似乎瘋了--疫病流行改變全球幸福曲線

 

It might seem crazy 似乎瘋了

The pandemic has changed the shape of global happiness 

疫病流行改變全球幸福曲線

The old have become happier and the young more miserable

老年人變得更快樂，年輕人變得更悲慘

International

Mar 20th 2021 edition

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Mar 20th 2021

SÃO PAULO AND SEOUL

The covid-19 pandemic has done nothing good for the mood of Park Ha-young, an undergraduate at Seoul National University. She spent much of last year worrying about the disease, and her chances of spreading it: “I was terrified of becoming the person to cause a huge outbreak.” Her freedom has been drastically curtailed. The government determines whether she can see friends or attend classes, leaving her frustrated and unable to make plans. She is beginning to worry about finding a job after she graduates.

新冠病毒大流行對首爾大學的學生朴荷英的心情無所助益。去年的大部分時間她都在擔心疾病與由她散播的可能性：「我很害怕成為導致疫情大爆發的人。」她的自由被大幅限縮。政府決定她是否可以見朋友或上課，這使她既沮喪又無法安排計畫。她開始擔心畢業後找不到工作

Politicians and officials frequently talk about how covid-19 affects public health and the economy. But for most people those are abstract considerations. What they experience each day are moods—the sense of being anxious and sad, or, if they are lucky, cheerful and optimistic. To mark World Happiness Day on March 20th, researchers linked to the un Sustainable Development Solutions Network have tried to pin down these moods and examine how the pandemic has changed them.

政治人物和官員經常談論新冠病毒如何影響公共健康和經濟。但是對於大多數人來說，這些考慮是抽象。他們每天所經歷的是情緒-焦慮和悲傷的感覺，或開朗的和樂觀的感覺，如果他們幸運的話。為紀念3月20日的世界幸福日，研究員與聯合國永續發展方法網路聯繫，試圖弄清楚這些情緒，並研究疫病流行如何改變它們。

Gallup, a pollster, asks the same questions in scores of countries. The most revealing one tells people to imagine a ladder, with steps numbered nought to ten. The top rung represents the best life you could have, the bottom rung represents the worst. What rung are you on now?

調查員蓋洛普（Gallup）在數十個國家問同樣的問題，最能揭露真相的問題是 ：告訴人們想像一排階梯，階梯數字從零到九。最頂層代表你可能擁有的最佳生活，最底部代表最糟的生活。你現在站在哪一層 ？

People’s responses to that question, known as a Cantril ladder, suggest (rather surprisingly) that the world was about as happy in the teeth of an awful pandemic as it was before the coronavirus struck. The average score across 95 countries, not population-weighted, crept up insignificantly from 5.81 in 2017-19 to 5.85 in 2020. But the pattern of life satisfaction has changed. Covid-19 has made old people more cheerful. A few countries have had some of the happiness squeezed out of them; others have amassed more of it.

這個問題稱作坎特里爾階梯量表，而人們的反應令人驚訝。它表明世界經歷過可怕疫情的幸福感，與新冠病毒襲擊前幾乎相同。 95個國家（未經過人口加權）的平均得分從2017至2019年的5.81緩步微升至2020年的5.85。但是，生活滿意度的模式已經改變。 新冠疫情使老年人變得更加開朗。少數國家的幸福被榨乾，其他國家則累積更多。

Covid-19 threatens the old far more than the young, with the risk of death after contracting the disease doubling for every eight years of life. Yet the old have cheered up. Globally, between 2017-19 and 2020 happiness was boosted by 0.22 points on the Cantril ladder among people over the age of 60. Celina Beatriz Gazeti dos Santos, a 64-year-old psychologist in São Paulo, ticks off a list of things that might dampen her mood—the pandemic, widespread corruption, a dislikeable government, others’ misery. Yet she proclaims herself increasingly happy and optimistic all the same.

新冠病毒對老人的威脅遠大過年輕人，染疫死亡的風險每提高八歲便增一倍。然而，老人已振作起來。全球2017至2019到2020年之間，坎特里爾階梯表的60歲以上族群的幸福感提高0.22分。聖保羅的64歲心理學家Celina Beatriz Gazeti dos Santos列出可能會使她沮喪的事-疫病流行、廣泛的貪腐、令人討厭的政府以及其他人的痛苦。然而，她仍然宣稱自己愈來愈快樂和樂觀。

In Britain, a country with excellent happiness data, everyone has slipped, but some more than others (see chart 1). There, and in other rich countries, the age profile of happiness before the pandemic struck was roughly U-shaped when plotted on a graph. People began their adult lives in a cheerful state. They became glummer in middle age. Then, after about the age of 50, they started to became happier again. If they made it to a very advanced age, however, they fell back into the doldrums.

英國曾是擁有極佳幸福數據的國家，每個人都在退步，但是有些人更慘。英國及其他富裕國家，疫情襲擊前的幸福年齡分布圖大致呈U曲線。人們以愉快的心境展開成年生活。他們在中年變得沈悶。然後，在大約50歲之後，他們再次變得較快樂。但是，如果他們到了很高的年齡，他們會再次陷入低迷。

Today the pattern is an upward slope. The young are less satisfied than the middle-aged, who are less satisfied than the old. That might be put down to Britain’s vaccination programme, which has targeted the old first. But the pattern has barely changed over the past year. Months before Britons became familiar with what some call “the Pfizer” and “the AstraZeneca”, something had shifted.

今天的圖案傾斜向上。年輕人的滿足感比中年人低，而中年人的滿足感又低於老年人。這可能歸因於英國的疫苗接種計畫，該計劃以老人為優先目標。但這型態過去一年來幾乎沒什麼改變。在英國人熟悉所謂的「輝瑞」和「阿斯特捷利康」數月之前，情況已經發生變化。

Video-conferencing software has enabled many old people to stay in touch with their families—sometimes better than before the pandemic. In countries that locked down, they have the pleasure of knowing that society made sacrifices to protect them. And as John Helliwell, an economist at the University of British Columbia who wrote part of the World Happiness Report points out, the old feel healthier. Globally, 36% of men over the age of 60 said they had a health problem last year, down from an average of 46% in the three years before. Among women, the share with health problems fell from 51% to 42%. Old people probably are not actually healthier. Rather, covid-19 has changed the yardstick. They feel healthier because they have dodged a disease that could kill them.

