動議駁回--藉冗長演說癱瘓議事是件怪事，並危害美國民主

 

Motion to dismiss 動議駁回

The filibuster is an oddity that harms American democracy 藉冗長演說癱瘓議事是件怪事，並危害美國民主

And it does not even stem from the constitution

而且它甚至不起源於憲法

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Mar 13th 2021

In the aftermath of a mass shooting at a primary school in Newtown, Connecticut, in 2012, two senators introduced a modest measure to require background checks on all gun sales. Out of 100 senators, 54 voted to move ahead with it. In almost every parliament in the world, such a majority would be enough to ensure passage. In the Senate it meant defeat.

康乃狄克州紐敦的一所小學在2012年發生大規模槍擊案後，兩名參議員提出了一項溫和措施，要求在所有的槍枝銷售時調查背景。在100位參議員中，54位投票贊成通過法案。在世界上幾乎所有的議會中，這樣的多數就足以確保通過。但在參議院，這意味著失敗。

The men who framed America’s constitution intended the Senate as a bulwark against the tyranny of the majority. Its present-day failure to pass bills supported by a majority of its members, though, was never any part of that original design. It is the result of what seems to have been a genuine error: a lack of fixed procedures for shutting down debate. That absence allowed minorities in the chamber to use various manoeuvres, most famously the filibuster, to block legislation a majority wishes to pass. Once onerous and used sparingly, subsequent changes to the rules have allowed these ruses to become routine, cost-free and all but ubiquitous. This has turned the Senate into the only legislative body in the world which requires a supermajority for ordinary business.

美國憲法制定者故意將參議院做為反對多數暴政的堡壘，它現今未能通過多數參議員支持的法案，即使這從來都不是原始設計的一部分，這個結果似乎是真正的錯誤：缺乏停止辯論的固定程序。這個缺陷使參院的少數黨可以採取各種人為操縱，最著名的就是冗長演說，用來阻撓多數黨希望通過的立法。這方法曾經繁瑣且很少使用，但隨後規則發生改變，使此策略變得常規化、無成本且幾乎無所不在。這使參議院成為世界上唯一對普通事務仍需要絕對多數決的立法機構。

The ability to filibuster could be abolished by a simple majority vote. But neither party has chosen this route. Instead, as the filibuster has become more routine, frustrated majorities have carved out various exceptions. Now that Democrats find that their unified control of Washington is insufficient for enacting the sweeping agenda of the Biden administration, further exceptions seem possible. But some requirements for supermajorities seem certain to stay.

簡單多數決可以廢除冗長演說阻撓議事的能力，但是沒有一黨選擇此路。取而代之的是，藉冗長演說阻撓議事變得愈來愈常態，沮喪的多數黨已排除各種例外。民主黨發現，他們在華盛頓的完全執政不足為拜登政府制定決定性的議程，似乎有可能有更多的例外。但是，對絕對多數決的一些要求看來肯定會延續。

The room where it doesn’t happen 不會出現的機會

Few have put the case against supermajorities better than Alexander Hamilton, one of the framers of America’s constitution, who brought to the issue the impassioned frustration of one who had seen them in action. Reflecting on the way they had been used in the Congress created by the Articles of Confederation, he wrote in the Federalist Papers that “What at first sight may seem a remedy, is, in reality, a poison.” Rather than protecting minorities, as its supporters claimed, “its real operation is to embarrass the administration, to destroy the energy of the government, and to substitute the pleasure, caprice, or artifices of an insignificant, turbulent, or corrupt junto, to the regular deliberations and decisions of a respectable majority.”

很少有人比美國憲法制定者漢彌爾頓（Alexander Hamilton）提出反對絕對多數決更好的論據，他提出激昂且接近行動的挫折引發討論。他在《聯邦論》寫到「乍看下是補救的措施，實際上是種毒藥」，反映對《邦聯條例》在國會被使用的方式的評價。比起支持者聲稱的「保護少數派」，其真正的舉動是使內閣尷尬，破壞政府的力量，並以輕挑的歡樂、反覆無常動盪或狡猾的腐敗群體，取代常態地縝密並尊重多數的決定。

He and his fellow framers saw the case for supermajorities in circumstances of great consequence—the constitution requires them for convicting impeached officials, overriding presidential vetoes, ratifying treaties and enacting constitutional amendments. They could have also written them in for other matters. They did not.

