支票與平衡--疫情可能為全民基本所得鋪路嗎？

 

Cheques and balances 支票與平衡

（checks and balances n. 政府機關彼此之間的相互制衡）

Might the pandemic pave the way for a universal basic income? 疫情可能為全民基本所得鋪路嗎？

 

A true UBI seems far off. But more experimentation is likely 真正的全民基本所得似乎還很遙遠，但更多的實驗躍躍欲試

NONE MARCH 02, 2021

WHEN ANDREW YANG began his campaign for the Democratic presidential nomination, his proposal for a “Freedom Dividend”—monthly cash payments of $1,000 to be paid to all Americans—distinguished him among a crowded field as an outsider and an unorthodox thinker. Nearly two years later, as Mr Yang leads the race for mayor of New York City, his plan to provide cash to half a million New Yorkers feels far less radical, and not just because it is much more modest than his idea for a national universal basic income (UBI).

當楊安澤（Andrew YANG）開始競逐民主黨總統候選人提名時，提出了「自由紅利」，即每月向全體美國人支付1,000美元的現金，作為勝率渺茫和非正統的思想家，這使他在眾多候選人中脫穎而出。將近兩年後，楊安澤在紐約市長競選中領先，他向50萬的紐約市民提供現金的計畫不再那麼激進，不單單是因為這比他提出的全民基本所得（UBI）的想法溫和得多。

Though UBI still meets with scepticism in many quarters, the experience of the pandemic, and the accompanying explosion in social spending, have changed the tone of discussions about radical reforms to welfare states. Cash transfers—like those deployed by many governments during the pandemic—have come to look like an efficient, effective way to meet any number of social needs. Few schemes during the pandemic offered recurring payments to all. Yet, though the age of the UBI has not dawned, the ordeal of covid-19 could have brought it closer.

儘管全民基本所得在許多方面仍受到懷疑，但在經歷疫情及社會支出暴增之後，有關福利制度進行徹底改革的討論氣氛改變。像疫情間許多政府運用的現金補助，看似有效率且具影響性方法，不計數量地滿足社會需求。疫情間很少方案能向全民一再地紓困。然而，儘管全民基本所得的時代還沒有到來，但新冠病毒的折磨下可能使它更近了。

Arguments for universal-income payments have flourished for centuries. Thomas Paine argued that the Earth is common property, and everyone who makes use of its land and resources owes society a “ground rent”, which should fund the payment of a “natural inheritance” to all adults. Plans for universal payments, and the subtly different idea of a guaranteed minimum income, were a recurring feature of welfare debates in the 20th century. Yet by the end of the century concerns about freeloading and persistently high rates of joblessness across much of Europe led to reforms that made benefits stingier or more contingent on work.

全民所得給付的爭論已興盛數個世紀。潘恩（Thomas Paine）主張地球是共同財產，利用土地和資源的每個人都欠社會一個「地租」，應向所有成年人支付「自然遺產」費用。全民給付計畫與保證最低收入概念有些微妙地不同，兩者的特徵在20世紀福祉辯論中經常出現。然而，到本世紀末，歐洲大部分地區對不勞而獲和持續高失業率的擔憂促使改革，使福祉變得更吝嗇或取決於工作。

Worries about inequality and the belief—especially among tech types—that robots and artificial intelligence might soon make many workers redundant led to renewed interest in basic incomes in the 2010s. But realistic proposals were scant, Mr Yang’s plucky presidential bid notwithstanding. In 2016 a Swiss referendum on a plan to pay all adults an unconditional income of about $2,500 per month was soundly rejected, with nearly 80% of voters opposed.

擔心不平等及對機器人和AI可能很快淘汰許多勞工的信念（特別是技術類型），重燃2010年代對基本收入的興趣。但切實的提議很少，儘管楊安澤大膽地做為總統競選政見。 2016年，瑞士公投徹底地否絕向所有成年人每月提供約2500美元無條件所得的計劃，近80％的選民反對。

Then came covid-19. Restrictions on activity placed huge swathes of society in a position of dire, urgent economic need. Governments responded with a fire hose of cash. From mid-March to mid-June more than 1.1bn people received cash payments, much of which was approved with little political opposition. Cash transfers accounted for about a third of all pandemic-related social-protection policies, according to the World Bank. America’s Congress passed a covid-relief act in March 2020 containing a provision to send no-strings-attached cheques of up to $1,200 to most adults by near-unanimous margins (another round of cheques followed at the end of the year).