視頻會議軟體使許多老人與家人保持聯繫，有時比疫情前更好。在實施封鎖的國家，他們很高興知道社會為保護他們做出犧牲。正如英屬哥倫比亞大學的經濟學家赫里威爾寫得《世界幸福報告》部分中指出，老人感覺更健康。全球來說，滿六十歲男性有36％自稱有健康問題，比三年前的平均46％下降。在女性中，有健康問題的比率從51％下降到42％。老年人實際上可能並沒有更健康。更準確地說，新冠病毒改變了評判標準。他們感到更健康，是因為他們躲過一種可能殺死他們的疾病。

Meanwhile the young have had a rough year. Many lost their jobs—in America the unemployment rate for people aged 20 to 24 shot up from 6.3% in February 2020 to 25.6% two months later (it fell back to 9.6% last month). In some rich countries young women have had a particularly hard time. They often work in sectors, such as hospitality, which have been shut down. When schools close, many are lumbered with more than their fair share of child care.

同時，年輕人度過艱難的一年，許多人失業。美國20歲至24歲的失業率從2020年2月的6.3％，激增至兩個月後的25.6％（上個月回落至9.6％）。一些富國的年輕婦女過得特別艱難。她們從事的往往是疫情期間關閉的行業，例如餐旅業。當學校關閉時，許多婦女為照顧小孩不堪重負。

They also have busy social lives. Having lots of friends seems, counter-intuitively, to have made the pandemic harder. One study of Britain by Ben Etheridge and Lisa Spantig, both at the University of Essex, found that women with at least four close friends slumped more than anyone during the spring 2020 lockdown. “People who are used to seeing lots of friends really suffered—and women and younger people have more friends,” says Xiaowei Xu of the Institute for Fiscal Studies.

他們也有繁忙的社交生活。與直覺相反，有很多朋友似乎使疫情流行變得更加困難。英國艾塞克斯大學的埃特里奇和斯潘蒂格的一項研究發現，在至少擁有四個親密朋友的女性在2020年春季封鎖期間的跌幅最大。 財政研究機構的徐小偉說：「過去探視很多朋友的人們十分難受，而婦女和年輕人有較多的朋友。」

Some countries have fared better than others (see chart 2). Whereas Britons’ happiness slumped in 2020, Germany rose from being the 15th happiest country in the world to the seventh happiest. Britain has endured long lockdowns and an excess-death rate of 190 per 100,000 people since the start of the pandemic. Germany’s excess-death rate is just 77 per 100,000. For most of last year Germany fought covid-19 much better than most of Europe, although it has gone on to fluff the vaccination endgame—leading Bild, a tabloid newspaper, to declare in February: “Liebe Briten, we beneiden you” (dear Britain, we envy you).

有些國家的情況比較好。雖然英國人的幸福感在2020年下降，德國則從世界最幸福的國家第15名上升到第七。自疫情以來，英國經歷漫長的封鎖，超額死亡率為每10萬人中有190人。德國的超額死亡率僅為10萬人中的77人。去年大部分時間，德國抗疫都比歐洲大部分地區都好得多，儘管它最後階段的疫苗接種搞砸了—通俗小報Bild在2月宣稱：「親愛的英國，我們嫉妒你」。

Strikingly, the countries that were at the top of the happiness chart before the pandemic remain there. The three highest-ranking countries in 2020—Finland, Iceland and Denmark—were among the top four in 2017-19. All three have dealt well with covid-19, and have excess-death rates below 21 per 100,000. Iceland has a negative rate. It helps to be a remote island.

值得注意的是，在疫病流行之前位於幸福榜前段的國家，仍然在那裡。 2020年排名前三的國家為芬蘭，冰島和丹麥，在2017至2019年排名前四。這三國對新冠疫情的處理都很好，超額死亡率低於100,000分之21。冰島為負值，成為一個孤島有助於防疫。

The most intriguing suggestion in the World Happiness Report is that some links between covid-19 and happiness operate in both directions. The authors do not suggest that happiness helps countries resist covid-19. Rather, they argue that one of the things that sustains national happiness also makes places better at dealing with pandemics. That thing is trust. Polls by Gallup show that many of the places that have coped best with covid-19, such as the Nordic countries and New Zealand, have widespread faith in institutions and strangers. Large majorities of their inhabitants believe that a neighbour would return a wallet if they found it.

《世界幸福報告》中最有趣的意見是，新冠病毒與幸福感之間的某些聯繫是雙向的。作者們並不認為幸福感可以幫助國家抵抗新冠病毒。更準確地說，他們主張有一件事維持國家幸福感，也使人們在應對疫情方面更有優勢。那件事就是信任。蓋洛普民調顯示，北歐和紐西蘭等防疫成功的地方，對機構和陌生人抱有廣泛的信心。他們的大多數居民相信，鄰居發現他們的錢包會歸還。

Countries have failed to see off covid-19 for many obvious reasons. Some are poor; others are poorly led. They lack recent experience with diseases such as sars. They cannot police their borders. But Jeffrey Sachs, an economist at Columbia University, suggests another reason: politicians and officials in many rich European and American countries decided they could not ask too much of the public. A combination of individualism and less-than-solid institutional trust meant they felt unable to insist on quarantines or mask-wearing until the situation grew desperate.

