連凱因斯都跌過跤：動能投資兩百年的誘惑與代價

提起凱因斯（John Maynard Keynes），多數人想到的是寫進每一本經濟學教科書的總體經濟學之父，是那隻自動調節市場的「看不見的手」。但這位經濟學巨人還有一個少有人提起的身分：操盤手，而且一開始做得並不好。

一檔股票漲了就追、跑得快就換過去抱，是人性最自然的反射動作，這套方法有個名字叫動能投資。連凱因斯都從這裡起步，也在這裡跌過跤。

凱因斯一開始也追漲

凱因斯操盤的，是劍橋大學國王學院（King's College）的校產。1924 年他出任學院財務主管（First Bursar），把學院可自由運用的錢，集中成一筆名為「the Chest」的基金親自管理。二戰之前，劍橋還處在日不落帝國的年代，是全世界數一數二有錢的大學，他手上能調度的銀彈，遠比後人想像的厚。

按劍橋學者錢伯斯（David Chambers）與丁森（Elroy Dimson）重建的操盤紀錄，凱因斯最早倚重一套叫「credit cycling」的打法，靠貨幣與景氣指標，在股票、債券、現金之間順著景氣循環切換，跌勢來臨前減碼、回升時加碼。換成今天台灣投資人熟悉的說法，這就是動能投資。

問題是，這套擇時方法並不靈光。凱因斯接手後的頭幾年績效落後英國股市，他自己後來在給學院的報告裡也坦言，他們始終沒能「在景氣循環的不同階段，靠著整批進出股票占到便宜」。擇時做久了，操盤人的判斷容易失準，股票一漲就忍不住追，最後分不清自己究竟是價值型還是成長型投資人，看到會漲的就買，買到好公司是運氣，買到壞公司也是常態。

動能投資簡史：從箱型理論到量化因子

凱因斯放棄擇時，動能投資卻沒有跟著消失。接下來的大半個世紀，它換上不同的名字，被一代又一代操盤手重新發現。

1930 年代起，美國基金經理人切斯納特（George Chestnutt）用「相對強弱」（relative strength）操盤 American Investors Fund 近三十年，挑的就是漲勢最強的股票，他留下一句幾乎是動能投資座右銘的話：

買領頭羊，別碰落後者。

1940、50 年代，唐契安（Richard Donchian）用移動平均線建立規則化的進出系統，後世稱他「趨勢追蹤之父」。1950 年代末，舞者出身的達華斯（Nicolas Darvas）發明「箱型理論」，把股價想像成一個個箱子，股價突破箱頂創新高就買進、設緊停損，骨子裡仍是追動能。

1967 年，李維（Robert Levy）發表〈相對強弱作為選股準則〉，第一次把這套做法寫成學術論文。真正把動能投資推上高峰的，是 1980 年代的崔豪斯（Richard Driehaus），他被許多人尊為「動能投資之父」，旗下基金自 1980 年成立起的十二年間，靠著買進獲利超預期、股價剛突破的中小型成長股，繳出約三成的年複利。

學術界遲至 1993 年才正式替動能背書。傑加帝胥（Narasimhan Jegadeesh）與提特曼（Sheridan Titman）發表〈買贏家、賣輸家〉，證明買進過去三到十二個月最強、放空最弱的股票，平均每月可多賺約 1%，1965 到 1989 年的多空組合年化報酬約 12%，動能從此被列為難以用效率市場解釋的「異常現象」。

2013 年，蓋奇（Christopher Geczy）與薩莫諾夫（Mikhail Samonov）把資料一路回推到 1801 年，做出號稱「全世界最長的回測」，發現橫跨兩百多年、橫跨股債匯與商品，動能溢酬始終站得住腳。

為什麼「有效」還是這麼難賺

弔詭的是，一個被兩百年資料證明有效的策略，實務上卻極難長期執行。近年丹尼爾（Kent Daniel）與莫斯科維茲（Tobias Moskowitz）的研究，點出動能最致命的弱點：它會在市場急轉彎時「崩盤」。多頭末段追進的強勢股，往往在反轉那一刻跌得最兇，把先前累積的超額報酬一次吐光。

這正是九十年前燒到凱因斯的同一把火。他當年的自承，沒能在景氣循環不同階段靠整批進出占到便宜，講的就是擇時策略在行情反轉時失靈。一個 1930 年代的操盤遺憾，與一篇 2010 年代的量化論文，指向同一個結論：動能能賺，前提是你得先撐過它崩盤的時刻。

從「人是理性的」到「有限度理性」

市場為什麼會在行情反轉時突然翻臉？答案要回到一個更根本的問題：人到底理不理性。經濟學之父亞當斯密在《國富論》裡的前提是，人是理性的，市場因而有一隻看不見的手自動調節。凱因斯幾乎把這個前提顛倒過來，他認為人是理性沒錯，但每個人只有「有限度的理性」，而且你的理性與我的理性其實長得不一樣。

這與凱因斯本人對市場最有名的比喻相通。他在《就業、利息與貨幣的一般理論》裡，把選股形容成一場報紙選美比賽，要賺錢，與其押自己覺得最美的，不如去猜大家會選誰。說到底，市場就是一群被情緒推著走的人在喊價，談不上什麼冷靜的算式。

「有限度理性」放到投資上有個淺白的例子。假設有一張股票，抱十年可以漲十倍，十八歲的人會搶著買，因為他等得起；換成九十八歲的人，同一張股票擺在面前，他多半不要，他寧可要一檔今年就能配 18%、晚上睡得著覺的東西。同一個標的，理性的答案因為年紀就完全不同，每個人都會依當下的處境，改寫自己對理性的定義。

三位大師，只有一人真正在股市裡賺錢

把同一個世代的幾位投資大師擺在一起，更能看出門道。費雪（Irving Fisher）比凱因斯年長十六歲，凱因斯又比葛拉漢（Benjamin Graham）年長十一歲，論名氣，當然是頂著總體經濟學之父頭銜的凱因斯最響亮。

然而這幾位名滿天下的大師裡，真正在股市裡賺到大錢的，是名氣相對小的葛拉漢，也就是價值投資之父、股神巴菲特的恩師。費雪是經濟學界的巨人，卻在 1929 年崩盤前還公開喊出股價已站上「永久的高原」，結果慘賠收場；凱因斯靠的是後來那次轉向，而非他一開始的聰明。

葛拉漢的方法，可以用三個字概括：撿菸蒂。不管好股票壞股票，只要夠便宜就買，把一家公司的流動資產加現金、減掉全部負債，只要折價折得夠深，就整批買進。連股神巴菲特早年起家，靠的也是套利、撿菸蒂這類撿便宜的功夫，與外界熟悉的「買進好公司長抱」相去甚遠。

凱因斯最終想通的答案，和巴菲特日後的信條幾乎如出一轍：謹慎挑出幾檔有把握的好公司，集中重押、長期抱牢，無論行情怎麼震盪都按兵不動。就是這一轉，讓國王學院的基金從約三萬英鎊滾到三十八萬英鎊，在他約二十年的操盤裡翻了十二倍，同一段時間英國股市幾乎原地踏步。

動能與價值，沒有標準答案

凱因斯這段歷史的提醒很簡單：動能與價值未必有高下，每個人的理性卻都有一條邊界。年輕、扛得住波動的人，適合去追成長；到了 80、90 歲要的是穩定現金流的人，就不該硬抱一檔「十年漲十倍」的股票。看清自己屬於哪一種，往往比預測下一個漲勢更重要。

凱因斯自己留過一句更狠的評語：成功的價值投資「非常困難，難以實踐」。連他都先花了好幾年、賠過錢才想明白。在追漲之前，或許每個投資人都值得先停一秒問自己：我的理性，到底有多大的邊界？

參考資料：

凱因斯操盤紀錄

• Chambers & Dimson, "Keynes the Stock Market Investor" 
• Chambers, Dimson & Foo, "Keynes, King's and Endowment Asset  Management"（NBER w20421） 
• 佐證：1924 任 First Bursar、credit cycling 早年失利、1930 年代轉 bottom-up、1930s 後年勝大盤逾 5%、把愛股當「pets」長抱
• CFA Institute "How Did Keynes Perform as an Investor?" 

