physical contact or cash. Investors sense a tectonic shift, like the one that shook retailing. Conventional banks now account for only 72% of the stockmarket value of the global banking and payments industry, down from 96% in 2010.


不單是中國,疫情也已加速其他地區的活動。伴隨著全球電子商務和遠距工作激增而來的,是數位支付大行其道。美國行動支付網路Venmo的數位支付比去年躍增52%,拉丁美洲金融科技公司Mercado Pago增142%。巴黎的農夫市集、披薩公司和新加坡小販已升級他們的系統,無需碰觸或現金支付就可立即收到付款。投資者感受到一種結構性變革,就像昔日零售業為之震撼一般。傳統銀行現在僅占全球銀行和支付產業股票市值72%,低於2010年的96%。


If the surge in digital finance is universal, the business models behind it are not. In Latin America look out for digital banks and e-commerce pioneers such as Nubank and MercadoLibre, owner of Mercado Pago. In South-East Asia Grab and Gojek, two ride-hailing services, are becoming “super-apps” with financial arms. Fintech firms now provide the majority of consumer loans in Sweden. In America credit-card firms such as Visa (the world’s most valuable financial firm), digital-finance giants such as PayPal (the sixth) and the big banks both co-operate and compete. Tech giants such as Apple and Alphabet are dipping their toes in, tempted by the financial industry’s $1.5trn global pool of profits.


如果數位金融興起是舉世皆然,背後的商業模式則各不相同。在拉丁美洲,要找數位銀行和電商先驅,例如Nubank或Mercado Pago母公司MercadoLibre。東南亞的兩大叫車服務公司Grab和Gojek,已成具有金融部門的「超級App」。瑞典的金融科技公司,如今提供大多數的消費者貸款。美國的信用卡公司(如Visa,全球市值最大金融公司)、數位金融巨頭(如PayPal,第六大),與大型銀行既互相合作又彼此競爭。科技巨頭如蘋果和字母正涉足金融業,爭食全球1.5兆美元的獲利大餅。


There is much to be excited about. At its best, fintech offers big gains in efficiency. If the world’s listed banks cut expenses by a third, the saving would be worth $80 a year for every person on Earth. Ant makes razor-thin margins on payments and takes minutes to grant a loan. Gone are the days of getting gouged by money-changers in airports. Firms such as TransferWise and Airwallex offer exchange services that are cheaper and faster.


有許多事令人激動。最佳情況下,金融科技可大舉提高效率。如果全球的上市銀行削減三分之一開支,那麼省下的錢相當於地球上每人每年多出80美元。螞蟻金服支付業務賺取微薄利潤,核撥貸款只需數分鐘。在機場被貨幣兌換商敲竹槓[叮嚀:「挖苦」擺在這上下文顯得很突兀,可見不是貼切的譯法哦]的日子已成往事。如TransferWise和Airwallex等公司,提供更便宜、快速的換匯服務。


Digitisation also promises to broaden the spread of finance. Reaching customers will be easier and data will make loan underwriting more accurate. Firms like Square and Stripe help small businesses connect to the digital economy. In India and Africa digital finance can free people from dodgy moneylenders and decrepit banks. By creating their own digital currencies, governments may be able to bypass the conventional banking system and tax, take deposits from, and make payments to citizens at the touch of a button. Compare that with the palaver of Uncle Sam posting stimulus cheques this year.


數位化也可望使金融服務更廣而普及[叮嚀:諸如「普惠金融」、「競合」這些詞簡潔漂亮,但未對照原文的讀者,乍看之下可能不知所云,第一次提到時,還是簡述一下為宜。切記譯文三原則「信、達、雅」,信最重要,達排在雅之前]。接觸客戶將更容易,數據也使貸款審核更精確。Square和Stripe等公司幫助小型企業連結數位經濟。在印度和非洲,數位金融可以使人們擺脫狡猾的錢莊和破舊的銀行。創立自家的數位貨幣,讓各國政府只需按個鍵,[這句譯得不知所云哦----“便可繞過傳統的銀行系統和稅務,提取存款並向公民支付”,因為原文拆句有誤]便可直接向公民徵稅、收取存款和撥付款項,繞過傳統銀行體系。相形之下,山姆大叔今年發放振興支票,就顯得曠日費時。