各國防疫失敗有許多明顯的原因。有些國家貧窮；其他國家領導不力。他們缺乏有關SARS等疾病的近期經驗。他們無法維持邊境警戒。但是，哥倫比亞大學的經濟學家薩克斯提出另一個原因：許多歐美富國的政治人物和官員們決定，他們不能向公眾提出太多要求。個人主義結合對體制的信任薄弱，意味著他們覺得無法堅持隔離或戴口罩，直到情況嚴重到不得不然。

People who don’t need people 不需要人的人

If that is right, it might help explain a broad regional change: the falling happiness of Latin America and the rising happiness of East Asia. Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Mexico all became less happy in 2020; China, Japan and Taiwan became happier, although South Korea slipped a bit. It is as though Latin American countries had the wrong kind of happiness before 2020, says Mr Helliwell—a happiness sustained by people’s close social connections, not by high levels of social trust. A global poll in 2019 found that only 52% of people in Latin America and the Caribbean thought a neighbour would return a wallet; just 41% thought a cop would. That is the lowest share of any region.

如果這是正確的，那可能有助於解釋廣泛的地區性變化：拉美的幸福感下降，東亞的幸福感上升。阿根廷、巴西、哥倫比亞和墨西哥都在2020年變得不那麼開心。中國，日本和台灣變得更加快樂，儘管韓國有所退步。赫里威爾說，拉丁美洲國家在2020年之前的幸福感似乎是錯誤的-這種幸福感是由人們緊密的社會聯繫，而非高度的社會信任所維持的。 2019年的一項全球民調發現，拉丁美洲和加勒比海地區只有52％的人認為鄰居會歸還錢包;只有41％的人認為警察會這麼做。這比率所有地區中最低的。

The pervasive lack of trust made it harder for Latin American countries to tackle covid-19 in a comprehensive way. People can and do keep their distance from each other, but that is emotionally tough in countries where people are normally so sociable. Mexicans have been deprived of their leisurely Friday lunches and Sunday family gatherings (though some carry on anyway). “The pandemic has changed a lot,” laments Edmilson de Souza Santos, a builder in Barueri, a São Paulo suburb. “You have to stop living your life.”

普遍缺乏信任使拉美國家更難全面應付新冠病毒。人們可以而且確實保持彼此的距離，但是這在情感上很難，尤其是在通常如此喜愛社交的國家。墨西哥人被剝奪周五悠閒的午餐和周日的家庭聚會，儘管有些人仍維持著。 「疫情改變了很多事」，聖保羅郊區巴魯埃里的建商Edmilson de Souza Santos感嘆。 「你必須停止你的生活。」

There remains a big national puzzle. America responded poorly to covid-19 and has suffered more than 500,000 excess deaths. Yet the Gallup poll detects a slight rise in Americans’ happiness level in 2020. A panel survey by the University of Southern California shows that mental stress and anxiety shot up in America last March and April, but then subsided. Two subsequent waves of infection and death appeared not to disturb them further.

這仍然有一個很大的國家難題。美國對新冠病毒的防疫不佳，超過50萬病例超額死亡。然而，蓋洛普民調發現，2020年美國人的幸福感略有上升。南加州大學進行小組調查顯示，去年3月和4月，美國人的精神壓力和焦慮情緒急劇上升，但隨後趨於平息。接著的兩次感染和死亡浪潮似乎並未進一步干擾他們。

Many American states have had rather lackadaisical lockdowns, at least for adults—for schoolchildren restrictions can seem unbending. That could have kept people’s spirits up. Abi Adams-Prassl of Oxford University and other researchers found that the first wave of lockdowns, last spring, lowered women’s moods. It could also be that extreme partisanship helps. Many Americans have spent the past year in an alternate information universe in which covid-19 is just like flu. It is hard to get too worked up about fake news. 

美國許多州對封鎖興致缺缺，至少對成年人來說（對學童的限制似乎能堅定不移）。那可能使人們情緒不至於太低落。牛津大學的亞當斯和其他研究人員發現，去年春季的第一波疫情封鎖，使婦女情緒沮喪。極端的黨派對立也可能有幫助。許多美國人過去一年在「新冠肺炎（covid-19）就像流感」的平行資訊世界中度過。既認定是假新聞，反應就不會太激動。

寸步向前--日本法院支持同性婚姻

 

Inching forward 寸步向前

A Japanese court backs same-sex marriage日本法院支持同性婚姻

But its ruling leaves it to the government to fix things

但法院裁決由政府去解決問題

Asia

Mar 20th 2021 edition

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Mar 18th 2021

TOKYO

On valentine’s day in 2019, 13 same-sex couples filed lawsuits in four cities across Japan. Their case was simple: they argued that their partnerships were no different from those of heterosexual couples, and that the government’s refusal to recognise gay marriage violated the constitution’s promise of equal treatment for all. This week a district court in Hokkaido, the northernmost of Japan’s main islands, came down on the side of the three couples who sued there, the first such ruling by a Japanese court. It is, as a sign held by supporters outside the courtroom proclaimed, “a big step forward for marriage equality”.

2019年的情人節，日本13對同性伴侶在四個城市提起訴訟。他們的案情很簡單：他們主張，他們的伴侶關係與異性伴侶並無不同，而且政府拒絕承認同性婚姻，違反憲法對所有人平等對待的承諾。本周三，日本主要島嶼的最北端，北海道地方法院偏向支持當地提訴的三對伴侶，這是日本法院首次如此裁定。正如法庭外的支持者所高舉的標語宣稱，這是「朝向婚姻平權的一大步」。

Yet it is also, for the time being, only a symbolic one. The three-judge panel declared that preventing the couples from marrying contradicted Article 14 of the constitution, which forbids discrimination on the basis of race, creed, sex, social status or family origin. Yet it also refused to award damages to the plaintiffs, arguing that public opinion was evolving quickly, and that the government should be given time to legislate on the matter.

