The second cold war 第二次冷戰
The China strategy America needs
美國所需的中國策略
President Joe Biden should aim to strike a grand bargain with America’s democratic allies
總統拜登的目標應是與美國的民主盟友敲定大協議
The achievement of the Trump administration was to recognise the authoritarian threat from China. The task of the Biden administration will be to work out what to do about it. Donald Trump’s instinct was for America to run this fight single-handed. Old allies were henchmen, not partners. As Joe Biden prepares his China strategy, he should choose a different path. America needs to strike a grand bargain with like-minded countries to pool their efforts. The obstacles to such a new alliance are great, but the benefits would be greater.
川普政府的成就在於承認中國專制主義的威脅，拜登政府的任務是找出該怎麼解決。川普的本能是美國獨自奮戰，老盟友是跟班，不是夥伴。在拜登準備他的中國策略時，他應該選擇一條不同的道路。美國需要與想法相近的國家敲定大協議，共同努力。建立這樣一個新聯盟的障礙很大，但效益更大。
To see why, consider how the cold war against China is different from the first one. The rivalry with the Soviet Union was focused on ideology and nuclear weapons. The new battlefield today is information technology: semiconductors, data, 5G mobile networks, internet standards, artificial intelligence (AI) and quantum computing. All those things will help determine whether America or China has not just the military edge, but also the more dynamic economy. They could even give one of the rivals an advantage in scientific research.
要了解原因，思考一下對中國冷戰與第一次冷戰有何不同。與蘇聯的競爭集中在意識形態和核武器上。如今的新戰場是資訊科技：半導體、數據、5G行動網絡，網際網路標準、人工智慧（AI）和量子計算。這將有助於確定美中是否不僅擁有軍事優勢，還擁有更具活力的經濟。他們甚至可使對手在科學研究占有優勢。
The first cold war created separate looking-glass worlds. The protagonists in the second are interconnected. That is partly a result of China’s integration into the global economy, especially after it joined the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001. But it also stems from the network efficiencies of many tech businesses, which reward size and spread. And it reflects how hard it is for any one country to master the full range of specialisms in the tech economy. In chips, say, American or British designs may be made in Taiwanese plants, using Japanese and Dutch equipment with German lenses before being assembled in Chinese factories. It is no accident that autarkic North Korea can build nukes but not advanced computers.
第一次冷戰創造分裂的鏡像世界，第二次冷戰的主角們則彼此息息相關。部分原因是由於中國融入全球經濟，特別在2001年加入世界貿易組織後。但這也源自許多科技企業的網路效率，網路效率犒賞具規模和影響力者。這反映任何一個國家要掌握高科技經濟的全部專業知識有多困難。以半導體晶圓來說，美國或英國的設計可能在台灣製造時，使用日本和荷蘭的設備加上德國鏡片，然後在中國組裝。自給自足的北韓可製造核武器，但不能製造先進電腦，絕非偶然。
The Chinese Communist Party has understood that tech is the path to power. China is blessed with a vast market, ambition and plenty of hard-working talent. The party is supercharging the efforts of Chinese firms with subsidies and industrial espionage. Aware of how scale matters, China is touting its technologies by securing export contracts, promoting itself as a digital power using the Belt and Road Initiative and waging a campaign of pro-China standards-setting in global bodies. Mr Trump’s abrasive solo response has had some successes. He has browbeaten some allies to stop buying gear for 5G networks from Huawei, a Chinese firm. And by threatening sanctions on chipmakers who supply Huawei, he has damaged it.
中共了解科技是通往力量之路。中國得天獨厚於廣大的市場、雄心勃勃且勤奮的人才。共產黨透過補貼和產業間諜，努力壯大中國企業。中國意識到規模的重要性，藉由獲取出口合約兜售自家技術，利用「一帶一路」宣揚自己是數位強國，並在全球組織發起親中的標準制定運動。川普猛烈的單方反擊取得一些成功。他恐嚇盟友停止購買中國華為的5G網絡設備，威脅要制裁供應華為的晶片製造商，對中國造成破壞。
But in the long run this approach favours China. It has already accelerated China’s efforts to create its own world-class chip industry—though that could easily take a decade or more. More important, if a bullying America always focuses solely on its own narrow interests, it will drive away the very allies that can help it stay ahead in tech. Europe is increasingly unwilling to leave itself open to American pressure. The European Union’s highest court has twice restricted the transfer of data to America, where they may be picked over by the intelligence agencies. And European policymakers have announced plans to impose rules on the cloud, to impose digital taxes on American tech giants and to limit foreign takeovers—including, potentially, American ones.