Yet the fintech conquest also brings two risks. The first is that it could destabilise the financial system. Fintech firms swarm to the most profitable parts of the industry, often leaving less profit and most of the risk with traditional lenders. Fully 98% of loans issued through Ant in China ultimately sit on the books of banks, which pay it a fee. Ant is eventually expected to capture a tenth or more of Chinese banking’s profits. Lumbering lenders in the rich world are already crushed by low interest rates, legacy IT systems and huge compliance costs. If they are destabilised it could spell trouble, because banks still perform crucial economic functions, including holding people’s deposits and transforming these short-term liabilities into long-term loans for others.


然而,金融科技征服市場也帶來兩個風險。一是可能擾亂金融體系。金融科技公司湧向產業中最賺錢的部分,往往把較沒利潤的生意和大部分風險留給傳統放款者。經由螞蟻金服在中國發放的貸款當中,有整整98%最後落腳銀行帳簿上,銀行則支付螞蟻一筆費用。[“最後卻成呆帳”譯文出自哪段原文?98%變呆帳,很恐怖!]螞蟻金服最終可望從中國銀行業的獲利抽成十分之一或更多。富國行動遲緩的放款機構已被低利率、老舊的IT系統和龐大的法遵成本壓得喘不過氣來。一旦銀行體系不穩定,可能預告麻煩將至,因為銀行仍然發揮重要的經濟功能,包括持有人民的存款,並將這些短期債務轉化成對他人的長期貸款。


The second danger is that the state and fintech “platform” firms could grab more power from individuals. Network effects are integral to the fintech model—the more people use a platform the more useful it is and likely that others feel drawn to it. So the industry is prone towards monopoly. And if fintech gives even more data to governments and platforms, the potential for surveillance, manipulation and cyber-hacks will rise. In China Ant is a cog in the Communist Party’s apparatus of control—one reason it is often unwelcome abroad. When Facebook, a firm not known for its ethical conduct, launched a digital currency, Libra, last year, it caused a global backlash.


第二個危險是,政府和金融科技「平台」公司可能從個人身上奪取更多權力。網路效應對金融科技經營模式不可或缺—平台使用的人愈多就愈有用,也可能吸引其他人,因此產業易被壟斷。如果金融科技讓政府和平台取得更多數據,則監視、操縱和網路駭客入侵的可能性將增加。在中國,螞蟻集團是共產黨控制機器中的一顆小齒輪,這是它在國外通常不受歡迎的原因。不以道德行為著稱的臉書去年推出數位貨幣Libra時,引發全球強烈反彈。


As the fintech surge continues, governments should take a holistic view of financial risk that includes banks and fintech firms—Chinese regulators rightly snuffed out Ant’s booming business in loan securitisation, which had echoes of the subprime fiasco. Governments should also lower barriers to entry so as to boost competition. Singapore and India have cheap, open, bank-to-bank payment systems which America could learn from. Europe has flexible banking that lets customers switch accounts easily. Last, the rise of fintech must be tied to a renewed effort to protect people’s privacy from giant companies and the state. So long as fintech can be made safer, open and respectful of individual rights, then a monetary innovation led by China will once again change the world for the better.■


隨著金融科技浪潮持續,各國政府應全面檢視金融風險,包括銀行和金融科技公司。中國監管機構制止螞蟻金服蓬勃發展的貸款證券化業務,是正確舉措,畢竟那種業務令人聯想到次貸災難。政府也應降低入行門檻,以促進競爭。新加坡和印度有便宜、開放、銀行對銀行的付款系統,可供美國學習。歐洲擁有靈活的銀行體系,可讓客戶輕易切換帳戶。最後,金融科技的興起必須受一個條件約束:更致力於保護人們的隱私,免受大企業和國家侵害。只要金融科技能更加安全、開放和尊重個人權利,那麼由中國領導的貨幣創新,將再次使世界變得更好。

