不死不活的企業--該怎麼處理殭屍企業

 

The corporate undead 不死不活的企業

What to do about zombie firms

該怎麼處理殭屍企業

Without care, measures taken during the pandemic will keep alive firms that ought to be put out of their misery

若不謹慎，疫病流行期間採取的措施，將使本該安樂死的企業苟延殘喘

Leaders

Sep 26th 2020 edition

Sep 26th 2020

For years economists have argued about whether governments and central banks in the rich world have mistakenly prolonged the lives of “zombie firms”. The corporate landscape, it is said, has turned from one filled with red-blooded creatures of creative destruction to a grey zone of the living dead, incapable of innovation or dynamism. Now the debate has new importance. The pandemic could lead governments to prolong the life of many undeserving firms. Keeping the growth of the undead in check will be vital to the long-term economic recovery.

多年來，經濟學家爭辯，富國政府和央行是否做錯了，讓「殭屍企業」得以延續生命。據說，企業界從原本充滿熱血沸騰的破壞式創新生物，變成活死人出沒的灰色地帶，既無法創新也沒有活力。這個辯論如今有新的重要性。疫情可能導致政府讓許多不值得救的公司延續生命。抑制這些不死族的成長，對長期經濟復甦至關重要。

Marginally profitable firms were central to Japan’s “lost decade” in the 1990s, when banks, unwilling to recognise losses, kept credit flowing to otherwise insolvent borrowers. Zombie-infested industries suffered from inert labour markets and lower productivity growth. Since then, the rich world as a whole has begun to look more zombified. In advanced economies the share of listed firms with low market capitalisations given their book value, and whose profits are insufficient to cover their interest payments, grew from around 4% in the mid-1980s to 15% in 2017, according to the Bank for International Settlements. The oecd reckons Italian and Spanish productivity levels would be over 1% higher were it not for the growth of zombie firms, which are alleged to have crowded out would-be rivals.

獲利微乎其微的公司，是日本1​​990年代陷入「失落的十年」的核心因素，當時銀行不願承認損失，持續授信給若沒貸款就無力償債的借款人。殭屍橫行的產業，飽受勞動市場遲滯和生產力低落所苦。從那時起，整個富裕世界開始顯得死氣沉沉。根據國際清算銀行的數據，在先進經濟體，因帳面價值低市值也低，且獲利不夠繳利息的上市公司占比，從1980年代中期約4％升至2017年的15％。OECD估計，若不是因為殭屍企業增加了，排擠掉潛在的競爭對手，義大利和西班牙的生產率水準本可提高1％以上。

The evidence for zombification in the 2010s is incomplete: the world economy displayed few signs of capital or labour shortages, which you might expect to see more of if zombies were hoarding resources. Many firms were marginally profitable because aggregate spending was weak. Yet the pandemic is creating a greater risk of extra zombification. Governments have intervened in the economy on an enormous scale in order to keep firms alive. A combination of furlough schemes to reduce wage bills, state-backed loans to provide liquidity and laws or other measures to stop bankruptcies has prevented a wave of company failures. The danger is that, as economies emerge from the pandemic with new wants and needs, some firms that should be allowed to fail are instead kept going.

2010年代的殭屍化證據並不完整：世界經濟幾乎未顯露［few:少到幾乎沒有］資本或勞力短缺跡象，假如殭屍企業囤積資源，應會見到更多這種跡象。許多公司獲利微薄，是因為總支出疲軟。然而，現在疫病流行，造成更大的額外殭屍化風險。政府為使企業生存下去，大規模干預經濟。降低工資支出的無薪假機制、提供流動性的國家擔保貸款，以及阻止破產的法律或其他措施並行，已防止了一波公司倒閉潮。這麼做的危險在於，隨著經濟擺脫疫情，新的需求興起，一些應倒閉的公司反而繼續營運。

The march of the undead can be kept in check. Governments should support workers not jobs, and intervene more surgically. Furlough schemes keep workers tied to companies; it would be better to offer generous unemployment benefits. State-backed loans should not be rolled over indefinitely, but instead be subject to gradually increasing interest rates, encouraging borrowers to rely on private finance. If governments truly believe that the disruption to the hospitality industry will be only temporary, then their support would be justified. But because the industry will never recoup the income that it has lost during the pandemic, it will need grants, not loans—a shift that would help concentrate politicians’ minds.

殭屍橫行可被遏制。政府應支持勞工而非工作，干預行動要如手術般精確。無薪假機制使勞工與公司密不可分；更好的做法，是提供慷慨的失業救濟金。政府擔保的貸款不應無限期展延，而要受制於逐步提高的利率，以鼓勵借款人倚靠民間融資。如果政府真的相信餐旅業受到的打擊只是暫時的，提供支持就合情合理；但因餐旅業在疫情期間流失的營收一去不復返，這行業需要的是補助款，而不是貸款—調整做法，將有助政治人物聚精會神。

Another priority is to avoid a banking crisis. Lenders with stretched balance-sheets have an incentive to keep funding their existing customers, masking past lending mistakes with yet more loans. In the short term this avoids recognising losses, in the long term they are funnelling capital to firms which squander it. Regulators must be alive to the risk of these zombie assembly lines. Banks should be kept as strong as possible during the pandemic, to reduce their incentive to conceal losses. That is a reason to limit their ability to pay dividends.

另一個優先要務是避免銀行業危機。資產負債表過度擴張的放款者，有動機繼續融資給現有客戶，以更多的貸款掩蓋過去的放款錯誤。短期而言，這麼做可避免認列損失；長遠來看，資本卻一點一滴流入浪費資金的公司。監管機構必須意識到這些殭屍生產線的風險。疫情期間應盡可能讓銀行保持強健，減少他們隱瞞損失的動機。限制銀行配發股息的理由即在此。

Last, ensure that firms can fail quickly and efficiently so that they can either be recapitalised or their assets and staff redeployed. Bankruptcy courts must be able to revive firms with reasonable prospects, or liquidate assets that can find new productive uses in other hands. Making the process faster and clearer will reduce the incentive of creditors to seek scorched-earth liquidations, especially for small businesses. Suspending bankruptcies for long periods, as Australia and Germany have done, is to deny reality. America, with its unsentimental approach to resolving ailing firms, sets a much better example.

最後，確保公司能夠快速、有效地退場，以利重組資本或重新部署資產和員工。破產法院必須能夠重振前景尚可的公司；或清算資產，以便易主後能找到更有生產力的新用途。使流程加快、更明確，將降低債權人尋求「焦土式」清算的動機，對小企業尤然。長期擱置破產案，例如澳洲和德國的做法，是拒絕接受現實。美國以不帶感情的方式處理財務陷困境的公司，樹立更好的範例。

All-but-indiscriminate aid to support firms and workers was a necessary feature of this year’s economic rescues, which took place amid widespread lockdowns of the economy. However, aid has become a threat to dynamism. As economies recover, the market should be allowed to play its proper role of determining winners and losers.■

在普遍的經濟封鎖下，對企業和勞工［叮嚀：worker通常譯成「勞工」，包括白領和藍領；「工人」通常指靠體力做粗活的藍領］幾乎無差別的資助，是今年經濟紓困的必要特色。但是，援助已變得威脅成長動能。隨著經濟復甦，應允許市場扮演固有的角色：決定贏家及輸家。