他和其他憲法制定者認為，在具有重大後果的情況下，絕對多數決是有理由的--憲法要求他們對彈劾的官員定罪、推翻總統否決權、批准條約並制定修憲。他們也可以寫在其他事項裡，他們沒有。

The filibuster was only rendered possible at all by a parliamentary housekeeping accident. In 1805 Aaron Burr (who, as a service to musical theatre, had killed Hamilton in a duel the previous year) recommended removing from the Senate rulebook the motion used to force the end of debates: it was thought redundant. It was only a few decades later that John C. Calhoun, a senator for South Carolina, realised that the absence of such a rule meant that debate could defer a vote indefinitely. After the civil war, organised filibusters—the term, an anglicisation of the Dutch vrijbuiter, meaning mercenary or privateer, denotes the way in which the tactic overthrows the normal order—became a recognised tactic. But they were used only for matters of great importance.

議事阻撓者僅是議會內部程序可能的意外。 1805年，伯爾（就像音樂劇所演的，他在前一年的決鬥中殺死漢彌爾頓）建議從參議院規則中刪去強制結束辯論的動議：這被認為是多餘的。僅僅幾十年後，南卡羅來納州參議員卡爾霍恩意識到，缺乏這類規則，意味著辯論可能會無限期推遲投票。內戰之後，有組織的議事阻撓者（此術語是荷蘭語英譯，意思是僱傭軍或武裝民船）表示這種推翻正常議程的方式，成為公認的策略。但是它們僅用於非常重要的事務。

Those 19th-century filibusters could run indefinitely. In 1917 the Senate created a way to cut them short: a “cloture” vote requiring a two-thirds majority (in 1975 this was reduced to three-fifths, which is 60 votes in today’s Senate). But a minority could still hold business hostage. And if it had enough votes to defeat a cloture motion it could block legislation.

那些19世紀的反對派可以無限期地阻撓議事。 1917年，參院創造一種方法縮短期限：終止討論需要「三分之二」的多數票（1975年將票數減至五分之三，在今日的參院為60票）。但是少數派仍然可以劫持重要事務。而且如果票數足以擊敗終止動議，將可能會阻礙立法。

The minority these rules ended up protecting was that of segregationists in the Senate. Their protection was achieved at the expense of the African-American minority in the country at large. From the end of the civil war to 1964 practically the only bills actually defeated by the filibuster were civil-rights legislation opposed by Southern Dixiecrats.

這些規則最終保護的少數派是參院的種族隔離主義者，對他們的保護以損害所有美國全體非裔少數族群為代價。從內戰結束到1964年，實際唯一遭到反對派阻撓的法案是遭南方民主黨人反對的民權法案立法。

The filibuster has changed since then. The “two-track system” created in 1970 allows the majority leader to consider more than one piece of legislation at a time. This has stopped filibusters from derailing all business, but has also reduced the public cost paid for using the device. Now the threat of a filibuster (known as a “hold”) chills the progress of any bill that seems unlikely to muster the 60 votes needed for a cloture vote. Such threats are now quotidian. “You can make it more difficult to pass a bill than it has ever been before. And you can do so with near total anonymity,” says Adam Jentleson, whose time as deputy chief of staff to Harry Reid, the Senate Democrats’ leader through much of the 2000s and 2010s, led him to entitle his book on the filibuster “Kill Switch”.

議事阻撓者自那時起發生變化。 1970年建立的「雙軌制」使多數黨領袖能一次審議多件法案。這不但阻止議事阻撓者使所有事務脫軌，也減少使用此策略時人民所支付成本。現在，議事阻撓者的威脅（或被稱為「僵持」）使任何總票數不太可能達60票以終止討論的法案進展心灰意冷。現在，這種威脅司空見慣，「你可能比以往任何時候都更難以通過法案。而且，你幾乎可以完全匿名地阻撓議事。」詹特森說，他在2000年代和2010年代大部分時間擔任參議院民主黨領袖瑞德的副手，使他將自己的著作命名為議事阻撓者的「緊急停止開關」。

Checks in a chequered history 查看盛衰多變的歷史

The recent increase in filibustering has been a bipartisan achievement. Both parties, when in the minority, have driven it forward—a ratcheting-up which both parties, when in the majority, have decried. During the presidency of George W. Bush, Mr Reid’s Democrats started to use the filibuster routinely to block nominations for cabinet secretaries and federal judges. A frustrated Mitch McConnell, then the Republicans’ majority whip, openly mulled changing the rules to allow simple majority votes: “What Senate Republicans are simply trying to do is get us back to the procedure that operated quite nicely for 214 years.” But Republican senators under Mr McConnell’s leadership took up the baton with gusto during Barack Obama’s presidency—and Democrats under Mr Reid and his successor, Chuck Schumer, outdid them during the tenure of Donald Trump.