2020年10月11日 星期日

不死不活的企業--該怎麼處理殭屍企業

 

The corporate undead 不死不活的企業

What to do about zombie firms

該怎麼處理殭屍企業


Without care, measures taken during the pandemic will keep alive firms that ought to be put out of their misery


若不謹慎,疫病流行期間採取的措施,將使本該安樂死的企業苟延殘喘




Leaders

Sep 26th 2020 edition


Sep 26th 2020

For years economists have argued about whether governments and central banks in the rich world have mistakenly prolonged the lives of “zombie firms”. The corporate landscape, it is said, has turned from one filled with red-blooded creatures of creative destruction to a grey zone of the living dead, incapable of innovation or dynamism. Now the debate has new importance. The pandemic could lead governments to prolong the life of many undeserving firms. Keeping the growth of the undead in check will be vital to the long-term economic recovery.

多年來,經濟學家爭辯,富國政府和央行是否做錯了,讓「殭屍企業」得以延續生命。據說,企業界從原本充滿熱血沸騰的破壞式創新生物,變成活死人出沒的灰色地帶,既無法創新也沒有活力。這個辯論如今有新的重要性。疫情可能導致政府讓許多不值得救的公司延續生命。抑制這些不死族的成長,對長期經濟復甦至關重要。

Marginally profitable firms were central to Japan’s “lost decade” in the 1990s, when banks, unwilling to recognise losses, kept credit flowing to otherwise insolvent borrowers. Zombie-infested industries suffered from inert labour markets and lower productivity growth. Since then, the rich world as a whole has begun to look more zombified. In advanced economies the share of listed firms with low market capitalisations given their book value, and whose profits are insufficient to cover their interest payments, grew from around 4% in the mid-1980s to 15% in 2017, according to the Bank for International Settlements. The oecd reckons Italian and Spanish productivity levels would be over 1% higher were it not for the growth of zombie firms, which are alleged to have crowded out would-be rivals.

獲利微乎其微的公司,是日本1​​990年代陷入「失落的十年」的核心因素,當時銀行不願承認損失,持續授信給若沒貸款就無力償債的借款人。殭屍橫行的產業,飽受勞動市場遲滯和生產力低落所苦。從那時起,整個富裕世界開始顯得死氣沉沉。根據國際清算銀行的數據,在先進經濟體,因帳面價值低市值也低,且獲利不夠繳利息的上市公司占比,從1980年代中期約4%升至2017年的15%。OECD估計,若不是因為殭屍企業增加了,排擠掉潛在的競爭對手,義大利和西班牙的生產率水準本可提高1%以上。

The evidence for zombification in the 2010s is incomplete: the world economy displayed few signs of capital or labour shortages, which you might expect to see more of if zombies were hoarding resources. Many firms were marginally profitable because aggregate spending was weak. Yet the pandemic is creating a greater risk of extra zombification. Governments have intervened in the economy on an enormous scale in order to keep firms alive. A combination of furlough schemes to reduce wage bills, state-backed loans to provide liquidity and laws or other measures to stop bankruptcies has prevented a wave of company failures. The danger is that, as economies emerge from the pandemic with new wants and needs, some firms that should be allowed to fail are instead kept going.

2010年代的殭屍化證據並不完整:世界經濟幾乎未顯露[few:少到幾乎沒有]資本或勞力短缺跡象,假如殭屍企業囤積資源,應會見到更多這種跡象。許多公司獲利微薄,是因為總支出疲軟。然而,現在疫病流行,造成更大的額外殭屍化風險。政府為使企業生存下去,大規模干預經濟。降低工資支出的無薪假機制、提供流動性的國家擔保貸款,以及阻止破產的法律或其他措施並行,已防止了一波公司倒閉潮。這麼做的危險在於,隨著經濟擺脫疫情,新的需求興起,一些應倒閉的公司反而繼續營運。

The march of the undead can be kept in check. Governments should support workers not jobs, and intervene more surgically. Furlough schemes keep workers tied to companies; it would be better to offer generous unemployment benefits. State-backed loans should not be rolled over indefinitely, but instead be subject to gradually increasing interest rates, encouraging borrowers to rely on private finance. If governments truly believe that the disruption to the hospitality industry will be only temporary, then their support would be justified. But because the industry will never recoup the income that it has lost during the pandemic, it will need grants, not loans—a shift that would help concentrate politicians’ minds.