動能投資史與量化實證 

• Geczy & Samonov, "Two Centuries of Price-Return Momentum"（1801 起回測） 
• Daniel & Moskowitz, "Momentum Crashes"（NBER w20439） 
• 佐證：動能在「恐慌態」（市場急跌＋高波動）後崩盤，反轉時吐光超額報酬
• Jegadeesh & Titman (1993), "Returns to Buying Winners and Selling Losers" 
• 切斯納特相對強弱、唐契安趨勢追蹤、達華斯箱型、李維 1967、崔豪斯：Stockopedia "The Momentum Factor"、Wikipedia "Momentum investing"、AAII "Momentum Investing the Richard Driehaus Way"

電子錢幣的崛起--重要的數位貨幣

 

The rise of e-money  電子錢幣的崛起

The digital currencies that matter

重要的數位貨幣

Get ready for Fedcoin and the e-euro 準備迎接數位美元和電子歐元

 

NONE MAY 08, 2021

TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE is upending finance. Bitcoin has gone from being an obsession of anarchists to a $1trn asset class that many fund managers insist belongs in any balanced portfolio. Swarms of digital day-traders have become a force on Wall Street. PayPal has 392m users, a sign that America is catching up with China’s digital-payments giants. Yet, as our special report explains, the least noticed disruption on the frontier between technology and finance may end up as the most revolutionary: the creation of government digital currencies, which typically aim to let people deposit funds directly with a central bank, bypassing conventional lenders.

科技變革正在顛覆金融領域。比特幣已從對無政府主義者的迷戀，變成一種價值1兆美元的資產類別，許多基金經理人堅持比特幣屬於任何平衡投資組合。大群的線上當沖交易者已成為華爾街的一股力量。 PayPal擁有3.92億用戶，象徵著美國正在迎頭趕上中國的數位支付巨擘。然而，正如我們的特別報告所解釋的，在科技與金融間的邊界上鮮為人知的破壞，可能最終形成最大的革命：創建政府數位貨幣，通常目的是讓人們繞過傳統的放款者，直接向中央銀行存入資金。

These “govcoins” are a new incarnation of money. They promise to make finance work better but also to shift power from individuals to the state, alter geopolitics and change how capital is allocated. They are to be treated with optimism, and humility.

這些「政府數位貨幣」是金錢的新化身。他們承諾使金融體系運作更良好，但也將權力從個人轉移到國家、改變地緣政治及資本的分配方式。他們應被樂觀和恭敬地看待。

A decade or so ago, amid the wreckage of Lehman Brothers, Paul Volcker, a former head of the Federal Reserve, grumbled that banking’s last useful innovation was the ATM. Since the crisis, the industry has raised its game. Banks have modernised their creaking IT systems. Entrepreneurs have built an experimental world of “decentralised finance”, of which bitcoin is the most famous part and which contains a riot of tokens, databases and conduits that interact to varying degrees with traditional finance. Meanwhile, financial “platform” firms now have over 3bn customers who use e-wallets and payments apps. Alongside PayPal are other specialists such as Ant Group, Grab and Mercado Pago, established firms such as Visa, and Silicon Valley wannabes such as Facebook.

大約十年前，在雷曼兄弟造成殘骸中，美國聯準會（Fed）前主席沃克抱怨，銀行業最沒用的創新是自動櫃員機（ATM）。自危機來，銀行業提高競爭力，將老舊的IT系統現代化。創業家建立一個「去中心化金融」的實驗性世界，比特幣是其中最廣為人知的一部分，它包含大量的代幣、資料庫和渠道，與傳統金融發生不同程度交互影響。同時，金融「平台」公司現在擁有超過30億客戶使用電子錢包和支付App。除PayPal之外，還有其他佼佼者，如螞蟻集團、Grab和Mercado Pago，發展完備的公司如Visa，以及矽谷的夢想家如Facebook。

Government or central-bank digital currencies are the next step but they come with a twist, because they would centralise power in the state rather than spread it through networks or give it to private monopolies. The idea behind them is simple. Instead of holding an account with a retail bank, you would do so direct with a central bank through an interface resembling apps such as Alipay or Venmo. Rather than writing cheques or paying online with a card, you could use the central bank’s cheap plumbing. And your money would be guaranteed by the full faith of the state, not a fallible bank. Want to buy a pizza or help a broke sibling? No need to deal with Citigroup’s call centre or pay Mastercard’s fees: the Bank of England and the Fed are at your service.

政府或央行的數位貨幣是下一階段，但有一個轉折，因為它們將把權力集中在國家，而不是透過網路分散或交由私人壟斷。它們背後的想法很簡單。你不需要在零售銀行開戶，而是通過類似支付寶或Venmo等App的介面直接與央行開戶。您不必簽支票或信用卡在線付款，而可以使用央行低成本的管道。你的錢將由國家給予強大的信心保證，而不是易出錯的銀行。想要購買披薩或幫助破產的兄弟姐妹嗎？無需與花旗集團的客服中心打交道，也無需支付萬事達卡的費用：英格蘭銀行和美國聯準會隨時為你服務。

This metamorphosis of central banks from the aristocrats of finance to its labourers sounds far-fetched, but it is under way. Over 50 monetary authorities, representing the bulk of global GDP, are exploring digital currencies. The Bahamas has issued digital money. China has rolled out its e-yuan pilot to over 500,000 people. The EU wants a virtual euro by 2025, Britain has launched a task-force, and America, the world’s financial hegemon, is building a hypothetical e-dollar.

央行從金融貴族完全改變成勞工階級，聽起來似乎很牽強，但它正在進行中。50多個貨幣機構代表著全球龐大GDP，正在探索數位貨幣。巴哈馬已發行數位錢幣。中國數位人民幣試點已推行至50多萬人口。歐盟希望到2025年實現歐元虛擬化，英國成立了特別工作小組，世界金融霸主美國正在打造虛擬電子美元。

One motivation for governments and central banks is a fear of losing control. Today central banks harness the banking system to amplify monetary policy. If payments, deposits and loans migrate from banks into privately run digital realms, central banks will struggle to manage the economic cycle and inject funds into the system during a crisis. Unsupervised private networks could become a Wild West of fraud and privacy abuses.

政府和央行的動機之一是擔心失去控制權。當今央行靠駕馭銀行體系來延展貨幣政策。如果付款、存款和貸款從銀行遷移到私人經營的數位領域，那麼央行將難以管理經濟性周期，也難在危機期間向系統注入資金。無人監督的私人網絡可能會成為欺詐和侵犯隱私的蠻荒之地。

The other motivation is the promise of a better financial system. Ideally money provides a reliable store of value, a stable unit of account and an efficient means of payment. Today’s money gets mixed marks. Uninsured depositors can suffer if banks fail, bitcoin is not widely accepted and credit cards are expensive. Government e-currencies would score highly, since they are state-guaranteed and use a cheap, central payments hub.