近來頻繁的議事阻撓是兩黨的成就。兩黨在成為少數派時，都推動小幅推動進展—然後在成為多數派時譴責。在小布希總統任期時，瑞德的民主黨人開始常態地使用冗長演說來阻止內閣和聯邦法官的提名。時任多數派共和黨黨鞭麥康奈爾感到沮喪，公開考慮規則修改為採取簡單多數決：「參議院共和黨人單純想做的，就是讓我們回到順利運作214年的議程。「但是，在歐巴馬總統任期時，麥康奈爾興致勃勃地領導共和黨參議員傳接力棒。然後瑞德和他的繼任者舒默所領導下的民主黨，在川普任期內有過之而無不及。

Senators seeking to justify the filibuster say that it is an incentive for bipartisanship in matters of substance. There may have been some merit to that argument when the parties had real ideological overlap, with a smattering of East Coast Republicans further to the left than some Southern Democrats. Those days are gone. The median Republican senator has moved a long way to the right (see chart 2), creating a polarised legislature well suited to a political landscape where animosity towards the other side trumps everything else.

試圖證明議事阻撓正當性的參議員說，這是一種誘因，在最重要問題促進兩黨合作。這種說法可能有某些價值，當政黨之間存在真正的意識形態重疊時，少數東岸的共和黨人比一些南方民主黨人更偏左，但時過境遷。中間派共和黨參議員大大地向右偏移，建立了一個兩極化的立法機構，非常適合政治格局，對另一方的敵意勝過一切。

What is more, control of the Senate now swings back and forth. Between 1933 and 1979, the Senate was led by Democrats for all but four years. Since 2000 it has changed hands five times. Put together these changes create “less incentive to share hands and jump over the cliff together” says Sarah Binder, a professor at George Washington University. The rewards for stymieing the majority in the hopes of retaking the gavel in the next election cycle look (rationally) enticing. In these circumstances the filibuster operates as a convenient tool of partisan struggles, not as a helpful stimulus towards dealmaking. The Senate certainly does not seem much more genial and conciliatory than the current House of Representatives, which has no such parliamentary faff.

更重要的是，參院的控制權現在來回擺動。在1933年到1979年間，參院一直由民主黨人領導。自2000年以來，它的控制權轉移五次。喬治華盛頓大學教授賓德說，綜合這些變化創造出「降低人們牽手跳越過懸崖的動力」。為了在下一輪選舉中重掌大權，而阻礙多數黨的利益，其回報(理性上)看起來誘人。在這種情況下，執行議事阻撓是黨派鬥爭的便利工具，而不是對達成共識的有益誘因。參議院顯然沒有比現在的眾議院看起來更友好與和諧，但後者不用費勁地在議會裡講廢話。

As the filibuster has risen in use, so have threats to change the rules and impose simple majority votes (called “the nuclear option” in the overheated parlance of the day). In 2013 Mr Reid, then majority leader, launched a limited nuclear strike, eliminating the filibuster on presidential nominations other than those for the Supreme Court. Mr McConnell lamented this “power grab” as a “sad day in the history of the Senate”. But in 2017 the nukes flew again as Mr McConnell got rid of the filibuster for Supreme Court confirmations.

隨著議事阻撓使用增加，威脅要改變規則並強制實行簡單多數決（在當今熱門用語被稱為「核選項」）。 2013年，時任多數黨領袖瑞德發起了一次有限度的核攻擊，消除除大法官提名之外總統提名的議事阻撓障礙。麥康奈爾對這一「權力奪取」悲痛為「參議院史上的悲傷日」。但是在2017年核武器再次飛起來，作為麥康奈爾擺脫對大法官任命確認的議事阻撓。

Why did he not go further? One reason is that in the 1970s the Senate created a limited exception to the filibuster: reconciliation, which allows a bill to pass the Senate if its provisions are aimed at changing spending and taxes. This means that tax cuts, like the appointment of conservative judges, are rendered filibuster-proof. If he could provide both those things Mr McConnell was content to do little else; his forbearance reflected shrewdness more than deference to senatorial norms.

他為什麼不做更多？原因之一是在1970年代，參院創建議事阻撓的有限例外：和解程序，如果此條款旨在改變支出和稅收，那麼就可以允許法案通過參院。這意味著減稅就像任命保守派法官一樣，可以防止議事阻撓。如果這兩件事他都能做到，麥康奈爾就不願再做別的事。他的寬容反映出精明，而不是服從參議員的規範。

The status quo is less pleasing to Democrats. Their plans for dramatic climate action and curtailing income inequality fit poorly with reconciliation, if at all. They are also well aware that the nature of the Senate makes Republican filibusters doubly minoritarian because the states they represent tend to be less populated. The 41 Republican senators needed to defeat a cloture motion could, in principle, represent just 23% of the population.