然而，目前這也僅是象徵性的一步。三名法官組成的小組宣布，禁止伴侶結婚與憲法第14條相抵觸，憲法第14條禁止基於種族，信仰，性別，社會地位或家庭背景的歧視。然而，法院也駁回對原告的損害賠償，主張公眾輿論正在迅速演變，應給政府時間為同性婚姻立法。

Neither the constitution nor any laws explicitly ban same-sex marriages. Some local governments issue documents certifying same-sex partnerships, which can simplify hunts for flats and visits to partners in hospital. But the national government does not acknowledge these, depriving gay couples of certain benefits of marriage. That leaves Japan out of step not only with other rich countries—it is the only g7 member that does not recognise same-sex unions—but also with its former colony, Taiwan, which in 2019 became the first Asian country to legalise gay marriage.

憲法和任何法律都沒有明確禁止同性婚姻。一些地方政府簽發同性伴侶關係的證明文件，這可以簡化找公寓和探視住院伴侶的過程。但是中央政府不承認這些文件，剝奪同性伴侶的某些婚姻的權益。這使日本成為G7成員國中唯一不承認同性結合的國家，不僅與其他富國，也與其前殖民地台灣不同步調。台灣在2019年成為第一個同性婚姻合法化的亞洲國家。

The plaintiffs say they will appeal against the refusal of compensation. In the meantime, campaigners plan to use the lower court’s finding to bolster suits in other cities. More favourable rulings could increase pressure on parliament to act.

原告說，他們將對駁回賠償提出上訴。同時，社會運動人士計劃利用下級法院的裁定支持其他城市的訴訟。更有利的判決可能會增加議會採取行動的壓力。

Most voters would welcome that. A poll in 2018 found that nearly 80% of people aged between 20 and 59 approved of same-sex marriage; the share rose to nearly 90% among those in their 20s. Since two wards in Tokyo became the first local authorities to issue same-sex partnership certificates in 2015, 72 more have followed, home to a third of the population.

大多數選民對此表示歡迎。 2018年的一項民調顯示，20至59歲的族群，近80％贊成同性婚姻；在20歲族群此比例上升到近90％。自2015年東京的兩個選區成為第一個頒發同性伴侶證書的地方當局，超過72個選區跟進，廣及三分之一人口居住地。

Many business leaders see gay marriage as an economic as well as moral issue. As the American Chamber of Commerce in Japan noted last year, given the shrinking labour force, “Japanese companies cannot afford to lose in the global competition for the brightest talent.” Nearly 150 companies belong to a “Business for Marriage Equality” campaign, among them blue-chip firms such as Fujitsu and Panasonic.

許多企業領袖將同性婚姻視為經濟和道德問題。正如日本美國商會去年指出，鑑於勞動力的萎縮，「日本公司不能在全球競爭中失去最有才華的人才。」近有150家公司是「企業促進婚姻平權」運動的成員，其中包括富士通和松下等藍籌公司。

But the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (ldp) remains opposed to gay marriage. Its old-fashioned views on matters of sexual equality extend to married couples, whom it continues to bar from retaining separate surnames. Just 9% of ldp candidates for the upper house of parliament in 2019 backed gay marriage. Last month the prime minister, Suga Yoshihide, defended the government for supporting “the foundations of the family in this country”. But banning people from forming families is a peculiar form of support. ■

但執政的自民黨仍反對同性婚姻。它對性平等問題的過時看法已擴展到已婚夫婦，繼續禁止他們保留各別的姓氏。 2019年國會上議院的自民黨候選人，只有9％支持同性婚姻。首相菅義偉上月為政府支持「這國家的家庭基礎」而辯護。但禁止人們組建家庭，是一種特殊的支持方式。 ■

各自成長--英國如何從脫歐中獲益

 

Growing apart 各自成長

How Britain can benefit from Brexit

英國如何從脫歐中獲益

Damage is inevitable, but there are ways of mitigating it

損害雖無可避免，但是有方法減輕

Leaders

Mar 13th 2021 edition

In january britain faced two simultaneous problems. Its departure from the European Union’s single market and customs union on the first day of the month hit trade. Exports of goods to the European Union (eu) fell by 40% between December 2020 and January 2021, while imports dropped by almost 30%. While the pandemic disrupted trade, much of that seems to have been the effect of Brexit. The second blow came from a surge in covid-19 cases. Britain, which already had the highest death rate in any big economy, saw deaths peak at 1,361 on January 19th.

1月的英國同時面臨兩個問題。當月第一天離開歐盟的單一市場和關稅同盟，衝擊貿易。在2020年12月到2021年1月期間，出口歐盟的商品減少40％，而進口降近30％。儘管疫情擾亂貿易，但大部分似乎是脱歐的影響。第二個打擊來自新冠病例激增。英國死亡率稱冠所有大型經濟體，在1月19日死亡人數達1,361人新紀錄。

The way Britain managed the second of these problems holds lessons for how it should deal with the first. The speed with which its medical regulator approved covid-19 vaccines allowed a swifter roll-out than in any other large country, which has helped slash the daily death toll to around 200. If Britain is to derive any benefit from leaving the eu, nimble regulation is one of the ways of doing so.

英國處理第二個問題的方式，可作處理第一個問題的借鏡。醫療監管機構迅速批准新冠疫苗，讓配送施打速度比其他大國更快，有助於使每日死亡人數降至200人左右。英國若要從脫歐受益，靈活的監管是達此目標的一種途徑。

Britain’s economy has experienced other big shocks in the past century, but the one brought about by Brexit is different from those inflicted after the second world war and in the 1980s. Clement Attlee’s and Margaret Thatcher’s governments had clear ideas about the direction in which they were taking the country. Boris Johnson’s does not. Brexiteers burbled about a British economic model, distinct from the European social-democratic model, without specifying what it should look like. The budget speech on March 3rd by Rishi Sunak, the chancellor, included a single reference to Brexit; the 111-page “plan for growth” that was published alongside the budget offers only a couple of pages of platitudes about Brexit at the end. Rather than producing a plan, the government has been going out of its way to pick fights with the European Commission instead.