另一個動機是承諾更好的金融體系。理想情況下，貨幣能提供可靠的價值儲蓄、穩定的帳戶單位和有效的付款方式。如今的貨幣褒貶不一。如果銀行倒閉，比特幣沒有被廣泛接受且信用卡成本昂貴，那麼沒有保險的儲戶可能會遭受損失。政府電子貨幣將獲得很高的評價，因為它們由國家擔保，並使用低廉中央支付系統。

As a result, govcoins could cut the operating expenses of the global financial industry, which amount to over $350 a year for every person on Earth. That could make finance accessible for the 1.7bn people who lack bank accounts. Government digital currencies could also expand governments’ toolkits by letting them make instant payments to citizens and cut interest rates below zero. For ordinary users, the appeal of a free, safe, instant, universal means of payment is obvious.

如此一來，政府數位貨幣能減少全球金融業的營運費用，這對全球每個人每年大約花費350美元以上。這使金融服務伸展到缺乏銀行帳戶的17億人口。政府數位貨幣還可以擴大政府的工具包，向公民即時支付並將利息降低至零。對於一般用戶而言，免費、安全、即時、通用的付款方式的誘因顯而易見。

It is this appeal, though, that creates dangers. Unconstrained, govcoins could fast become a dominant force in finance, particularly if network effects made it hard for people to opt out. They could destabilise banks, because if most people and firms stashed their cash at the central banks, lenders would have to find other sources of funding with which to back their loans.

但正是這種吸引力造成危險。不受約束的政府數位貨幣可以迅速成為金融的主導力量，特別是如果網路效應使人們難以選擇退出，它們可能使銀行體系不穩定，因為如果大多數人和公司將現金都存在央行，放貸者將不得不尋找其他資金來源來支持貸款。

If retail banks were sucked dry of funding, someone else would have to do the lending that fuels business creation. This raises the queasy prospect of bureaucrats influencing credit allocation. In a crisis, a digital stampede of savers to the central bank could cause bank runs.

如果零售銀行籌資被吸乾，有些公司又不得不靠借錢來推動業務發展。這將提高官僚影響信貸分配的不安前景。危機來臨時，儲戶對央行的數位恐慌性竄逃可能導致銀行擠兌。

Once ascendant, govcoins could become panopticons for the state to control citizens: think of instant e-fines for bad behaviour. They could alter geopolitics, too, by providing a conduit for cross-border payments and alternatives to the dollar, the world’s reserve currency and a linchpin of American influence. The greenback’s reign is based partly on America’s open capital markets and property rights, which China cannot rival. But it also relies on old payments systems, invoicing conventions and inertia—making it ripe for disruption. Small countries fear that, instead of using local money, people might switch to foreign e-currencies, causing chaos at home.

政府數位貨幣一旦崛起，可能成為國家控制公民的環形監獄：思考一下即時電子罰款的不良影響，他們也能改變地緣政治，提供跨境支付管道及替代渠道轉換成美元--全球儲備貨幣和美國影響力的關鍵。美元的統治地位部分基於美國的開放資本市場和房地產權，中國無法與之抗衡。但是，它也依賴於舊的支付系統、簽發貨單的慣例與慣性，從而使其適應崩盤。小國擔心人民可能因為國內動亂，而轉換成國外電子貨幣。

New money, new problems 新錢幣，新問題

Such a vast spectrum of opportunities and dangers is daunting. It is revealing that China’s autocrats, who value control above all else, are limiting the size of the e-yuan and clamping down on private platforms such as Ant. Open societies should also proceed cautiously by, say, capping digital-currency accounts.

如此眾多的機遇和危險令人生畏。這顯示，中國獨裁者重視控制權高於一切，正限制數位人民幣的規模，並壓制如螞蟻集團等的私人平台。自由國家也應該謹慎行事，例如限制數位貨幣帳戶。

Governments and financial firms need to prepare for a long-term shift in how money works, as momentous as the leap to metallic coins or payment cards. That means beefing up privacy laws, reforming how central banks are run and preparing retail banks for a more peripheral role. State digital currencies are the next great experiment in finance, and they promise to be a lot more consequential than the humble ATM. ■

政府和金融公司需為貨幣運作的長期轉變做好準備，就像金屬硬幣或卡片支付的大躍進一樣重要。這意味要加強個資法、改革央行的運作方式，讓零售銀行準備好扮演更次要的角色。國家數位貨幣是金融領域的下一個重大實驗，它們承諾將比謙遜的ATM帶來更大的影響。 ■

授信給應得者--新冠疫情造成微型信貸緊縮

Credit where it’s due 授信給應得者

＊credit where credit's due.  ：該讚揚的就讚揚

Covid-19 is causing a microcredit crunch

新冠疫情造成微型信貸緊縮

Lenders deserve relief, belief and a dose of red tape

應給放款者紓困、信任和一點繁文縟節

Leaders

Aug 15th 2020 edition

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Leaders

Aug 15th 2020 edition

Aug 15th 2020

Across the developing world vast numbers of people have lost their jobs or seen their incomes fall. Many are being forced to sell their meagre belongings to pay for food. Ideally state handouts would plug the gap in their finances, but in many countries the public coffers are empty. Often people are too poor a credit risk, or live too remotely, to get help from banks. Microcredit, a form of lending tailored to them, should be part of the answer, but the industry is flunking one of its biggest tests.

放眼開發中國家，無數人失業或收入下降。許多人被迫出售微薄的財產來填飽肚子。理想情況下，國家的救濟可填補他們的財政缺口，但多國財庫空虛。人們常因貧窮有信用風險，或居住在窮鄉僻壤，無法獲銀行援助。「微型信貸」這種為他們量身定做的放貸形式，應成為部分解方，但這個行業卻有個重大考驗未能過關。

In the 1990s and 2000s microcredit was one of the next big things in development finance. In 2006 Bangladesh’s Grameen Bank and its founder, Muhammad Yunus, won the Nobel peace prize. The industry’s champions developed a grand ambition. Letting the poor borrow and invest, they argued, would unleash their inner entrepreneur and allow them to earn their way out of poverty. A new model emerged. Instead of demanding collateral, which few poor people have, loan officers judged creditworthiness by assessing expected income. Lending often went to groups of people, who knew and monitored each other better than banks could. That also saved officers time and hassle, creating efficiencies that enabled clients to borrow small sums at affordable rates.

在1990年代和2000年代，微型信貸是發展金融領域的明日之星。 2006年，孟加拉的格萊珉銀行及其創始人穆罕默德·尤努斯（Muhammad Yunus）獲得諾貝爾和平獎。這一行的佼佼者胸懷大志，聲稱讓窮人借錢和投資，將釋放窮人內心的企業家，進而憑己力賺錢擺脫貧困。一個新模式出現了。授信者藉評估預期所得，來判斷值不值得授信，而不是要求抵押品，畢竟拿得出（抵押品）的窮人少之又少。貸款通常撥給一群人，他們彼此認識、互相監督，做得比銀行更好。這也節省了放款者的時間和麻煩，創造了效率，使客戶能以負擔得起的利率，借入小額資金。

Today the lending portfolios of microfinance institutions (MFIs) are worth a combined $124bn. But the industry is in trouble. Covid-19 is straining its finances. Repayments, usually done in cash and in person, have plummeted, yet the banks and investors which provide the MFIs with funds still expect money. A crunch looms. 