殭屍橫行可被遏制。政府應支持勞工而非工作,干預行動要如手術般精確。無薪假機制使勞工與公司密不可分;更好的做法,是提供慷慨的失業救濟金。政府擔保的貸款不應無限期展延,而要受制於逐步提高的利率,以鼓勵借款人倚靠民間融資。如果政府真的相信餐旅業受到的打擊只是暫時的,提供支持就合情合理;但因餐旅業在疫情期間流失的營收一去不復返,這行業需要的是補助款,而不是貸款—調整做法,將有助政治人物聚精會神。

Another priority is to avoid a banking crisis. Lenders with stretched balance-sheets have an incentive to keep funding their existing customers, masking past lending mistakes with yet more loans. In the short term this avoids recognising losses, in the long term they are funnelling capital to firms which squander it. Regulators must be alive to the risk of these zombie assembly lines. Banks should be kept as strong as possible during the pandemic, to reduce their incentive to conceal losses. That is a reason to limit their ability to pay dividends.

另一個優先要務是避免銀行業危機。資產負債表過度擴張的放款者,有動機繼續融資給現有客戶,以更多的貸款掩蓋過去的放款錯誤。短期而言,這麼做可避免認列損失;長遠來看,資本卻一點一滴流入浪費資金的公司。監管機構必須意識到這些殭屍生產線的風險。疫情期間應盡可能讓銀行保持強健,減少他們隱瞞損失的動機。限制銀行配發股息的理由即在此。

Last, ensure that firms can fail quickly and efficiently so that they can either be recapitalised or their assets and staff redeployed. Bankruptcy courts must be able to revive firms with reasonable prospects, or liquidate assets that can find new productive uses in other hands. Making the process faster and clearer will reduce the incentive of creditors to seek scorched-earth liquidations, especially for small businesses. Suspending bankruptcies for long periods, as Australia and Germany have done, is to deny reality. America, with its unsentimental approach to resolving ailing firms, sets a much better example.

最後,確保公司能夠快速、有效地退場,以利重組資本或重新部署資產和員工。破產法院必須能夠重振前景尚可的公司;或清算資產,以便易主後能找到更有生產力的新用途。使流程加快、更明確,將降低債權人尋求「焦土式」清算的動機,對小企業尤然。長期擱置破產案,例如澳洲和德國的做法,是拒絕接受現實。美國以不帶感情的方式處理財務陷困境的公司,樹立更好的範例。

All-but-indiscriminate aid to support firms and workers was a necessary feature of this year’s economic rescues, which took place amid widespread lockdowns of the economy. However, aid has become a threat to dynamism. As economies recover, the market should be allowed to play its proper role of determining winners and losers.■

在普遍的經濟封鎖下,對企業和勞工[叮嚀:worker通常譯成「勞工」,包括白領和藍領;「工人」通常指靠體力做粗活的藍領]幾乎無差別的資助,是今年經濟紓困的必要特色。但是,援助已變得威脅成長動能。隨著經濟復甦,應允許市場扮演固有的角色:決定贏家及輸家。


2020年10月1日 星期四

債務增肥--政府能借的錢多到超乎以往所能想像

 Putting on weight 債務增肥

Governments can borrow more than was once believed 

政府能借的錢多到超乎以往所能想像

Hence only muted concern about borrowing to respond to covid-19

因此對舉債抗疫顧慮輕微

Schools brief

Sep 12th 2020 edition


Sep 12th 2020

If people know one thing about the thinking of John Maynard Keynes, who more or less founded macroeconomics, it is that he was in favour of governments borrowing lots of money, at least under some circumstances. The “New Keynesian” orthodoxy that evolved from his work in the second half of the 20th century was much less liberal in this regard. It put less faith in borrowing’s purported benefits, and had greater concerns about its dangers.