這種現狀使民主黨人不太高興。他們極端氣候行動和縮減所得不平等的計畫與和解相去甚遠，如果可能發生的話。他們也很清楚參議院的本質，由於共和黨在參院所代表的州往往人口數較少，因此使共和黨議事阻撓的少數派為雙倍。原則上，需要41名共和黨參議員落空才能終止討論，但他們只代表總人口的23％。

The process of shoehorning President Joe Biden's covid-19 relief bill through the reconciliation process (which forced the shedding of a long-sought increase to the federal minimum wage) underscores this painful state of affairs for progressives. The stillborn bill to reform the immigration system and create a pathway to citizenship for illegal immigrants, introduced at the insistence of the Biden administration, will be another expedition doomed to a dead end.

總統拜登的新冠紓困法案藉由和解程序強行過關，這也迫使取消長期尋求增加聯邦最低工資條款，突顯出進步派議員痛苦的狀況。在拜登政府的堅持下提出的改革移民制度，為非法移民創造公民身份途徑的法案腹死胎中，將是注定失敗的另一次遠征。

This has produced new enthusiasm for going fully nuclear. When Mr McConnell, now in the minority again, recently tried to force Mr Schumer to guarantee that the filibuster would not be tampered with, Mr Schumer demurred. Mr Biden—in the past very much a traditionalist on Senate procedure—has not flatly ruled out abolition. But in practice it seems off the table. Two moderate Democrats, Joe Manchin of West Virginia and Kyrsten Sinema of Arizona, have expressed their resistance to outright abolition in no uncertain terms. Pressed on the possibility by a reporter, Mr Manchin snapped back “Jesus Christ, what don’t you understand about ‘never’?”

這激發對全面發展核武器的熱情。當麥康奈爾（現又成為少數派）最近試圖迫使舒默保證議事阻撓不會被削弱時，舒默表示反對。拜登過去曾是參院程序的傳統派，但他並沒有斷然地排除廢除議事阻撓。實際上，這似乎是不可能的。兩名溫和派民主黨人--西維吉尼亞州的曼欽和亞利桑那州的希尼瑪--對徹底廢除表達反對。迫於記者對可能性逼問，曼欽回嗆：「天阿，你對『絕不』一無所知嗎？」

This leaves only the option of a further carve-out. The likeliest immediate crisis point will be a new voting-rights bill with which Democrats hope to head off Republicans’ efforts to amend state election laws. Because voting rights have little budgetary effect, the measure could not pass using reconciliation. The hope of reformers is to force a carve-out for certain genres of critical legislation (beginning with civil and voting rights) and try to expand its remit over time.

進一步開創是唯一留下的選項。眼前最可能的危機點將是一項新的投票權法案，民主黨希望藉此阻擋共和黨人修改州選舉法的努力。由於投票權的不影響預算，因此該條款無法利用和解程序通過。改革者的希望是強制開創某些類型的關鍵立法（從公民權和投票權開始），並嘗試隨著時間的推移擴大適用範圍。

Other reforms could temper the filibuster where it still applies—and might meet with Mr Manchin’s approval. Dr Binder suggests lowering the threshold for cloture from 60 votes to, say, 57, then 54, and, finally, 51 as the debate on a bill goes on. Norm Ornstein, a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, suggests requiring the minority to provide 41 votes to continue debate (rather than requiring the majority to find 60) and insisting that the debate-seekers actually hold the floor of the Senate and debate the measure they object to.

其他改革也能削弱議事阻撓仍適用的地方，並且可能會得到曼欽的同意。隨著關於法案的辯論進行，賓德博士建議將終止辯論的門檻從60票降低到57票，然後是54票，最後是51票。美國企業研究院學者奧恩斯坦建議，要求少數黨湊滿41票才能繼續辯論，而不是要求多數黨找到60票，並堅持尋求辯論的人實際上在參院擁有發言權，並對他們反對的措施進行辯論

There is little doubt that in either case the minority, whichsoever party it might be, would seek to maximise whatever possibilities for obstruction remained. And hopes that more debate would be better debate should be tempered: the Senate will never be the “world’s greatest deliberative body”, as is sometimes grandiloquently claimed. But steps towards simple majority rule would bring it more into line with the rest of the democratic world—and the vision of the framers.

毫無疑問，無論是哪一黨，少數派都將尋求維持阻礙的可能性最大化，並希望更多辯論優於應被緩和的辯論：參議院將永遠不會是「世上最慎重的機構」，如同其有時大言不慚的聲稱。但是，邁向簡單多數決，將使其接軌其他民主世界，以及制憲者的願景更加吻合。