如今微型信貸機構（MFI）的放款總額達1,240億美元，但這一行正陷入麻煩。新冠疫情造成財務壓力。通常用現金當面進行的還款活動陡降，但提供微型信貸機構資金的銀行和投資者仍期待收錢。資金緊俏隱約可見。

More than two-thirds of MFIs have cut lending, often by at least half. Nearly one-third do not have enough cash to meet outflows this quarter. If only this were the industry’s only problem. Compounding it is a set of deeper, longer-standing issues that have begun to undermine its reputation for efficiency and probity .

超過三分之二的微型信貸機構已削減放款，通常至少減半。將近三分之一現金不足，以致本季資金入不敷出。這一行問題不止於此。一系列更深層、長期存在的問題使情況雪上加霜，開始破壞這一行以效率和誠實著稱的信譽。

As the industry has grown in size it has also grown in complexity. From insurance to leasing, a lengthening suite of services has turned microcredit into microfinance, adding new players to the fray. A mishmash of regulators have struggled to keep up. Patchy regulation and lots of loopholes have become a serious problem as the industry’s high repayment rates—well above 90% on average—have lured for-profit lenders, some of which demand land titles as collateral, charge extortionate rates and use heavy-handed tactics to collect payments. From Congo to Kosovo, scandals have surfaced.

微型信貸行業規模擴大，複雜性也隨之增加。從保險到租賃，不斷延展的服務組合，已將微型信貸轉變為微型金融，新的競爭者陸續投入。有如雜牌軍的監管官員難以跟上腳步。拼拼湊湊的法規和大量的漏洞，已形成嚴重問題，因為該行業的高還款率（平均在90％以上）吸引以營利為目的的放款人，其中一些人要求以土地所有權做為抵押品，收取高利率，並採取粗暴手段收款。從剛果到科索沃，醜聞逐漸浮現。

An expanding body of academic research suggests that microfinance consistently falls short of its boosters’ admittedly high expectations. Among the economists who have plucked at its laurels are last year’s Nobel prizewinners, Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo. They and others have found that its effects on investment, revenue and consumption are small and uncertain. The result is waning interest in the industry from blue-chip investors and donors.

愈來愈多的學術研究顯示，微型信貸始終未能達到支持者坦承過高的期望。一些經濟學家已摘除其桂冠，包括去年諾貝爾獎得主巴納吉（Abhijit Banerjee）和杜芙若（Esther Duflo）。他們和其他人發現，微型信貸對投資、收入和消費的影響很小且不確定。這結果使績優股投資人和捐助者對該行業的興趣減弱。

The timing is terrible. People use MFIs for a variety of needs, from buying goods to helping relatives. What matters is less what the funds are spent on than households’ and firms’ ability to smooth their income and outgoings over time, which is particularly important when bad news, or a bad season—or a pandemic—strikes. Without microcredit, covid-19 means more people in desperate situations will turn to loan sharks and pawnbrokers, at the risk of falling into debt spirals.

時機很糟。人們使用微型信貸機構來滿足各種需求，從購買商品到幫助親戚都有。最重要的不是這些資金花在何處，而是家庭和公司緩和收支失衡的能力。這在壞消息、慘淡季節或疫情來襲時尤其重要。沒有微型信貸，疫情又肆虐，意味更多陷入絕境的人將轉向放高利貸者和當舖，面臨掉落債務漩渦的風險。

What to do? In the short term, viable MFIs need support. Donors and investors should consider moratoriums, reschedulings or injecting capital. Nearly half of MFIs say they have not had any discussion with funders yet. Supervisors may need to loosen reserve requirements to provide breathing space. Forbearance with struggling clients should be tolerated, as long as MFIs sketch out a path back to normal for when the pandemic is over.

該怎麼做？短期來看，可行的小額信貸機構需要支持。捐助者和投資者應考慮暫緩償付、展延債務或注入資本。近一半的微型信貸機構表示，尚未與資助者進行任何討論。監管機關可能需要放寬準備金要求，提供喘息空間。寬容對待財務窘困客戶的業者，應予以包容，只要微型信貸機構能勾勒出疫後重返常軌的藍圖。

In the longer term governments need to crack down on predatory lending and make rules more consistent and uniform. That will prevent vulnerable people from being exploited and also help restore confidence in legitimate microlending firms.Calibrating regulation is not easy, but some obvious measures include better information-sharing, so MFIs know what they are doing and people can shop around; an obligation to properly assess borrowers’ ability to repay; transparency on rates and fees; protection against harassment; and credible grievance mechanisms, advertised in information campaigns. For governments battling deep recessions microfinance may seem a sideshow. But all MFIs together have 140m customers, so nursing the industry back to health will give a big bang for the buck.■ 

長遠來看，政府需要取締掠奪性放貸行為，並使規則更趨一致和統一。這將防止弱勢者受到剝削，也有助於恢復對合法微型貸款公司的信心。法規校正並非易事，但有些措施顯然可行，包括：加強資訊共享，以便微型信貸機構知道自己在做什麼，民眾也可貨比三家；善盡妥善評估借款人還款能力的義務；利率和費用公開透明；保護客戶免受騷擾；以及可靠的申訴機制，透過資訊宣傳公諸於世。對於忙著與嚴重衰退搏鬥的政府來說，微型信貸似乎是次要的。但是微型信貸機構合起來總共有1.4億客戶，因此，呵護這行業恢復健康，這筆錢將會是一本萬利。

超級大國政治--地球上最危險的地方

 NONE MAY 01, 2021

Superpower politics 超級大國政治

The most dangerous place on Earth 地球上最危險的地方

America and China must work harder to avoid war over the future of Taiwan 美中必須更努力避免因台灣的未來而發動戰爭

 

THE TEST of a first-rate intelligence, wrote F. Scott Fitzgerald, is the ability to hold two opposing ideas in mind at the same time and still retain the ability to function. For decades just such an exercise of high-calibre ambiguity has kept the peace between America and China over Taiwan, an island of 24m people, 100 miles (160km) off China’s coast. Leaders in Beijing say there is only one China, which they run, and that Taiwanis a rebellious part of it. America nods to the one China idea, but has spent 70 years ensuring there are two.

弗茲傑羅寫道，一流智慧的試金石，是腦中能兼容兩種相反觀念，還能維持正常運作。數十年來，藉著這種高素質模擬兩可的做法，維持了美中之間持續對台灣議題的和平。台灣是一個2,400萬人口的島嶼，距中國海岸僅100英里（160公里）。北京歷屆領導人說只有一個中國，即他們治理的那個，台灣則是其叛離的一部分。美國贊同一個中國的想法，但花了70年來確保其實為二。

Today, however, this strategic ambiguity is breaking down. The United States is coming to fear that it may no longer be able to deter China from seizing Taiwan by force. Admiral Phil Davidson, who heads the Indo-Pacific Command, told Congress in March that he worried about China attacking Taiwan as soon as 2027.

但如今這種戰略性的模擬兩可正在瓦解。美國開始擔心它可能不再能夠阻止中國武力奪取台灣。印太部司令、海軍上將戴維森在3月告訴國會，他擔心中國最快在2027年襲擊台灣。

War would be a catastrophe, and not only because of the bloodshed in Taiwan and the risk of escalation between two nuclear powers. One reason is economic. The island lies at the heart of the semiconductor industry. TSMC, the world’s most valuable chipmaker, etches 84% of the most advanced chips. Were production at TSMC to stop, so would the global electronics industry, at incalculable cost. The firm’s technology and know-how are perhaps a decade ahead of its rivals’, and it will take many years of work before either America or China can hope to catch up.