在過去的一個世紀，英國的經濟經歷其他重大衝擊，但脱歐帶來衝擊與二戰後和1980年代所承受的不同。艾德禮和柴契爾政府對領導國家的方向有清晰的想法，但強生沒有。支持脱歐者嘟囊著英國的經濟模式與歐洲的社會民主模式截然不同，卻未具體說明應有的模樣。財政大臣蘇納克在3月3日的預算報告包含英國脫歐的單一參考，長達111頁的「成長計劃」與預算案一起公布，最後僅提供兩頁關於脱歐的陳詞濫調。政府沒有制定計劃，而是費勁心思與歐盟委員會纏鬥。

This failure has several causes. Britain’s scope for diverging from the eu is limited. The trade deal agreed on Christmas Eve between the two commits Britain to staying close to European norms. If it does not it may be punished by trade restrictions; anyway, most businesses are fine with the eu’s standards. To sell into the bloc, they need to stick to its rules, and working with one set of regulations is cheaper than working with two. Northern Ireland’s half-in half-out position raises the costs of divergence, for a bigger gap between Britain and the eu hardens the border in the Irish Sea and angers unionists committed to keeping the province inside the United Kingdom. And British voters do not have much appetite for the hyper-liberal economy which some Brexiteers advocated. Britons want their food safe and their employers to be required to treat workers well.

失敗的原因有多種。英國偏離歐盟的範圍是有限的。依照雙方在耶誕節前夕達成的貿易協議，英國承諾貼近歐盟規範。如果不這樣做，可能遭貿易限制懲罰；無論如何，大多數企業都願意接受歐盟標準。想賣東西給大國，他們需遵守規則，執行一套法規要比執行二套法規的成本便宜。北愛爾蘭半脫歐的狀況增加分歧的成本，因為英國與歐盟之間的差距，加深愛爾蘭海邊界的鴻溝，並激怒致力將北愛爾蘭留在英國境內的統一主義者。英國選民對部分脱歐主義者提倡的高度自由的經濟沒有太多的興趣。英國人只希望他們的食物安全、雇主善待勞工。

In most ways, therefore, Britain should aim to stay close to Europe. Yet there is scope for it to diverge in both damaging and beneficial ways. Britain could, for instance, abandon the eu’s restrictive state-aid regime; indeed, the government is already consulting on how to go about it. Britons should be wary of these moves. No doubt, Britain has room to improve on the eu’s rules, which are pernickety, but voters should regard the prospect of ripping up limits on state aid as a risk, rather than a benefit, of Brexit. Shovelling money in the direction of private companies is not a habit that taxpayers should want their governments to acquire.

因此，大致來說，英國都應致力於與歐洲保持緊密聯繫。然而，它在傷害和受益方式上都有分歧的餘地。例如，英國可以拋棄歐盟的限制國家補貼制度；的確，政府已在諮詢如何進行。英國人應對這些舉動保持警惕。毫無疑問，英國有改善歐盟苛刻規定的餘地，但是選民們應視取消國家補貼的限制，為脱歐的風險而非利益。政府若養成把錢掃向私人企業的習慣，並非納稅人所樂見。

In other ways, divergence could work in Britain’s interests. The process of regulation can be faster for one country than for 27 and, as the medical regulator showed with vaccines, there is much to be said for speeding it up. The nature of rules can be different, too. Where Britain has critical mass—as in finance—and in others in which it has innovative companies, such as fintech, life sciences and artificial intelligence, the country can help set the standard for liberal, nimble regulatory regimes, rather than taking whatever rules Brussels makes. And Britain can sharpen up competition. It will need to, since Brexit will reduce competitive pressure and thus undermine productivity. The Competition and Markets Authority has offered a number of wise proposals for opening up sectors to new challengers—by, for instance, overhauling antiquated eu rules that shield airlines from competition. The turmoil in the travel business makes this an excellent time to do so.

其他方面的分歧，則可能符合英國的利益。 監管一個國家的過程，要比管理27國快，正如醫療監管機構核准疫苗所示，加快流程的優點不勝枚舉。法規的本質也可以不同。在英國具有群聚效應的產業（例如金融業），以及其他擁有創新企業的領域（例如金融科技、生命科學和人工智慧），國家可協助制定自由、靈活的監管制度，而不是對歐盟定的規則照單全收。英國可以加強競爭，這是必須的，因為脱歐將減少競爭壓力，進而損害生產力。競爭和市場管理局已經提出許多明智的建議，向新進者開放市場，例如，全面修改過時的歐盟規則，保護航空公司免於競爭。旅行業的動盪，成為執行的絕佳的時機。

This newspaper still regards the decision to leave the eu as a self-inflicted wound. But Britain will, for the moment at least, have to live with it. It should therefore grab advantages from Brexit where it can find them, and exploit them thoroughly. ■

本報仍然將離開歐盟的決定視為自殘。但是，至少目前來說，英國必須勇敢面對。因此，英國應當盡可能找出脫歐的益處，並充分利用。

支票與平衡--疫情可能為全民基本所得鋪路嗎？

 

Cheques and balances 支票與平衡

（checks and balances n. 政府機關彼此之間的相互制衡）

Might the pandemic pave the way for a universal basic income? 疫情可能為全民基本所得鋪路嗎？

 

A true UBI seems far off. But more experimentation is likely 真正的全民基本所得似乎還很遙遠，但更多的實驗躍躍欲試

NONE MARCH 02, 2021

WHEN ANDREW YANG began his campaign for the Democratic presidential nomination, his proposal for a “Freedom Dividend”—monthly cash payments of $1,000 to be paid to all Americans—distinguished him among a crowded field as an outsider and an unorthodox thinker. Nearly two years later, as Mr Yang leads the race for mayor of New York City, his plan to provide cash to half a million New Yorkers feels far less radical, and not just because it is much more modest than his idea for a national universal basic income (UBI).