但長遠來看，這種方法有利於中國。它加快中國致力建立自家的世界級晶片產業，儘管無疑要耗費十年甚至更長。更重要的是，如果霸道的美國總是只專注於自身狹隘的利益，將推開能助其在技術上保持領先的盟友。歐洲愈來愈不願意對美國施壓逆來順受。 歐盟最高法院已兩度限制數據傳輸至美方，唯恐傳到美國可能被情報機構擷取。歐洲政策制定者已宣布計劃嚴綁雲端規則，對美國科技巨頭開徵數位稅，並限制外國收購，包括潛在的美國收購者。
A grand bargain would turn that conflict with Europe into collaboration. Rather than be consumed by squabbles, the allies could share an approach to issues like taxation, takeover rules and supply chains. For example, Europe’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is on the way to becoming a de facto standard outside Europe. With closer collaboration in intelligence, the alliance could be more alert to security threats from Chinese hackers and tech firms. By co-ordinating their efforts on critical technologies, they could specialise rather than duplicate research. By diversifying supply chains and vetting each “tect themselves from accidental or malevolent disruptions. By working together on technical standards such as OpenRAN, which uses mostly off-the-shelf hardware for 5G networks, they can create a favourable environment for their own companies. Crucially, by collaborating on ethical norms over, say, facial recognition, they can protect their societies.
大協議可使與歐洲的衝突轉成合作。盟友間不但不會因爭吵而內耗，反而可分享解決稅收、併購規則、供應鏈等議題的辦法。例如，歐洲的一般資料保護規則（GDPR）正成為歐洲以外的實質標準。隨著情報上的緊密合作，聯盟可能會更加警惕來自中國駭客和科技公司的安全威脅。努力協調關鍵技術，他們可以專業分工取代重複研究。透過供應鏈多樣化和逐一審查，保護自己防禦意外或惡意破壞共同制定技術標準例如OpenRAN--主要將現成的硬體用於5G網絡，他們可以為自己公司創造良好的環境。重要的是，透過臉部辨識等道德規範合作，可以保護他們的社會。
Instead of leaving America isolated, a grand bargain would help it keep ahead in the race for tech dominance by bringing it the gains of closer co-operation with like-minded countries. The whole alliance would be boosted by the tech industry’s formidable network effects. A bargain would also leave America more open to cross-border scientific collaboration and immigration, vital for a place that thrives on the contributions of foreign students, many of whom stay on to carry out research or work in tech. Such openness is a strength that China lacks.
一個大協議不但不會使美國孤立，反而可助美國與想法相近的國家更緊密合作，進而在技術主導競賽中保持領先地位。科技業令人生畏的網路效應，將促進整個聯盟的發展。協議也將使美國對跨國科學合作和移民更加開放，許多外國學生繼續從事研究或進科技業工作，這對一個依靠外國學生的貢獻而繁榮的地區至關重要，這種開放是中國缺乏的力量。
Some people argue that co-operation of this sort needs a treaty, an institution like NATO or the WTO. But that would take a long time to set up. What it would possess in gravitas it would lack in flexibility. A grouping like an enlarged G7 would be more adaptable and less clumsy.
有人主張這類範疇的合作需要條約，像北約或世貿組織這樣的機構。但這將耗費很長時間來建立，雖具莊重感但缺乏靈活性。像擴大版G7之類的團體，適應力較強且不那麼笨拙。
Either way, striking a grand bargain will be hard. For one thing, America would need to acknowledge that it is not as dominant as it was when it set up global governance after the second world war. It would have to be willing to make concessions to its allies right now—over privacy, taxation and some details of industrial policy, say—in order to protect its system of government in the long term. For the strategy to be credible abroad, there would need to be bipartisan consensus in Washington.
無論哪種方式，要敲定大協議很困難。一方面，美國需承認，主導地位已不再像二戰後建立全球政府時一樣，現在必須願意就隱私、稅收和某些產業政策細節，對盟友做出讓步，來保護治理體系走得長久。為使策略在國外具有信譽，美國需要兩黨在國會達成共識。
America’s allies would have to make concessions, too. They would have to trust a country which, under Mr Trump, has sometimes looked on the transatlantic alliance with contempt. Some Europeans would have to temper their dream of becoming a superpower that stands apart from both China and America.
美國的盟友也必須讓步。他們將必須相信一個--在川普領導下--有時會輕視跨大西洋聯盟的國家。一些歐洲人將不得淡化他們的夢想--成為一個與中美分庭抗禮的強權。
Yet that European dream has always looked far-fetched. And if anything can overcome divisions in Washington, China can. Moreover, the sacrifices would be worth it. A grand bargain would help focus competition with China on tech, potentially enabling detente in areas where collaboration is essential, such as curbing global warming, health and, as with the Soviet Union, arms control. A grand bargain could make the world safer by making it more predictable. When superpowers are set on a collision course, that is something profoundly to be wished for. ■
但那個歐洲夢總是看似遙不可及。如果有什麼可以克服美國兩黨的分歧，那會是中國。而且，犧牲是值得的。大協議將有助於把美中競爭聚焦在科技，這可能在其他務必攜手合作的領域緩和對峙，諸如遏制全球暖化、健康，以及軍備控制，一如當年與蘇聯的談判。 大協議可使世界變得更可預測，因此變得更安全。在兩大超級強權眼看就要迎頭對撞時，這是令人寄予厚望的事。 ■
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