戰爭將是一場大災難，不光是因為台灣將血流成河，以及兩個核武強權間的風險驟升，原因之一在於經濟。台灣位於半導體產業的心臟地帶。全球最有價值的晶片製造廠台積電，蝕刻84％的最尖端晶片。一旦台積電生產中止，而全球電子業也會跟著停擺，損失成本難以計算。該公司的技術和專業可能領先競爭對手十年，而且美國或中國需花費很多年才能望其項背。

The bigger reason is that Taiwan is an arena for the rivalry between China and America. Although the United States is not treaty-bound to defend Taiwan, a Chinese assault would be a test of America’s military might and its diplomatic and political resolve. If the Seventh Fleet failed to turn up, China would overnight become the dominant power in Asia. America’s allies around the world would know that they could not count on it. Pax Americana would collapse.

更嚴峻的原因是，台灣是中美競爭的舞台。儘管美國不受條約約束的保衛台灣，但中國動武將考驗美國軍力及其外交和政治決心。一旦第七艦隊沒有現身，中國將在一夜之間成為亞洲的主宰。美國在世界各地的盟友會知道，他們不能倚靠美國。美利堅盛世將會崩潰。

To understand how to avoid conflict in the Taiwan Strait, start with the contradictions that have kept the peace during the past few decades. The government in Beijing insists it has a duty to bring about unification—even, as a last resort, by means of invasion. The Taiwanese, who used to agree that their island was part of China (albeit a non-Communist one), have taken to electing governments that stress its separateness, while stopping short of declaring independence. And America has protected Taiwan from Chinese aggression, even though it recognises the government in Beijing. These opposing ideas are bundled into what Fitzgerald’s diplomatic inheritors blithely call the “status quo”. In fact, it is a roiling, seething source of neurosis and doubt.

要了解如何避免台海戰爭，得從維持數十年和平的矛盾著手。 北京政府堅稱，有責任實現統一，即使最後迫不得已武力侵台，也在所不惜。台灣人過去同意此島是中國的一部分（但非共產主義中國），卻選出強調分離的政府，儘管沒有宣布獨立。即使美國承認北京政府，美國也保護台灣免受中國的侵略。這些對立觀念被承襲費茲傑羅外交作風的人士包裹起來，愉快地稱之為「現狀」。實際上，這卻是神經緊繃和懷疑猜忌不斷翻滾、沸騰的根源。

What has changed of late is America’s perception of a tipping-point in China’s cross-strait military build-up, 25 years in the making. The Chinese navy has launched 90 major ships and submarines in the past five years, four to five times as many as America has in the western Pacific. China builds over 100 advanced fighter planes each year; it has deployed space weapons and is bristling with precision missiles that can hit Taiwan, US Navy vessels and American bases in Japan, South Korea and Guam. In the war games that simulate a Chinese attack on Taiwan, America has started to lose.

最近發生改變的是，美國意識到中國25年來海峽的軍力建設出現臨界點。過去五年來，中國海軍編制90艘大型艦艇和潛艇，是美國在西太平洋的四到五倍。中國每年製造超過100架先進戰鬥機，部署太空武器，大批覆蓋可以打到台灣、美國軍艦及在日本、南韓和關島的美軍基地的精密導彈。在模擬中國對台灣進攻的戰爭遊戲中，美國已經開始敗退。

Some American analysts conclude that military superiority will sooner or later tempt China into using force against Taiwan, not as a last resort but because it can. China has talked itself into believing that America wants to keep the Taiwan crisis boiling and may even want a war to contain China’s rise. It has trampled the idea that Hong Kong has a separate system of government, devaluing a similar offer designed to win over the people of Taiwan to peaceful unification. In the South China Sea it has been converting barren reefs into military bases.

部分美國分析師總結，軍事優勢遲早會誘使中國對台灣動武，不是什麼最後手段，而是因為他有能力這麼做。中國說服自己相信美國希望台灣危機沸騰，甚至可能希望透過戰爭來遏制中國崛起​​。它已踐踏容許香港擁有自治政府體制的想法，也貶低類似的一國兩制提議，藉此贏得台灣人民對和平統一的認同。它還將南海貧瘠的島礁，轉變成軍事基地。

Although China has clearly become more authoritarian and nationalistic, this analysis is too pessimistic—perhaps because hostility to China is becoming the default in America. Xi Jinping, China’s president, has not even begun to prepare his people for a war likely to inflict mass casualties and economic pain on all sides. In its 100th year the Communist Party is building its claim to power on prosperity, stability and China’s status in its region and growing role in the world. All that would be jeopardised by an attack whose result, whatever the US Navy says, comes with lots of uncertainty attached, not least over how to govern a rebellious Taiwan. Why would Mr Xi risk it all now, when China could wait until the odds are even better?

儘管中國明顯已變得更加專制和民族主義，但這種分析還是太悲觀。也許是因為對中的敵意在美國已心照不宣。中國國家主席習近平甚至還沒有開始要他的人民做好準備，發動一場可能給各方造成大規模傷亡和經濟痛苦的戰爭。在共產黨成立100周年，強打的是繁榮、穩定和中國在區域及全球愈趨重要的角色，而這一切，都會因一場攻擊而受到危害，無論美國海軍怎麼說，戰爭都帶來許多不確定性，並非只有治理叛離的台灣。若中國可以等到更好的時機，習近平為什麼要現在冒險孤注一擲？

Yet that brings only some comfort. Nobody in America can really know what Mr Xi intends today, let alone what he or his successor may want in the future. China’s impatience is likely to grow. Mr Xi’s appetite for risk may sharpen, especially if he wants unification with Taiwan to crown his legacy.

但這只能帶來一絲安慰。美國沒有人真的知道習近平當今的盤算，遑論他或他的繼任者未來怎麼想。中國的不耐情緒可能會升溫。習近平對風險的偏好可能會驟升，特別是如果他想靠統一台灣，來為自己的政績加冕。

If they are to ensure that war remains too much of a gamble for China, America and Taiwan need to think ahead. Work to re-establish an equilibrium across the Taiwan Strait will take years. Taiwan must start to devote fewer resources to big, expensive weapons systems that are vulnerable to Chinese missiles and more to tactics and technologies that would frustrate an invasion.

若要確保戰爭對中國來說仍是代價太高的豪賭，美國和台灣必須想得更遠。重建台海平衡將耗時數年。台灣必須開始投入較少資源購置大型、昂貴的武器系統，畢竟那面對中國導彈不堪一擊；反之，應投入更多資源，加強反侵略的戰術和技術。

America requires weapons to deter China from launching an amphibious invasion; it must prepare its allies, including Japan and South Korea; and it needs to communicate to China that its battle plans are credible. This will be a tricky balance to strike. Deterrence usually strives to be crystal-clear about retaliation. The message here is more subtle. China must be discouraged from trying to change Taiwan’s status by force even as it is reassured that America will not support a dash for formal independence by Taiwan. The risk of a superpower arms race is high.