凱因斯(John Maynard Keynes)或多或少創立了總體經濟學,他的思想若有一點廣為人知,那就是贊同政府借入大量資金,至少在某些情況下這麼做。到20世紀下半葉,從他研究演變而來的「新凱因斯主義」正統觀念,對這方面的寬容大不如前----對舉債聲稱的益處信心薄弱,卻更加擔憂其危險性。


The 2010s saw the pendulum swinging back. In large part because they feel bereft of other options, many governments have borrowed heavily—and as yet they have paid no dreadful price. Can this go on?

2010年代,鐘擺又擺回來。許多政府大量舉債,主要因為他們覺得別無選擇。目前為止尚未付出沉重的代價,但這種情況能持續下去嗎?


Keynes’s ideas about borrowing reflected his view of recessions—and in particular, the Depression of the 1930s, during which he wrote “The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money”—as vicious circles. Recessions come about when the economy is hit by a sudden rise in the desire to save money; such desires lead to lower spending, which leads to more unemployment, which leads to yet less spending, and so on. If the government borrows enough to offset lower private spending with increased spending of its own the circle can be broken—or stopped from getting going.


凱因斯對舉債的觀念反映他對經濟衰退的看法--有如惡性循環。尤其是1930年代的大蕭條,他在那段時期寫下《就業、利息和貨幣的一般理論》。大蕭條來臨時,經濟遭突然暴增的儲蓄需求打擊;儲蓄欲望導致支出降低,進而導致更多人失業,而這又導致支出減少,如此循環下去。如果政府舉債來增加公共支出,足以抵消減少的民間支出,那麼這個迴圈就可以被打破,停止繼續循環下去。


Most early Keynesians assumed that the deficits caused by borrowing to stimulate the economy would be temporary; after borrowing more than they raised in taxes in order to provide a fiscal stimulus, governments would be able to raise more in taxes, and thus pay off their debts, in the good times that followed. Some, though, suspected that the structure of the advanced economies of the 1930s might mean they were low on demand even in the good times, and that a permanent deficit might be necessary to keep the economy going at a rate that minimised unemployment.


早期凱恩斯主義者大多假設,因舉債刺激經濟造成的赤字是暫時的;政府借入超過稅收的額度提供財政刺激,將能在隨後的繁榮時期徵得更多的稅,進而償還債務。不過,有些人懷疑,從1930年代先進經濟體的結構來看,或許意味著需求低迷,即使在繁榮時期也一樣,而常態性的赤字可能是必須的,好讓經濟成長維持在使失業率最小化的速度。


Debates about the proper role of fiscal stimulus became less urgent in the decades after the second world war, as robust economic growth eased worries that demobilisation might bring a return of Depression-like conditions. Faith in Keynesian orthodoxy was further shaken by the economic developments of the 1970s and 1980s. Some economists began to argue that the public would eventually adjust to stimulus measures in ways that weakened their impact. Robert Barro, a leading proponent of this “rational expectations” approach, argued that a fiscal stimulus paid for by borrowing would see households spend less and save more, because they would know that tax rises were coming. This decreased private spending would then offset the increased public spending.


在二次世界大戰後幾十年,有關財政刺激適當角色的辯論,變得不太急迫。因為強勁的經濟成長,緩和了解除動員可能回到大蕭條情況的擔憂。19701980年代的經濟發展,進一步動搖對正統凱因斯主義的信仰。一些經濟學家開始認為,民眾對刺激措施的調適行為,終將削弱政策的影響。這種「理性預期」方法的主要倡議者巴羅(Robert Barro)主張,舉債支付的財政刺激措施將使家庭支出減少、儲蓄變多,因為他們知道增稅將至。減少的私人消費將抵消增加的公共支出。


Linked to, but broader than, such academic questions was the fact that, by the 1970s, the ways in which Keynesian governments had been running their economies seemed to have failed. A trifecta of slowing growth, soaring inflation and high unemployment brought the idea of governments being able to avoid recessions through stimulus into disrepute.