新冠病毒接著來襲，限制行動使社會大範圍處於危及且迫切的經濟需求。各國政府釋出大量現金作為回應。自3月中旬到6月中旬，超過11億人收到現金給付，大部分法案在無政治阻力下批准。根據世界銀行資料，有關疫情的社會保護政策中，現金補助約占三分之一。美國國會於2020年3月通過新冠紓困法案，包含一項準備金為：無條件向大多數成年人無差別地發送支票，金額上看1200美元（另一輪紓困年底接踵而至）。

Residents of Hong Kong received payments worth nearly $1,300; those in Japan about $950; most Singaporean adults roughly $425. Some governments experimented with payments that could be used only locally, through vouchers (as in Malta) or pre-loaded debit cards (as in parts of South Korea). But most simply sent cash.

香港居民收到的給付金額接近1,300美元；日本約950美元；多數新加坡成年人約425美元。一些政府嘗試透過消費券（如馬爾他）或預借現金卡（如韓國部分地區），但最簡單的還是寄送現金。

Few if any of these schemes offered a true UBI, though. In the rich world, most cash-relief programmes were one-off transfers, aimed at stimulating consumption and cushioning against income shocks. In poor countries transfers more closely resembled a basic income, in that they were often recurrent. But most were aimed at the poor and vulnerable. In its biggest-ever welfare programme, the Brazilian government provided monthly payments to the poorest third of the population until December 2020. Togo’s scheme sends fortnightly transfers to the mobile wallets of informal workers where lockdowns are in place.

但是，這些方案都不是真正的全民基本所得。富國大多數救濟金計畫都是一次性轉移，旨在刺激消費並緩解收入衝擊。窮國的補助比較像是基本所得，因為它們經常是周期性的，但大多數針對窮人和弱勢族群。史上規模最大的福祉計劃，屬巴西政府每月付款給最貧困的三分之一人口，直到2020年12月。多哥的方案為每兩周匯款至封鎖地區的非正式工人的行動支付錢包。

But as the end of the acute phase of the pandemic draws near, and normal economic activity slowly resumes, the number of programmes still in place is dwindling. Only 7% of policies have been extended; the average scheme lasted just three months, according to the World Bank. In America, President Joe Biden’s stimulus bill, which is working its way through Congress, makes provision for a third round of cheques, though fewer people will receive them than in 2020.

但是隨著疫情緊急狀態結束和正常經濟活動緩慢恢復，仍在執行的紓困方案數量正在減少，僅7％的政策延長；據世界銀行資料，方案平均僅持續三個月。美國總統拜登（Joe Biden）的刺激方案正在國會審查，為第三輪紓困做準備，儘管獲得支票的人數比2020年來得少。

Pandemic assistance itself will not evolve into sustained basic-income programmes. But the world’s experience with covid-19 could still make their eventual adoption more likely. Polling suggests that young people in both America and Europe support UBI. Both Democrats and some Republicans have expressed support for an expanded child tax credit in America, which would provide cash with no strings attached to families on low incomes. Though benefits phase out for those on high incomes, the plan (which is part of Mr Biden’s pending covid-relief bill) comes close to providing a basic income to families with children.

疫情紓困援助本身不會演變成持續的基本所得方案。但是，全世界的新冠疫情經驗，仍使它們最終被採用的可能性更高。民調顯示，歐美的年輕人都支持全民基本所得。美國民主黨人和一些共和黨人都支持擴大兒童稅收抵免，為低所得家庭無條件給付現金。儘管這項福祉排除高收入族群，計畫已成為拜登即將通過新冠紓困法案的一部分，近似為有孩子的家庭提供基本所得。

In South Korea, a presidential election contest scheduled for next year is shaping up to be a referendum of sorts on UBI. Lee Jae-myung, a potential candidate who as governor of the province of Gyeonggi oversaw a regional basic-income programme, suggests that South Korea should adopt a national-level UBI of 500,000 won ($430) per year, rising eventually to that same amount per month. (A possible rival for the presidency, Chung Sye-kyun, the current prime minister, opposes the plan.)

南韓將於明年舉行總統大選，將形成對全民基本所得的公投。京畿道知事李在明為潛在候選人，督察區域基本所得計劃，他建議南韓應採用每年50萬韓元（430美元）的全國性的全民基本所得，最終提高到每月相同金額。 現任總理鄭世均反對此計畫，他可能成為李在明總統大選的對手。

Pandemic experience also adds to a growing body of evidence on the effects of cash-transfer programmes. In response to the surge in interest in UBI, researchers and governments around the world launched a variety of experiments, at least some of which had begun to yield results before the arrival of covid-19. Finland, for example, conducted a trial in 2017-18 in which 2,000 randomly selected unemployed Finns were paid a modest income each month, roughly equivalent in size to unemployment benefits, which was guaranteed for the term of the trial.