美國需要武器來阻止中國發動海陸空入侵，它須與盟友就緒，包括日本和南韓；它需向中國傳達其戰鬥計畫是可信的。要取得平衡，十分棘手。嚇阻，通常要明確表態可能報復。這裡的訊息比較微妙：必須阻止中國試圖以武力改變台灣現狀，同時讓中國放心，美國不支持台灣追求正式獨立的暴衝。超級大國軍備競賽的風險很高。

Be under no illusions how hard it is to sustain ambiguity. Hawks in Washington and Beijing will always be able to portray it as weakness. And yet, seemingly useful shows of support for Taiwan, such as American warships making port calls on the island, could be misread as a dangerous shift in intentions.

保持模稜兩可有多麼難，別抱任何幻想。華府和北京的鷹派總能把它描繪成軟弱。況且，展現對台灣的支持，例如美國軍艦停靠台灣，這麼做看似有用，卻可能被錯誤解讀成美國意圖起了危險的轉變。

Most disputes are best put to rest. Those that can be resolved only in war can often be put off and, as China’s late leader Deng Xiaoping said, left to wiser generations. Nowhere presents such a test of statesmanship as the most dangerous place on Earth. ■

最好擱置大多數爭議。唯有戰爭才能解決的問題，通常都可推遲，正如已故中國領導人鄧小平所說的，留給更明智的後代去解決。沒有別處像這地球上最危險的地方這般，考驗著政治家的風範。 ■

貓熊的力量--日本強大的派閥努力在取悅中國

  

 

Panda power 貓熊的力量

A powerful faction in Japan strives to keep China sweet

日本強大的派閥努力在取悅中國

NONE MAY 01, 2021

THERE ARE no fewer than seven pandas at the Adventure World zoo in Wakayama, a mountainous region in central Japan. After the latest cub was born in November, Zhao Lijian, a spokesman for China’s foreign ministry known for his pugnacious tweets, went all gooey: “It will be a witness of the friendship between China and Japan.” That may be wishful thinking. But the prevalence of the rare bears in Wakayama certainly bears witness to the clout of Nikai Toshihiro, one of the prefecture’s representatives in the Diet and one of China’s best friends in Japan.

日本中部群山環繞和歌山縣，有不少於七隻貓熊在冒險世界動物園。小貓熊11月誕生後，推特上好戰出了名的中國外交部發言人趙立堅滿口甜言蜜語說：「這將見證中日友誼。」那可能是一廂情願的想法。但是和歌山稀有貓熊的盛行，無疑見證了二階俊博的影響力，二階俊博是日本國會代表，也是中國在日本最好的朋友。

Mr Nikai is the secretary-general of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), second in rank only to its leader, Suga Yoshihide, who is also the prime minister. He wields immense influence over the party’s candidates, legislative agenda and budget. He has held the job for longer than anyone in the party’s 65-year history.

二階俊博是執政的自民黨幹事長，地位僅次於黨魁暨首相菅義偉。他對黨內候選人、立法議程和預算擁有巨大的影響力。在自民黨65年歷史，他擔任祕書長的時間比任何人都來得長。

Mr Nikai is also Japan’s most prominent advocate of friendlier ties with China. The two neighbours have a series of long-simmering disputes, over everything from Japan’s half-hearted contrition for its atrocities during the second world war to a territorial dispute over some tiny specks in the East China Sea. But plenty of powerful Japanese, especially among business people, would prefer to be on better terms. China buys some 22% of Japan’s exports, more than America’s 18%. Hong Kong absorbs another 5%. Japan needs “a more harmonious relationship with China”, says Nakanishi Hiroaki, the head of Keidanren, Japan’s biggest business lobby. As Seguchi Kiyoyuki, a former head of the central bank’s office in Beijing, argues, “The US is father and China is mother—we cannot choose.”

這兩個鄰國紛爭由來已久，從日本對二戰暴行悔過有口無心，到東海小島領土爭端，林林總總。 但許多日本權貴，尤其是商界人士，都寧願兩國改善關係。中國購買22％日本出口的產品，超過美國的18％，香港貢獻另外5％。日本最大的商業遊說團體、經濟團體聯合會會長中西宏明說，日本需要「與中國建立更和諧的關係」。正如日本央行北京事務所前所長瀨口清之主張：「美國是父親，中國是母親，我們無法選擇。」

Mr Nikai tends to echo such sentiments. Born in 1939 in Gobo, a small city in Wakayama prefecture, he came of age in an era when backroom dealmaking was the norm in Japan. He is a skilled practitioner of “ryoteipolitics”, says Nakabayashi Mieko of Waseda University, referring to the posh restaurants where Japanese powerbrokers gather in private rooms to resolve matters of business and state out of the public eye.

二階俊博傾向附和這種觀點。他出生在1939年和歌山縣一個小城御坊市，且在日本密室操盤很普遍的時代茁壯成長。早稻田大學的中林美惠子說，他是「料亭政治」的實踐者，意指日本政治掮客聚在豪華餐廳包廂喬政商事務，遠離公眾視線。

Whereas younger politicians focus on public relations, Mr Nikai concentrates on human relationships, says Iio Jun of the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies in Tokyo. He used to run the powerful Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, which helped him not only to build ties with big business, but also to gather a loyal following within the LDP. In 2016 the prime minister of the day, Abe Shinzo, tapped him to become its secretary-general, in part to keep him from throwing his weight behind a rival candidate for leadership of the party.

東京國立政策研究大學的飯尾潤說，年輕的政治家關注社會關係，而二階俊博則專注於人際關係。他曾經擔任位高權重的經濟、貿易及產業大臣，這不僅幫助他與大企業建立聯繫，而且有助在自民黨內聚集忠實的追隨者。 2016年時任首相安倍晉三欽點他為幹事長，部分原因是為了避免他鼎力支持對手競選黨魁。

That perch helped make Mr Nikai a kingmaker when Mr Abe unexpectedly resigned owing to ill health last year. Mr Suga was not seen as a successor, but Mr Nikai marshalled support for him. “He feels that he made the Suga administration, so he feels perhaps equal to Suga, or even higher than him,” says Shinohara Fumiya, a commentator close to Mr Nikai. His continued backing is essential to Mr Suga’s survival, though deference to Mr Nikai has also damaged Mr Suga’s standing. Mr Nikai promoted an ill-considered subsidy for domestic tourism that helped spread the pandemic. In an embarrassing reversal, Mr Suga had to scrap the idea.

這一高位助使二階俊博成為造王者，當安倍晉三去年因身體欠佳而意外辭職時，菅義偉並未被視為接班人，但二階俊博引領對他的支持。 熟悉二階俊博的評論者篠原文也說，「對他來說，他覺得自己一手造成了菅義偉政府，所以他覺得自己與菅義偉平等，或甚至高於他。」他的持續支持對菅義偉的生存至關重要，儘管服從二階俊博也損害了菅義偉的地位。 二階俊博對國內旅遊業推行一項思慮欠佳的補貼，這種補貼幫助散播疫情。在令人尷尬的挫折後，菅義偉不得不打消這個念頭。

Among Mr Nikai’s causes, none counts for more than relations with China. For many Japanese of his generation, a sense of guilt about the war bred an eagerness to help China develop. Ancient cultural ties serve as another impetus to get along. “It’s China’s cultural power that first bought Nikai,” reckons Miura Lully, a political scientist in Tokyo.