當楊安澤（Andrew YANG）開始競逐民主黨總統候選人提名時，提出了「自由紅利」，即每月向全體美國人支付1,000美元的現金，作為勝率渺茫和非正統的思想家，這使他在眾多候選人中脫穎而出。將近兩年後，楊安澤在紐約市長競選中領先，他向50萬的紐約市民提供現金的計畫不再那麼激進，不單單是因為這比他提出的全民基本所得（UBI）的想法溫和得多。

Though UBI still meets with scepticism in many quarters, the experience of the pandemic, and the accompanying explosion in social spending, have changed the tone of discussions about radical reforms to welfare states. Cash transfers—like those deployed by many governments during the pandemic—have come to look like an efficient, effective way to meet any number of social needs. Few schemes during the pandemic offered recurring payments to all. Yet, though the age of the UBI has not dawned, the ordeal of covid-19 could have brought it closer.

儘管全民基本所得在許多方面仍受到懷疑，但在經歷疫情及社會支出暴增之後，有關福利制度進行徹底改革的討論氣氛改變。像疫情間許多政府運用的現金補助，看似有效率且具影響性方法，不計數量地滿足社會需求。疫情間很少方案能向全民一再地紓困。然而，儘管全民基本所得的時代還沒有到來，但新冠病毒的折磨下可能使它更近了。

Arguments for universal-income payments have flourished for centuries. Thomas Paine argued that the Earth is common property, and everyone who makes use of its land and resources owes society a “ground rent”, which should fund the payment of a “natural inheritance” to all adults. Plans for universal payments, and the subtly different idea of a guaranteed minimum income, were a recurring feature of welfare debates in the 20th century. Yet by the end of the century concerns about freeloading and persistently high rates of joblessness across much of Europe led to reforms that made benefits stingier or more contingent on work.

全民所得給付的爭論已興盛數個世紀。潘恩（Thomas Paine）主張地球是共同財產，利用土地和資源的每個人都欠社會一個「地租」，應向所有成年人支付「自然遺產」費用。全民給付計畫與保證最低收入概念有些微妙地不同，兩者的特徵在20世紀福祉辯論中經常出現。然而，到本世紀末，歐洲大部分地區對不勞而獲和持續高失業率的擔憂促使改革，使福祉變得更吝嗇或取決於工作。

Worries about inequality and the belief—especially among tech types—that robots and artificial intelligence might soon make many workers redundant led to renewed interest in basic incomes in the 2010s. But realistic proposals were scant, Mr Yang’s plucky presidential bid notwithstanding. In 2016 a Swiss referendum on a plan to pay all adults an unconditional income of about $2,500 per month was soundly rejected, with nearly 80% of voters opposed.

擔心不平等及對機器人和AI可能很快淘汰許多勞工的信念（特別是技術類型），重燃2010年代對基本收入的興趣。但切實的提議很少，儘管楊安澤大膽地做為總統競選政見。 2016年，瑞士公投徹底地否絕向所有成年人每月提供約2500美元無條件所得的計劃，近80％的選民反對。

Then came covid-19. Restrictions on activity placed huge swathes of society in a position of dire, urgent economic need. Governments responded with a fire hose of cash. From mid-March to mid-June more than 1.1bn people received cash payments, much of which was approved with little political opposition. Cash transfers accounted for about a third of all pandemic-related social-protection policies, according to the World Bank. America’s Congress passed a covid-relief act in March 2020 containing a provision to send no-strings-attached cheques of up to $1,200 to most adults by near-unanimous margins (another round of cheques followed at the end of the year).

新冠病毒接著來襲，限制行動使社會大範圍處於危及且迫切的經濟需求。各國政府釋出大量現金作為回應。自3月中旬到6月中旬，超過11億人收到現金給付，大部分法案在無政治阻力下批准。根據世界銀行資料，有關疫情的社會保護政策中，現金補助約占三分之一。美國國會於2020年3月通過新冠紓困法案，包含一項準備金為：無條件向大多數成年人無差別地發送支票，金額上看1200美元（另一輪紓困年底接踵而至）。

Residents of Hong Kong received payments worth nearly $1,300; those in Japan about $950; most Singaporean adults roughly $425. Some governments experimented with payments that could be used only locally, through vouchers (as in Malta) or pre-loaded debit cards (as in parts of South Korea). But most simply sent cash.

香港居民收到的給付金額接近1,300美元；日本約950美元；多數新加坡成年人約425美元。一些政府嘗試透過消費券（如馬爾他）或預借現金卡（如韓國部分地區），但最簡單的還是寄送現金。

Few if any of these schemes offered a true UBI, though. In the rich world, most cash-relief programmes were one-off transfers, aimed at stimulating consumption and cushioning against income shocks. In poor countries transfers more closely resembled a basic income, in that they were often recurrent. But most were aimed at the poor and vulnerable. In its biggest-ever welfare programme, the Brazilian government provided monthly payments to the poorest third of the population until December 2020. Togo’s scheme sends fortnightly transfers to the mobile wallets of informal workers where lockdowns are in place.

但是，這些方案都不是真正的全民基本所得。富國大多數救濟金計畫都是一次性轉移，旨在刺激消費並緩解收入衝擊。窮國的補助比較像是基本所得，因為它們經常是周期性的，但大多數針對窮人和弱勢族群。史上規模最大的福祉計劃，屬巴西政府每月付款給最貧困的三分之一人口，直到2020年12月。多哥的方案為每兩周匯款至封鎖地區的非正式工人的行動支付錢包。

But as the end of the acute phase of the pandemic draws near, and normal economic activity slowly resumes, the number of programmes still in place is dwindling. Only 7% of policies have been extended; the average scheme lasted just three months, according to the World Bank. In America, President Joe Biden’s stimulus bill, which is working its way through Congress, makes provision for a third round of cheques, though fewer people will receive them than in 2020.

