自由但受夠了--儘管民主，突尼西亞人依然暴動

 

Free but fed up 自由但受夠了

Despite democracy, Tunisians riot

儘管民主，突尼西亞人依然暴動

Ten years after the Arab spring, jobs are still scarce

阿拉伯之春之後十年，工作仍然稀少

BY DAY THE streets are quiet, the cafés full of unemployed men. At night, though, groups of young people have fought running battles with police during a week of protests and riots in several Tunisian cities that started on January 15th. Local media portray them as looters and vandals; more than 600 have been arrested, and the army has been deployed to restore order. But other Tunisians are more sympathetic. In Ettadhamen, a working-class suburb of the capital, Tunis, residents decry the joblessness and despair that periodically cause eruptions of anger. “They always want to depict protesters as troublemakers,” says 37-year-old Ahmed (who declined to give his full name). “They never want to say they’re protesting over living conditions.”

白天街道很安靜，咖啡館充滿著失業的男人。但到了晚上，一群年輕人與警察爭執不下。自1月15日這一周來，突尼西亞多個城區爆發示威和騷亂，當地媒體將他們刻畫成為強盜和暴民，超過600人被逮補，軍隊進駐以恢復秩序。但是其他突尼西亞人更贊同抗議民眾。在首都突尼斯市郊的埃塔哈默（Ettadhamen）住著工人階級，居民譴責失業和絕望情緒，導致憤怒周期性地爆發。 「他們總是想將抗議者描繪成麻煩製造者」37歲的艾哈邁德（他拒絕提供全名）說， 「他們永遠不想說，他們是為生活條件而抗議。」

This month’s unrest began almost ten years to the day after Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, Tunisia’s dictator from 1987 to 2011, stepped down amid a popular uprising. Since then Tunisia has become a democracy, with fair elections and political freedoms. In economic terms, though, it has been a disappointing decade. Annual growth averaged just 1.8% from 2011 to 2019. Last year the economy shrank by between 7% and 9% as covid-19 forced long lockdowns and clobbered the vital tourism sector. Unemployment is stubbornly high at 16% overall, and 36% for young people. The Tunisian dinar has lost 47% of its value.

本月的動盪幾乎從十年前，突尼西亞1987至2011年獨裁統治者本阿里（Zine El Abidine Ben Ali）在人民起義後下台，就展開至今。從那時起，突尼西亞成為民主國家，擁有公正的選舉和政治自由。但從經濟角度來看，這是令人失望的十年。從2011年到2019年平均成長率僅1.8％。由於新冠疫情迫使長期封鎖並打擊重要的旅遊業，去年經濟萎縮7％至9％。失業率居高不下，總體為16％，年輕人為36％。突尼西亞貨幣第納爾貶值47％。

Successive governments—there have been nine prime ministers since the revolution—have seemed powerless to jump-start the economy. In part that reflects the messy nature of politics in a fragile democracy. Long-running disputes between Islamist and secularist factions make it hard to get much done. Powerful labour unions fought efforts to trim a bloated public sector. And, in contrast to decades past, public opinion now matters. In 2018 a string of tax increases sparked a week of protests, some violent. “The people want the fall of the regime,” chant some of the protesters today, echoing calls made ten years ago.

繼任政府自革命後歷經九位總理，似乎皆無能為力推動經濟發展。部分反映脆弱民主政治的混亂本質。伊斯蘭教派與世俗派系間的長期爭執，使得許多事情很難完成。強大的工會抵抗裁減浮腫公共部門的努力。且與過去的幾十年相比，現在輿論很重要。2018年一連串的增稅引發為期一周的抗議活動，有些是暴力的。如今某些抗議者反覆唸誦「人民希望政權垮台」，回響著十年前呼聲。

Small in size, bordered by war-torn Libya and stagnant Algeria, Tunisia has struggled to find avenues for growth. The cash-strapped government cannot afford much spending on development or welfare. Public debt has soared from 43% of GDP in 2011 to a projected 89% this year. The IMF estimates that Tunisia budgeted just 1.8% of GDP to support individuals and firms during the pandemic (the global average is 5.9%). To cover a widening deficit, the government may have to seek another loan from the IMF, which could necessitate painful austerity measures. It received a $745m loan from the IMF in April to deal with the pandemic, but that has run out.

突尼西亞的國土面積小，毗鄰飽經戰亂的利比亞和經濟停滯不前的阿爾及利亞，但突尼西亞一直拚命尋找成長的途徑。資金拮据的政府負擔不起發展或福利的大量支出。公共債務已從2011年占GDP的43％，激增至今年預估的89％。國際貨幣基金組織（IMF）估計，突尼西亞在疫情期間僅將GDP的1.8％用於扶持個人和公司（全球平均水平為5.9％）。 為彌補不斷擴大的赤字缺口，政府可能不得不向IMF尋求另一筆貸款，這可能需要採取痛苦的撙節措施。它在4月從IMF獲得7.45億美元貸款來應付疫情，但是已經用光。

Some young people see no choice but to leave. The country’s economic malaise has fuelled a rise in risky forms of emigration. Last year 12,776 Tunisians crossed the Mediterranean to Europe, up from 3,900 in 2019. They made up the largest single group of migrants crossing the sea, about 20% of the total. For many, the hopes of ten years ago have given way to a depressing present: proud they may be of their country’s political progress, but pride alone is not enough to persuade them to stay at home. ■

有些年輕人別無選擇地離開。突尼西亞的經濟萎靡不振，為鋌而走險移民增加火上澆油。突尼西亞人橫渡地中海到歐洲，從2019年3,900名增至去年的12,776名。他們構成最大的一群跨海移民，約占總數20％。對許多人來說，十年前的希望已被當下的沮喪取代：他們可能為自己國家的政治進步感到自豪，但單憑自豪還不足以說服他們留在家鄉。 ■