與這種學術問題有關、但涵蓋面更廣的事實是,到了1970年代,奉行凱因斯主義的政府管理經濟的方式似已失敗。成長放緩、通膨竄升和高失業率三重打擊,使政府能藉由刺激避免衰退的想法,公信力蕩然無存。


The new orthodoxy was that governments should instead rely on monetary policy. When the economy slowed, monetary policy would loosen, making it cheaper to borrow, thus encouraging people to spend. Government borrowing, for its part, should be kept on a short leash. If governments pushed up their debt-to-GDP ratio, markets would become unwilling to lend to them, forcing up interest rates willy-nilly. The usefulness of monetary policy demanded a sober approach to fiscal policy.


新的正統觀念是,政府應改為依賴貨幣政策。經濟放緩時,貨幣政策將寬鬆,使借貸成本降低,進而鼓勵人們消費。另一方面,政府舉債應被緊緊束縛。如果政府提高債務對GDP的比率,市場將不願意借錢給政府,迫使利率不得不提高。貨幣政策要奏效,需要搭配一套嚴謹的財政政策做法。


The 2000s, however, saw a problem with this approach beginning to become plain. From the 1980s, interest rates had been in a long, steady decline. By the 2000s they had reached historical lows. Low rates made it harder for central banks to stimulate economies by cutting them further: there was not room to do so. The global financial crisis pushed rates around the world to near zero.


但在2000年代,這種做法的問題開始變得顯而易見。從1980年代開始,利率一直長期穩定下降。到2000年代,利率降到歷史低點。低利率使央行難以進一步降息來刺激經濟:沒有再降的餘地了。全球金融危機已將各國利率壓到接近零。


Governments experimented with more radical monetary policy, such as the form of money printing known as “quantitative easing”. Their economies continued to underperform. There seemed to be room for new thinking, and a revamped Keynesianism sought to provide it. In 2012 Larry Summers, a former American treasury secretary, and Brad DeLong, an economist, suggested a large Keynesian stimulus based on borrowing. Thanks to low interest rates, the gains it would provide by boosting the growth rate of GDP might outstrip the cost of financing the debt taken on.


各國政府嘗試更激進的貨幣政策,像是被稱為「量化寬鬆」的印鈔模式,但經濟仍毫無起色。此時似乎有新思維的空間,改良版的凱恩斯主義乘隙而入。 2012年前美國財政部長薩默斯(Larry Summers)和經濟學家德隆(Brad DeLong)建議在舉債的基礎上,實施大規模的凱因斯式刺激措施。由於利率正低,透過提高GDP成長率將帶來的收益,可能超過債務的融資成本。


In the following year Mr Summers followed some 1930s Keynesians, notably Alvin Hansen, in suggesting that borrowing in order to stimulate might be needed not just as an occasional pick-me-up, but as a permanent part of the economy. Hansen had argued that an ageing population and a low rate of technological innovation produced a long-term lack of demand which he called “secular stagnation”. Mr Summers took an updated but similar view. Part of his backing for this idea was that the long-term decline of interest rates showed a persistent lack of demand.


次年,薩默斯與1930年代的凱因斯主義者,特別是漢森(Alvin Hansen),提出舉債刺激經濟可能是需要的,這不僅只是短暫的興奮劑,而且是經濟永久的一部分。漢森主張,人口老化和技術創新率低導致長期需求不足,他稱之為「長期停滯」。薩默斯發表更新但相似的觀點。他支持這想法的部分原因是利率長期下降,顯示需求持續匱乏。


Way down we go 一路走下去


Sceptics insisted that such borrowing would drive interest rates up. But as the years went by and interest rates remained stubbornly low, the notion of borrowing for fiscal stimulus started to seem more tenable, even attractive. Very low interest rates mean that economies can grow faster than debt repayments do. Negative interest rates, which have been seen in some countries over recent years, mean that the amount to repay will actually be less than the amount borrowed.