但是隨著疫情緊急狀態結束和正常經濟活動緩慢恢復，仍在執行的紓困方案數量正在減少，僅7％的政策延長；據世界銀行資料，方案平均僅持續三個月。美國總統拜登（Joe Biden）的刺激方案正在國會審查，為第三輪紓困做準備，儘管獲得支票的人數比2020年來得少。

Pandemic assistance itself will not evolve into sustained basic-income programmes. But the world’s experience with covid-19 could still make their eventual adoption more likely. Polling suggests that young people in both America and Europe support UBI. Both Democrats and some Republicans have expressed support for an expanded child tax credit in America, which would provide cash with no strings attached to families on low incomes. Though benefits phase out for those on high incomes, the plan (which is part of Mr Biden’s pending covid-relief bill) comes close to providing a basic income to families with children.

疫情紓困援助本身不會演變成持續的基本所得方案。但是，全世界的新冠疫情經驗，仍使它們最終被採用的可能性更高。民調顯示，歐美的年輕人都支持全民基本所得。美國民主黨人和一些共和黨人都支持擴大兒童稅收抵免，為低所得家庭無條件給付現金。儘管這項福祉排除高收入族群，計畫已成為拜登即將通過新冠紓困法案的一部分，近似為有孩子的家庭提供基本所得。

In South Korea, a presidential election contest scheduled for next year is shaping up to be a referendum of sorts on UBI. Lee Jae-myung, a potential candidate who as governor of the province of Gyeonggi oversaw a regional basic-income programme, suggests that South Korea should adopt a national-level UBI of 500,000 won ($430) per year, rising eventually to that same amount per month. (A possible rival for the presidency, Chung Sye-kyun, the current prime minister, opposes the plan.)

南韓將於明年舉行總統大選，將形成對全民基本所得的公投。京畿道知事李在明為潛在候選人，督察區域基本所得計劃，他建議南韓應採用每年50萬韓元（430美元）的全國性的全民基本所得，最終提高到每月相同金額。 現任總理鄭世均反對此計畫，他可能成為李在明總統大選的對手。

Pandemic experience also adds to a growing body of evidence on the effects of cash-transfer programmes. In response to the surge in interest in UBI, researchers and governments around the world launched a variety of experiments, at least some of which had begun to yield results before the arrival of covid-19. Finland, for example, conducted a trial in 2017-18 in which 2,000 randomly selected unemployed Finns were paid a modest income each month, roughly equivalent in size to unemployment benefits, which was guaranteed for the term of the trial.

疫病流行的經驗也為現金補助的效果，提供愈來愈多的證據。世界各地的研究人員和政府啟動許多的實驗，回應對全民基本所得激增的興趣，有些實驗在疫情前已產生結果。例如，芬蘭在2017至2018年度進行一項試驗，隨機選擇2,000名芬蘭失業者，保證在試驗期間每月支付適度的所得，規模上約與失業給付相當。

Evidence from the experiment was muddied by a change to a law in 2018, which tightened conditionality for receiving for unemployment benefits. Even so, the results are intriguing. Among the biggest worries relating to UBI is the possibility that it might discourage recipients from seeking paid work. Yet participants who received unconditional payments actually worked more than those on the dole. Reported well-being was substantially higher among the experimental group; recipients reported lower levels of depression and stress, a higher degree of confidence in their abilities, and more social trust than did those in the control group.

該實驗的證據因2018年法律變更而變得混亂，法律限縮領取失業救濟金的條件。即使如此，結果也很有趣。全民基本所得最大的擔憂是，它可能會阻止領取者尋求有償工作。然而，收到無條件給付仍工作的人，實際上比領取救濟金的人更多。與對照組相比，實驗組的幸福感明顯更高；抑鬱和壓力水平較低，對自我能力的信心較高，並且對社會的信任度更高。

Transfer wise 聰明轉帳

The Finnish results are broadly consistent with findings from other experiments. Rebecca Hasdell, then of the Basic Income Lab at Stanford University, conducted a review of 16 basic-income studies published between 2009 and 2019 that covered rich and poor countries. The research provides consistent evidence of a positive effect on educational attainment and on measures of physical and mental health, and reduced poverty. Effects on labour-market participation are generally small; half of the studies that assess its impact do not find a statistically significant effect. Most of the rest find a positive effect, she writes.

芬蘭的結果與其他實驗的結果大致一致。當時史丹佛大學基本所得實驗室的哈斯德（Rebecca Hasdell）調查自2009年至2019年發表的涵蓋富國和窮國的16項基本所得研究，提供了一致的證據，表明對受教育程度、身心健康指標以及減少貧窮有積極影響。對勞動市場參與的影響通常很小；半數評估其影響的研究中沒有發現統計學上的顯著效果。她寫道，其餘大多數都發現正面的影響。

Where participation does decline, though, it is often associated with an increase in caregiving, which could worsen gender inequality in the labour market. In low- and middle-income countries increased caregiving is often linked to lower workforce participation by women. In some studies, a basic income also seems to reduce participation by older workers.

但是，在參與率確實下降的地方，通常與居家照護增加有關，這可能惡化勞動市場的性別不平等。在低收入和中等收入國家，增加的居家照護往往與婦女參與勞動力減少有關。在一些研究中，基本所得似乎也減少老年勞工的參與率。

In some cases the beneficial effects of UBI seem to have persisted through the pandemic. A team of economists that had begun a large-scale UBI experiment in Kenya before the outbreak of covid-19 was able to monitor its performance during the crisis. Recipients reported levels of well-being that were modestly but meaningfully higher than those of the control group. Effects on health outcomes were ambiguous. But people receiving payments were more likely to engage in risk-taking commercial activities: perhaps, the authors suggest, because of the insurance provided by the transfers. That suggests that even if basic incomes discourage some sorts of work, they may encourage other desirable activities, such as entrepreneurship.