疫病流行的經驗也為現金補助的效果，提供愈來愈多的證據。世界各地的研究人員和政府啟動許多的實驗，回應對全民基本所得激增的興趣，有些實驗在疫情前已產生結果。例如，芬蘭在2017至2018年度進行一項試驗，隨機選擇2,000名芬蘭失業者，保證在試驗期間每月支付適度的所得，規模上約與失業給付相當。

Evidence from the experiment was muddied by a change to a law in 2018, which tightened conditionality for receiving for unemployment benefits. Even so, the results are intriguing. Among the biggest worries relating to UBI is the possibility that it might discourage recipients from seeking paid work. Yet participants who received unconditional payments actually worked more than those on the dole. Reported well-being was substantially higher among the experimental group; recipients reported lower levels of depression and stress, a higher degree of confidence in their abilities, and more social trust than did those in the control group.

該實驗的證據因2018年法律變更而變得混亂，法律限縮領取失業救濟金的條件。即使如此，結果也很有趣。全民基本所得最大的擔憂是，它可能會阻止領取者尋求有償工作。然而，收到無條件給付仍工作的人，實際上比領取救濟金的人更多。與對照組相比，實驗組的幸福感明顯更高；抑鬱和壓力水平較低，對自我能力的信心較高，並且對社會的信任度更高。

Transfer wise 聰明轉帳

The Finnish results are broadly consistent with findings from other experiments. Rebecca Hasdell, then of the Basic Income Lab at Stanford University, conducted a review of 16 basic-income studies published between 2009 and 2019 that covered rich and poor countries. The research provides consistent evidence of a positive effect on educational attainment and on measures of physical and mental health, and reduced poverty. Effects on labour-market participation are generally small; half of the studies that assess its impact do not find a statistically significant effect. Most of the rest find a positive effect, she writes.

芬蘭的結果與其他實驗的結果大致一致。當時史丹佛大學基本所得實驗室的哈斯德（Rebecca Hasdell）調查自2009年至2019年發表的涵蓋富國和窮國的16項基本所得研究，提供了一致的證據，表明對受教育程度、身心健康指標以及減少貧窮有積極影響。對勞動市場參與的影響通常很小；半數評估其影響的研究中沒有發現統計學上的顯著效果。她寫道，其餘大多數都發現正面的影響。

Where participation does decline, though, it is often associated with an increase in caregiving, which could worsen gender inequality in the labour market. In low- and middle-income countries increased caregiving is often linked to lower workforce participation by women. In some studies, a basic income also seems to reduce participation by older workers.

但是，在參與率確實下降的地方，通常與居家照護增加有關，這可能惡化勞動市場的性別不平等。在低收入和中等收入國家，增加的居家照護往往與婦女參與勞動力減少有關。在一些研究中，基本所得似乎也減少老年勞工的參與率。

In some cases the beneficial effects of UBI seem to have persisted through the pandemic. A team of economists that had begun a large-scale UBI experiment in Kenya before the outbreak of covid-19 was able to monitor its performance during the crisis. Recipients reported levels of well-being that were modestly but meaningfully higher than those of the control group. Effects on health outcomes were ambiguous. But people receiving payments were more likely to engage in risk-taking commercial activities: perhaps, the authors suggest, because of the insurance provided by the transfers. That suggests that even if basic incomes discourage some sorts of work, they may encourage other desirable activities, such as entrepreneurship.

在某些情況下，全民基本所得的益處似乎在疫情間持續存在。在新冠肺炎爆發前，經濟學家團隊在肯亞開始大規模全民基本所得的實驗，能夠監控危機期間的表現。報告顯示，領取者的幸福水平比對照組溫和但有意義地提高，對健康結果的影響則模棱兩可。但是領取給付者更有可能從事冒險的商業活動：研究人員指出，也許是因為補助提供保險。這顯示，即使基本所得不利於某些工作，它們也會鼓勵其他理想的活動，例如企業家精神。

Extrapolating from these findings is a fraught business. Studies of long-established systems with UBI-like features, such as Alaska’s Permanent Fund, which invests oil revenues and distributes dividends to the public, also indicate that the employment effects of a universal payment seem to be small (and may well be positive). But conclusions drawn from programmes that are limited in geographical or temporal scope may not fully capture the ways in which a large-scale, permanent UBI could affect society. Norms regarding work and leisure might adjust in ways that alter the response to payments—for good or ill.