懷疑者堅稱舉債會推升利率。但是,多年過後,利率依舊低迷,舉債推行財政刺激的觀念開始顯得更站得住腳,甚至更具吸引力。極低的利率意味著經濟成長可以比償債速度更快。近年來在一些國家已看到負利率,這意味著償還的金額實際上將少於借入的金額。


Adherents of “Modern Monetary Theory” (MMT) went further than this, arguing that governments should borrow as much as was needed to achieve full employment while central banks focused simply on keeping interest rates low—a course of action which orthodox economics would expect to promptly drive up inflation. Currently MMT remains on the fringes of academic economics. But it has been embraced by some left-wing politicians; Senator Bernie Sanders, the candidate beaten by Joe Biden for the Democratic nomination, counted an MMT enthusiast, Stephanie Kelton of Stony Brook University, among his chief advisers.


現代貨幣理論(MMT)的擁護者進一步主張,各國政府應為實現充分就業,盡可能地借錢,而央行只要專注於維持低利率----這種行動路線,按傳統經濟學來看,勢必會迅速推升通膨。當前,MMT仍處於經濟學界的邊緣,但已獲一些左翼政治人物[叮嚀:除非明顯有貶抑意思才譯「政客」]敞臂接納。與拜登爭民主黨提名落敗的參議員桑德斯(Bernie Sanders),他的主要顧問就包括一位MMT狂熱者--石溪大學的科爾頓(Stephanie Kelton)。


The shift in mainstream thinking on debt helps explain why the huge amounts of government borrowing with which the world has responded to the pandemic has not worried economists. But now that governments have, if only for want of an alternative, become more willing to take on debt, what should be their limit? For an empirical answer, it is tempting to consider Japan, where the ratio of net public debt to GDP stood at 154% prior to the pandemic.


有關債務的主流思想轉變,有助於解釋為什麼世界各國政府大量舉債抗疫,經濟學家卻不憂心。但既然政府已變得更願意承擔債務,即使只因別無選擇,那麼舉債極限應該在哪?要找個實證的答案,不由得令人想到疫情爆發前的日本:公債淨額對GDP的比率為154%。


If Japan can continue to borrow with that level of debt, it might seem that countries with lower levels should also be fine. But this ignores the fact that if interest rates stagger back from the floor, burdens a lot smaller than Japan’s might become perilously unstable. There is no immediate account for why this might be likely. But that does not mean it will not happen. And governments need to remember that debt taken on at one interest rate may, if market sentiment changes, need to be rolled over at a much higher one in times to come.


如果日本可以繼續以這樣的水平舉債,那麼債務水平較低的國家似乎也應該沒事。但這忽略了一個事實,如果利率從谷底踉蹌回升,就連遠比日本小的債務負擔,都可能變得岌岌可危。雖沒立即說明為何這可能發生,並不表示就不會發生。政府還需記住,如果市場風向改變,以某個利率發行債券的債務,可能必須在日後以更高的利率展延。


Given this background risk, governments ideally ought to make sure that new borrowing is doing things that will provide a lasting good, greater than the final cost of the borrowing. If money is very cheap and likely to remain so, this will look like a fairly low bar. But there are opportunity costs to consider. If private borrowing has a high return and public borrowing crowds it out, then the public borrowing either needs to show a similarly high return or it needs to be cut back.


考慮此背景風險,理想上,政府應確保新借入的資金,要花在未來能提供源源不絕收益的計畫上,而這些收益須超過最終借貸成本。若資金非常便宜且可能持續下去,這看起來是相當低的要求。但還有機會成本要考慮。如果借錢給私部門的回報率高,卻遭到借給公部門的額度排擠掉,那麼公部門借貸必須拿出同樣高的報酬率,不然就得少借一些。


At the moment private returns remain well above the cost of new borrowing in most places: in America, for instance, the earnings of corporations are generally high relative to the replacement cost of their capital. This makes it conceivable that resources used by the government would generate a greater level of welfare if they were instead mobilised by private firms.