在某些情況下，全民基本所得的益處似乎在疫情間持續存在。在新冠肺炎爆發前，經濟學家團隊在肯亞開始大規模全民基本所得的實驗，能夠監控危機期間的表現。報告顯示，領取者的幸福水平比對照組溫和但有意義地提高，對健康結果的影響則模棱兩可。但是領取給付者更有可能從事冒險的商業活動：研究人員指出，也許是因為補助提供保險。這顯示，即使基本所得不利於某些工作，它們也會鼓勵其他理想的活動，例如企業家精神。

Extrapolating from these findings is a fraught business. Studies of long-established systems with UBI-like features, such as Alaska’s Permanent Fund, which invests oil revenues and distributes dividends to the public, also indicate that the employment effects of a universal payment seem to be small (and may well be positive). But conclusions drawn from programmes that are limited in geographical or temporal scope may not fully capture the ways in which a large-scale, permanent UBI could affect society. Norms regarding work and leisure might adjust in ways that alter the response to payments—for good or ill.

從這些發現中推論是一項艱鉅的任務。對類似全民基本所得功能的長期系統的研究，例如阿拉斯加的永久基金，其投資石油收入並向公眾分發股息，同樣表明全民給付對就業的影響似乎很小（並且可能是積極的） 。但是，從地理或時間範圍有限的計劃所得出的結論，可能無法完全反映出大規模、永久性的全民基本所得可能影響社會的方式。關於工作和休閒的行為表現，可能會依給付不同而調整，無論是好是壞。

Behaviour could shift as more members of society receive generous income payments: perhaps because of a “social multiplier effect” which reflects the fact that some activities become more enjoyable as more people engage in them. That is, UBI recipients in, say, the Finnish experiment might have been more inclined to seek work because being in work is more attractive (and not being in work less so) when most people are employed—a dynamic that could potentially change were income payments to become universal.

隨著更多的社會成員收到豐厚的所得給付，行為可能會發生變化：也許是由於「社會乘數效應」，這反映一項事實，隨著更多人參與，某些活動變得更愉快。也就是說，例如，芬蘭實驗中領取全民基本所得者可能更傾向找工作，因為當大多數人就業，工作變得更有吸引力（而大多人不工作，則職場吸引力就降低），這種可能會潛在改變的動態，能使所得給付變得普遍。

Still, encouraging results from UBI trials are likely to encourage more experimentation. They may also provide support to other welfare policies that share features with a UBI without going the whole hog: such as universality; a relaxed approach to the question of work incentives; or a guaranteed income to some groups, as Mr Yang now proposes. That is because the most daunting obstacle to full-fledged UBI programmes remains: the little matter of funding. Mr Yang’s original proposal for a UBI, for instance, would have cost about 14% of GDP a year, though the price tag could be partly reduced by rationalisation of other welfare schemes. (For comparison, overall federal spending amounted to 21% of GDP in 2019.) Neither short-term UBI trials nor mass cash transfers in response to covid-19 required governments to take on the difficult task of financing enormous new expansions to the welfare state.

儘管如此，全民基本所得試驗的令人鼓舞的結果，可能會激勵更多的實驗，為類似全民基本所得功能的福利政策提供支持，而無需執行到底 ：像是通用性。對工作激勵問題採取寬鬆的方法；或像楊安澤現提議的那樣，為某些群體提供保證性所得。這也是因為，全面的全民基本所得計劃，面臨最艱鉅的障礙依然是資金問題。例如，楊安澤最初提出的全民基本所得，每年將花費GDP的14％左右，儘管透過其他福利計劃的重組可以降低部分價格。相比之下，2019年美國聯邦政府總支出占GDP的21％。）無論是針對短期全民基本所得試驗，還是針對新冠疫情的大規模現金補貼，都要求政府承擔艱鉅的任務，即為福利制度的大規模擴張提供資金。

Much of the aid provided to households over the past year has been financed with new government borrowing, up to and including Mr Biden’s proposals. As accommodating as markets have been of government borrowing over the past year, it seems unlikely that UBI dreams can be made real without the question of financing eventually being asked and answered.

去年向家庭提供的大部分援助，都是透過政府舉債籌資，包括拜登的計畫。去年市場滿足政府舉債的需求，在資金問題沒有最終答案的情況下，全民基本所得的夢想似乎不可能實現。

Reality cheque 現實的支票

Some politicians are beginning to grapple with the issue. Mr Lee reckons that a small UBI in South Korea could be paid for by adjusting the existing budget, but he allows that increasing the generosity of payments would require additional money. Taxes on land, carbon emissions and digital services are his preferred funding mechanisms. Mr Yang, for his part, argues that a combination of curbing spending inefficiencies and philanthropic donations can pay for his proposed cash transfers (which would cover only the poorest New Yorkers).

一些政治人物開始設法克服這個問題。李在明認為，韓國透過調整現有預算，可支付的小筆的全民基本所得，但他承認給付的慷慨度增加需要額外的資金。土地稅、排碳稅和數位服務稅是他偏愛的籌資機制。楊安澤則主張，遏制無效率的支出和慈善捐款的結合，可以給付他提議的現金補貼，這將只覆蓋最貧困的紐約市民。

But where the great welfare-state expansions of the mid-20th century were enabled by a spirit of solidarity and self-sacrifice, forged in depression and war, which made tax-financing of new benefits politically possible, the new enthusiasm for cash transfers owes more to a broad-based relaxation in concern about government borrowing. As the pandemic ends, that relaxed attitude may change as well, among some segments of the political spectrum at least. Only then will we learn how far along the path to a UBI the pandemic has actually moved society.

但是，如果在蕭條和戰爭中形成團結和自我犧牲精神，能使20世紀中葉巨大的福利制度擴張，這使新福祉的稅收籌資在政治上成為可能，那麼新的現金補助熱情，就應更廣泛地舒緩政府舉債的擔憂。隨著疫情的結束，這種放鬆態度也可能發生變化，至少在某些政治領域是如此。只有到那時，我們才能了解疫情在通向全民基本所得的道路上，實際上走了多遠。