從這些發現中推論是一項艱鉅的任務。對類似全民基本所得功能的長期系統的研究，例如阿拉斯加的永久基金，其投資石油收入並向公眾分發股息，同樣表明全民給付對就業的影響似乎很小（並且可能是積極的） 。但是，從地理或時間範圍有限的計劃所得出的結論，可能無法完全反映出大規模、永久性的全民基本所得可能影響社會的方式。關於工作和休閒的行為表現，可能會依給付不同而調整，無論是好是壞。

Behaviour could shift as more members of society receive generous income payments: perhaps because of a “social multiplier effect” which reflects the fact that some activities become more enjoyable as more people engage in them. That is, UBI recipients in, say, the Finnish experiment might have been more inclined to seek work because being in work is more attractive (and not being in work less so) when most people are employed—a dynamic that could potentially change were income payments to become universal.

隨著更多的社會成員收到豐厚的所得給付，行為可能會發生變化：也許是由於「社會乘數效應」，這反映一項事實，隨著更多人參與，某些活動變得更愉快。也就是說，例如，芬蘭實驗中領取全民基本所得者可能更傾向找工作，因為當大多數人就業，工作變得更有吸引力（而大多人不工作，則職場吸引力就降低），這種可能會潛在改變的動態，能使所得給付變得普遍。

Still, encouraging results from UBI trials are likely to encourage more experimentation. They may also provide support to other welfare policies that share features with a UBI without going the whole hog: such as universality; a relaxed approach to the question of work incentives; or a guaranteed income to some groups, as Mr Yang now proposes. That is because the most daunting obstacle to full-fledged UBI programmes remains: the little matter of funding. Mr Yang’s original proposal for a UBI, for instance, would have cost about 14% of GDP a year, though the price tag could be partly reduced by rationalisation of other welfare schemes. (For comparison, overall federal spending amounted to 21% of GDP in 2019.) Neither short-term UBI trials nor mass cash transfers in response to covid-19 required governments to take on the difficult task of financing enormous new expansions to the welfare state.

儘管如此，全民基本所得試驗的令人鼓舞的結果，可能會激勵更多的實驗，為類似全民基本所得功能的福利政策提供支持，而無需執行到底 ：像是通用性。對工作激勵問題採取寬鬆的方法；或像楊安澤現提議的那樣，為某些群體提供保證性所得。這也是因為，全面的全民基本所得計劃，面臨最艱鉅的障礙依然是資金問題。例如，楊安澤最初提出的全民基本所得，每年將花費GDP的14％左右，儘管透過其他福利計劃的重組可以降低部分價格。相比之下，2019年美國聯邦政府總支出占GDP的21％。）無論是針對短期全民基本所得試驗，還是針對新冠疫情的大規模現金補貼，都要求政府承擔艱鉅的任務，即為福利制度的大規模擴張提供資金。

Much of the aid provided to households over the past year has been financed with new government borrowing, up to and including Mr Biden’s proposals. As accommodating as markets have been of government borrowing over the past year, it seems unlikely that UBI dreams can be made real without the question of financing eventually being asked and answered.

去年向家庭提供的大部分援助，都是透過政府舉債籌資，包括拜登的計畫。去年市場滿足政府舉債的需求，在資金問題沒有最終答案的情況下，全民基本所得的夢想似乎不可能實現。

Reality cheque 現實的支票

Some politicians are beginning to grapple with the issue. Mr Lee reckons that a small UBI in South Korea could be paid for by adjusting the existing budget, but he allows that increasing the generosity of payments would require additional money. Taxes on land, carbon emissions and digital services are his preferred funding mechanisms. Mr Yang, for his part, argues that a combination of curbing spending inefficiencies and philanthropic donations can pay for his proposed cash transfers (which would cover only the poorest New Yorkers).

一些政治人物開始設法克服這個問題。李在明認為，韓國透過調整現有預算，可支付的小筆的全民基本所得，但他承認給付的慷慨度增加需要額外的資金。土地稅、排碳稅和數位服務稅是他偏愛的籌資機制。楊安澤則主張，遏制無效率的支出和慈善捐款的結合，可以給付他提議的現金補貼，這將只覆蓋最貧困的紐約市民。

But where the great welfare-state expansions of the mid-20th century were enabled by a spirit of solidarity and self-sacrifice, forged in depression and war, which made tax-financing of new benefits politically possible, the new enthusiasm for cash transfers owes more to a broad-based relaxation in concern about government borrowing. As the pandemic ends, that relaxed attitude may change as well, among some segments of the political spectrum at least. Only then will we learn how far along the path to a UBI the pandemic has actually moved society.

但是，如果在蕭條和戰爭中形成團結和自我犧牲精神，能使20世紀中葉巨大的福利制度擴張，這使新福祉的稅收籌資在政治上成為可能，那麼新的現金補助熱情，就應更廣泛地舒緩政府舉債的擔憂。隨著疫情的結束，這種放鬆態度也可能發生變化，至少在某些政治領域是如此。只有到那時，我們才能了解疫情在通向全民基本所得的道路上，實際上走了多遠。