在二階俊博的志業中，沒有比中日關係更重要的。對他這一代的許多日本人來說，對戰爭的內咎產生幫助中國發展的渴望。古老的文化淵源提供和睦相處的另一動力。東京政治學家三浦琉麗認為：「是中國文化力量最先讓二階俊博信服。」

Yet it is China’s economic power that has kept Mr Nikai enthralled. He began taking big delegations of businessmen to China as early as 2000. His long-term relationships with Chinese leaders make him a “rarity” these days, says Yu Tiejun of Peking University. “Diplomacy depends on human relationships to a great extent; trust is the most important thing. We cannot find many people like him who could be trusted by this side.”

然而，讓二階俊博深深著迷的，卻是中國的經濟實力。北京大學的于鐵軍說，他早在2000年就開始帶領大型商業代表團訪華。他與中國領導人的長期關係使他如今變得「稀有」。 「外交在很大程度取決於人際關係；信任是最重要的事。像他這樣可受我方信任的人，找不到幾個（寥寥無幾）。」

Those ties proved useful when Sino-Japanese relations hit a nadir in the early 2010s. As tension over the disputed islands threatened to flare into open conflict, China banned exports of important industrial materials to Japan and angry mobs ransacked Japanese car showrooms in China. But Mr Nikai kept talking and travelling. “We need to be able to talk to the Chinese, and Mr Nikai is an asset,” says Miyake Kunihiko, a former diplomat and special adviser to Mr Suga. When Mr Abe moved to calm relations in 2017, Mr Nikai delivered a letter from him to Xi Jinping, China’s president. “He played a role as the bridge between Abe and Xi,” says Kawashima Shin of the University of Tokyo. In the trip’s wake, bilateral trade flourished and the number of Chinese tourists visiting Japan leapt. Mr Abe made plans to receive Mr Xi on a state visit to Tokyo.

2010年初中日關係在跌至最低點時，這些維繫被證明是有用的。由於爭議島嶼的緊張局勢，戰爭威脅一觸即發，中國禁止向日本出口重要的工業材料，憤怒的暴民洗劫日本在中國的汽車展列室。但是，二階俊博不斷對話和奔走。菅義偉的前外交官兼特別顧問官家邦彥說：「我們需要能夠與中國人對話，而二階俊博是一種資產。」2017年安倍試圖緩和兩國關係時，二階俊博為他送信給中國國家主席習近平。東京大學的川島真說：「他扮演了安倍與習近平之間橋樑的角色。」在此行之後，雙邊貿易蓬勃發展，訪日的中國遊客數量猛增。安倍制定計畫接待習近平到東京進行國事訪問。

But tensions between the two countries are rising again, testing the limits of Mr Nikai’s influence. China’s recent abuses in Hong Kong and Xinjiang and its growing hostility to Taiwan have made moderation harder to sell. Separating business from security is becoming trickier, too, as the line between them becomes more blurred. Calls are growing in Japan for Mr Xi’s visit (which was postponed because of covid-19) to be cancelled and for Japan to adopt Western sanctions on China.

但兩國之間的緊張局勢再次升溫，考驗二階俊博影響力的極限。中國最近在香港和新疆的暴行，以及對台灣的敵對情緒日益增強，使得溫和理念難以推銷。將國安從商業分離也愈來愈難，因為界線變得愈來愈模糊，習近平的訪問因新冠疫情而推遲，愈來愈多的日本民眾呼籲取消，並要求日本跟進西方制裁中國。

After a recent summit, President Joe Biden and Mr Suga issued a joint statement supporting Taiwan, which the two countries have never before done. Mr Zhao has complained that Japan is acting as a “vassal” of America. “Nikai has hot lines to the Chinese side, but even such hot lines cannot solve territorial issues,” says Mr Kawashima. The pandas in Wakayama are not gifts, he notes, but merely on loan. ■

在最近的峰會後，美總統拜登和菅義偉發表支持台灣的聯合聲明，這是兩國從未有過的。趙立堅抱怨說，日本的言行舉止有如美國的「附庸國」。 川島真說：「二階俊博擁有直通中國的熱線電話，但即使這樣的熱線也無法解決領土問題。」他指出，和歌山的熊貓不是贈禮，只是借來的。 ■

每日圖表--溫室氣體排放量在2021年將迅速增加

 

Daily chart 每日圖表

Greenhouse-gas emissions are set to rise fast in 2021 溫室氣體排放量在2021年將迅速增加

Last year’s decline, caused by the pandemic, will probably be short-lived

去年因疫病流行造成下降可能是短暫的

Graphic detail

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Apr 20th 2021

A YEAR AGO, as countries locked down amid spiralling covid-19 infections and deaths, some environmentalists heralded a potential silver lining to the pandemic: a decline in the world’s use of fossil fuels, and therefore greenhouse-gas emissions. Indeed, global energy-related carbon emissions fell by 5.8% in 2020, or nearly 2 gigatonnes of carbon dioxide, thanks to reduced demand for oil, coal and gas. Such a reduction, alone, would have no long-term impact on global temperatures, which depend on cumulative emissions in the atmosphere. But the hope among climate optimists was that falling emissions might cause a further shift away from fossil fuels towards cleaner energy sources.

一年前，各國由於新冠病毒感染和死亡人數激增而實施封鎖，一些環保主義者預示對此流行病的一絲慰藉：世界對化石燃料的使用減少，進而導致溫室氣體排放量下降。的確，由於對石油、煤炭和天然氣的需求減少，全球能源相關碳排量在2020年下降了5.8％，即減少近20億公噸的二氧化碳。單憑如此，就不會對全球溫度造成長期影響，全球溫度取決於大氣中的累積排放量。但是，氣候樂觀主義者的希望是碳排量的下降將導致進一步轉變，從化石燃料邁向清潔能源。

A new report by the International Energy Agency (IEA), an intergovernmental forecaster, suggests that this hope may have been misplaced. In its latest Global Energy Review, the IEA predicts that energy-related carbon-dioxide emissions will rise by 1.5 gigatonnes to 33 gigatonnes in 2021, an increase of almost 5%. In absolute terms this would be the largest increase since 2010 when, after the global financial crisis of 2007-09, governments poured cash into carbon-intensive projects in an effort to pull their economies out of recession.

跨國預測機構國際能源署（IEA）的最新報告指出，這種希望可能錯誤寄託。IEA在最新的《全球能源評論》預測，能源相關的碳排量將在2021年增加15億噸至330億噸，增長近5％。在絕對數據上看，這將是自2010年以來的最大增幅，在2007至2009年全球金融危機之後，各國政府向碳密集項目砸錢，努力拉升經濟擺脫衰退。

Most of the increase in emissions predicted for 2021 will be driven by a dramatic rebound in the burning of coal, particularly in China. The IEA thinks global demand for coal will approach the peak of 2014. It also expects global demand for natural gas to exceed the level of 2019. Demand for both fuels will be pushed up by higher consumption once vaccination roll-outs cause societies to open back up. Oil will also rebound, though at a slower rate because of the sluggish recovery of aviation. All told, emissions will be slightly lower in 2021 than before the pandemic, but are likely to quickly exceed 2019 levels once lingering coronavirus restrictions—such as limits on international travel—are lifted.