目前,大多數地方私部門的報酬率仍遠高於新借貸的成本:例如,美國企業的收益通常高於資產的重置成本。可想而知,如果政府使用的資源改由私營公司運用,會創造出更多福祉。


But it does not currently look as though they would be. Despite the seemingly high returns to new capital, private investment in America is quite low. This suggests either that there are other obstacles to new investment, or that the high returns on investment reflect an insufficient level of competition rather than highly productive companies.


但目前看來事與願違,儘管新資本似乎可獲高額報酬,美國的私營部門投資仍然很低。這顯示可能存在其他新投資障礙,不然就是高投資報酬率反映的不是公司生產力高,而是市場競爭不足。


Both possibilities call for government remedy: either action aimed at identifying and dismantling the obstacles to investment, or at increasing competition. And until such actions produce greater investment or lower returns, the case for government borrowing remains quite strong. This is even more the case for public investments which might in themselves encourage the private sector to match them—“crowding in”, as opposed to crowding out. Investment in a much better electricity grid, for example, could increase investment in zero-carbon generation.


這兩種可能性都需要政府採取補救行動:查明並消除投資障礙,或促進市場競爭。在這些行動促進更多的投資或降低報酬率之前,政府舉債的理由仍很充分。公部門投資的理由甚至更充足,可能還會鼓勵私營部門比照辦理----「擠進」投資而不是排擠。例如,投資建設更好的電網,可能助長對零碳發電的投資。


In the long run, the way to avoid having to borrow to the hilt is to implement structural changes which will revive what does seem to be chronically weak demand. Unfortunately, there is no consensus over why demand is weak. Is technological progress, outside the realm of computers and communications, not what it was? Is inequality putting money into the hands of the rich, who are less likely to spend their next dollar, rather than the poor, who are more likely? Are volatile financial markets encouraging precautionary saving both by firms and governments? Is the ageing of the population at the root of it all?


從長遠來看,避免深陷債務的方法是實施結構性改革,這將提振似乎長期疲軟的需求。不幸的是,對於為何需求疲軟尚無共識。難道電腦和通訊領域外的技術進步大不如前?難道貧富不均使錢落入富人手中後,他們比窮人更不可能花下一美元,而窮人更可能花用?波動的金融市場促使企業和政府儲蓄,以備不時之需?人口老化是這一切的根源嗎?


Making people younger is not a viable policy option. But the volatility of markets might be addressed by regulation, and a lack of competition by antitrust actions. If inequality is at the root, redistribution (or its jargony cousin, predistribution) could perk up demand. Dealing with the structural problems constraining demand would probably push up interest rates, creating difficulties for those governments which have already accumulated large debt piles. But stronger underlying growth would subsequently reduce the need for further government borrowing, raise GDP and boost tax revenues. In principle that would make it easier for governments in such situations to pay down their increased debt.


使人民變年輕不是可行的政策選項,但市場波動可藉由監管解決,缺少競爭也可透過反壟斷行動解決。若不平等是根源,重新分配(另一近似術語是「預先分配」)可能會激起需求。處理造成需求受限的結構性問題,也許會推高利率,給已經債台高築的政府製造麻煩。但強勁的成長基礎將減少政府日後進一步舉債的需求、提高GDP並增強稅收。原則上,在此情況下,政府可以更輕鬆地償還增加的債務。


The new consensus that government borrowing and spending is indeed an important part of stabilising an economy, and that interest rates are generally low enough to allow governments to manage this task at minimal cost, represents progress. Government borrowing is badly needed to deal with many of the world’s current woes. But this consensus should ideally include two additional planks: that the quality of deficit-spending still matters, and that governments should prepare for the possibility of an eventual change in the global interest-rate environment—much as 2020 has shown that you should prepare for any low-probability disaster. ■


新的共識是:政府的借貸和支出確實是穩定經濟的重要部分,且利率普遍較低,足以使政府以極低的成本達成這項任務。這代表進步。政府借錢對處理當今世上的許多困難是亟需的。但是,理想情況下,這種共識還應包括兩個額外的條款:赤字支出的品質仍然重要,且政府應為全球利率環境終將改變的可能性做準備--就像2020年的啟示,你得為任何罕見的災難未雨綢繆。