由於燃煤燃燒的急劇反彈帶動，預計2021年碳排量將大幅增加，尤其是在中國。 IEA認為，全球對煤炭的需求將接近2014年的高峰，也預估全球對天然氣的需求將超過2019年的水平。一旦推出疫苗接種導致社會重新開放，這兩種燃料的需求將被更高的消費量推升向上。石油也將反彈，但速度比較緩慢，因為航空業復甦遲緩。總而言之，2021年的碳排量將比疫病流行前略低，但一旦解除殘餘的防疫限制（例如對國際旅行設限），碳排量可能迅速超過2019年的水準。

The IEA expects renewable-energy generation to rise, too. In 2021 renewable sources will account for 30% of global electricity, its largest ever share. Wind and solar power is on track for its largest rise in history. But even these achievements will be eclipsed by the increased use of fossil fuels to meet global energy demand, which is expected to grow by 4.6%.

IEA預計再生能源發電量也將增加。到2021年，再生能源將占全球電力的30％，這是歷來最大的比例。風能和太陽能有望實現史上最大的增長。但就連這些成就也會相形見絀，因為要滿足全球能源需求，化石燃料用量增幅會更大，預計將成長4.6％。

If such predictions are borne out, 2020 will have been little more than a temporary dip in the world’s emissions, not a turning-point. For Fatih Birol, the IEA’s executive director, this is evidence that not nearly enough is being done to protect the environment as the world emerges from the pandemic. “This is a dire warning that the economic recovery from the Covid crisis is currently anything but sustainable for our climate,” Mr Birol said. “Unless governments around the world move rapidly to start cutting emissions, we are likely to face an even worse situation in 2022.”

如果這些預測得到證實，那麼2020年世界碳排量僅是暫時下降，而不是轉折點。對IEA署長畢洛而言，這證明在世界逐漸擺脫疫情的此刻，保護環境的努力遠遠不夠。「這是一個可怕的警告，目前經濟從新冠危機中復甦，但無助於我們的氣候永續。」畢洛說。「除非世界各國政府迅速採取行動開始削減碳排，否則我們很可能在2022年面臨更糟的情況。」

水墓--日本對福島核廢水的答案：入海

 

Watery grave 水墓

Japan’s answer to Fukushima’s nuclear wastewater: Get in the sea 日本對福島核廢水的答案：入海

It will be treated before being released. But locals are sceptical

廢水釋放前將被處理，但當地人仍心存疑慮

Asia

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Apr 13th 2021

TOKYO

LESS THAN an hour after north-eastern Japan was rocked by the biggest earthquake in the country’s history, in 2011, a towering tsunami crashed into the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear plant and triggered a triple reactor meltdown. In the decade since the disaster, water has continued to flow through the wreckage. Some 1.25m tonnes of liquid now sits in storage tanks near the reactors (pictured). But authorities are running out of space to put the stuff. On Tuesday the Japanese government announced it would release the wastewater into the ocean after treating it to remove most radioactive elements.

2011年，日本東北史上最大地震搖晃後不到一小時，一場排天倒海的海嘯摧毀福島第一核電廠，並引發1-3號機核反應爐熔毀。大災難後十年來，水繼續流過殘骸。約125萬公噸的液體現在置於核反應爐附近的儲槽中（如圖所示）。但是當局用光放置這些物品的空間。.日本政府周二宣布將把廢水排入海洋，排放前會經過處理，去除大部分放射性元素。

The decision was no less controversial for having long been expected. Debates about what to do with the water have raged for years. The government and Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), the plant’s operator, insist the plan is safe and meets international standards for releasing wastewater at nuclear power plants. The discharges will begin only two years from now, subject to further approval by Japan’s nuclear regulator. Besides, it will be a gradual release over the course of several decades. Nonetheless, local fishermen, several neighbouring countries and many environmental activists remain fiercely opposed.

這個決定早在預料之中，爭議性卻沒有因此而減少。關於如何處理這些廢水已爭論多年。政府與電廠營運商東京電力公司（TEPCO）堅稱計劃是安全的，並且符合核電廠排放廢水的國際標準。核廢水排放兩年後才會展開，仍須日本核監管機關進一步批准，而且會分幾十年逐步釋出。儘管如此，當地漁民、眾多鄰國和許多環保運動人士仍然強烈反對。

The waters are a mixture of fluids used to cool the cores of the damaged reactors, as well as ground and rainwater that constantly flow through the plant. TEPCO has tried in vain to stop the accumulation, even attempting to construct an underground ice wall to prevent water from seeping into the plant. Yet the water continues to build up at a rate of 170 tonnes per day, complicating the already devilish decommissioning process.

這些水是用來冷卻受損核反應爐芯的液體混合物，以及不斷流經電廠的地下水和雨水。TEPCO嘗試阻止廢水蓄積，但徒勞無功，甚至想過要建造地下冰牆以防止水滲入（核電）廠內。然而，水繼續以每天170噸的速度蓄積，使得已很困難的退役過程變得複雜。

Before releasing any of the water into the ocean, TEPCO says it will be filtered with a treatment system designed to remove all but trace amounts of dangerous radionuclides. But it cannot separate tritium, a radioactive isotope of hydrogen that experts consider harmless in small amounts. The tritium-tainted water will be diluted with seawater until the concentrations fall below internationally-accepted limits. Both America, Japan's most important ally, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have endorsed the approach. “The method Japan has chosen is both technically feasible and in line with international practice,” said the IAEA’s director, Rafael Mariano Grossi.

東京電力公司表示，任何水排入海之前，將用處理系統過濾，危險的放射性元素將去除殆盡。但是它不能分離出氫的放射性同位素--氚，專家認為少量無害。 受氚污染的水將用海水稀釋，直到濃度降至國際公認的最低限值以下。日本最重要的盟友美國和國際原子能機構（IAEA）都贊同此方法。國際原子能機構總幹事格羅西說：「日本選擇的方法在技術上可行，且符合國際慣例。」

That is not enough to reassure sceptics. Local fishermen who have struggled to rebuild their businesses after the disaster worry that it will further taint the reputation of their catch. “No one is convinced or can understand it,” the head of one local fishery co-operative said on Monday as word leaked out of the impending announcement. The governments of South Korea, China and Taiwan have all raised safety concerns. Environmental activists accuse the Japanese authorities of playing down the radiation risks and ignoring other possible solutions, such as building additional storage tanks elsewhere. Greenpeace, a pressure group, argues that the Japanese government merely “opted for the cheapest option”.

這不足以消除疑慮。災難後苦苦掙扎重建業務的當地漁民擔心，這將進一步汙染漁獲物的聲譽。在周一即將宣布的訊息走漏風聲後，的當地漁業合作社的負責人說：「沒人信服或可以理解它。」南韓、中國和台灣的政府都提出對安全的憂心。環保運動人士指責日本當局低估輻射風險，無視其他可能的解決方案，例如在其他地方建造更多的儲罐。施壓團體綠色和平組織主張，日本政府只是「選擇最便宜的方案」。

The scepticism reflects another of the disaster’s legacies: an enduring mistrust of experts and official institutions. It is not entirely unfounded. In 2018, after years of insisting that the water in storage had already been filtered to contain only tritium, TEPCO admitted that much of it had not been treated properly and still contained other, dangerous, isotopes. Roughly 70% of the accumulated water needs to be re-treated before it can be discharged. Releasing the water may make it easier to rebuild the Fukushima area, but it will do little to help restore trust.

這些懷疑反映核災的另一個遺毒：對專家和官方機構的長期不信任。這並非毫無根據。在多年堅持儲槽的水過濾後僅含有氚之後，TEPCO在2018年承認，其中許多水未經妥善處理，仍然含有其他危險的同位素。大約70％的儲水需要重新處理才能排出。排放廢水可能使重建福島地區變得更容易，但對重拾信任的幫助卻微乎其微。